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PIRACY, SLAVERY, AND THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE GAP 
BETWEEN THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF JUS COGENS
Stephanie Elizabeth Smith 
Old Dominion University, 2013 
Director: Dr. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz
A gap currently exists between the sources of international law in the canon of jus 
cogens or peremptory norms. This gap is observed in the comparison of the rhetoric 
perpetuated by the community of international lawyers and the actions of states. It is 
especially apparent in the two oldest tenets of jus cogens, the prohibitions against piracy 
and slavery. The disconnect between rhetoric and reality exposes the limitations and the 
political nature of international law.
The gap is demonstrated by using peremptory norms as a crucial case in the 
international legal system because of its perceived status as the strongest and most robust 
set of norms. However, as demonstrated by the prohibitions against piracy and slavery, 
they fail to meet expectations. To understand the rhetoric of jus cogens, an examination 
of international legal textbooks is conducted to provide a window into the world view of 
the community of international lawyers. The other side of the gap is established by both 
the action and inaction of states concerning these norms. Implications arising from this 
gap affect the moral basis, purpose, stability, and strength of the international legal 
system.
The disconnect between the sources of international law gives rise to significant 
issues in international relations theory. In particular, the epistemic community of 
international lawyers is seen to have a constructed world view that has power over
agendas and policies. This is shown to be inaccurate based on the crucial case of the 
peremptory norms surrounding piracy and slavery. International law is considered to be 
the paragon of normative systems that significantly influence state behavior. However, 
this project has shown that the mere existence of strong norms within a particular 
epistemic community may not have extensive power to modify state behavior. Caution is 
called for when drawing the international legal system as an example of normative power 
in world politics.
This dissertation is dedicated to those who have inspired 
and to those who are hopefully inspired.
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The boat stealthily cut through the water and within moments the gunfire broke 
out upon the deck of the Fourseas.1 While the majority of the crew was locked in a room, 
the bridge officers maintained their positions. As the pirates work to retrieve valuables 
off the heavy cargo ship off the coast of Lagos, Nigeria, gunfire continued until both the 
ship’s captain and chief engineer were dead. In Pakistan, entire families of brick kiln 
workers live in slavery by making as many bricks as possible to get ahead of the debt that 
they incur from living at the brick kiln factory.2 It takes a family of five to make the 
minimum of 1,000 bricks needed to get compensation to pay for their debt to live at the 
brick kiln. These “employers” are willing to extend credit for any life event to tie the 
individuals tighter to their servitude. If they try to run away, they “are traced by the help 
of police and local politicians and all the money spent during this exercise is added to 
their debt.”3
When are these two events taking place? Many would guess that it is the 
eighteenth century or maybe even as recent as the late 1800s, but these events and similar 
ones occur daily with increasing frequency in the 21st Century. Both incidents are 
examples of activities that have long been prohibited under international law. These 
actions are violations of peremptory norms or jus cogens, which hold a special place in
1 The Associated Press, ’’Violence Against Shippers the New Norm O ff West Africa,” USA Today,
February 14, 2012 found at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-02-13/nigeria-pirate- 
attack/53070492/1 retrieved on November 1, 2012.




the international legal system. Why is this important and what are the implications of 
these illegal acts for the international legal system?
Peremptory norms are specialized and unique areas of international law. These 
norms, collectively referred to as jus cogens, are considered to be very potent. They hold 
a paramount place in the international legal system. Their perceived nature prohibits 
derogation from these norms and places apparent obligations upon states to act in support 
of these norms. Jus cogens are also viewed to have the ability to overcome issues of both 
sovereignty and jurisdiction. While the category of norms that have been designated jus  
cogens is broader than the prohibitions against piracy and slavery, these are the core of 
the group. These prohibitions are historically more well-established than other areas of 
jus cogens, such as the prohibition of genocide, and provide clear-cut evidence of their 
status as peremptory norms.
This research project looks at the status of peremptory norms as a window on the 
current state of the international legal system. To fully understand the condition of this 
area of the international system, this project will examine the differences between the law 
in theory and the actual behavior of international actors, specifically with regard to 
contemporary acts of piracy and slavery. These differences have far reaching 
implications in the big picture of the international legal system. Examining the 
inconsistencies between the sources of international law concerning jus cogens, 
specifically the norms prohibiting slavery and piracy will expose a noticeable gap 
between the rhetoric and the reality of peremptory norms. An understanding of 
international law is vital to understanding the international system in general because law
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“function[s] as a medium of communication and interaction in world politics.”4 The 
intertwined nature of the international legal system and international law, its foundations 
and tenets, “lie firmly in the development of Western culture and political organization.”5 
The international legal system is significant component to the overall international 
system.
The sources of international law are formalized in Article 38 of the Statute o f  the 
International Court o f  Justice, which is “widely recognized as the most authoritative and 
complete statement as to the sources of international law.”6 The sources listed in Article 
38 are the following: “international conventions, whether general or particular;” 
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;” “the general 
principles of law as recognized by civilized nations;” and, “judicial decisions and 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations.”7 While the 
Statute is not precise about what international custom means, it has come to be 
understood as “the practice (action or inaction) of States,” relating to “the process 
whereby custom grows from action by one subject o f law which is either accepted, 
rejected, or tolerated by the other subjects of law.”8 Publicists, as referenced in the 
Statute’s definition of sources, include judges and academic writers on the topic of 
international law.9 Books published by these writers are considered “important as a way 
of arranging and putting into focus the structure and form of international law and of
4 Shirley V. Scott, International Law in World Politics: An Introduction, 2nd Ed., (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
2010), 75.
5 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 5th Ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 13. See 
also Scott, 2010, 290.
6 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 6* Ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 70.
7 “Charter o f the United Nations and Statute o f  the International Court o f  Justice,” October 24, 1945, (New  
York: United Nations Department o f  Public Information, 1985), 26.
8 Malcolm D. Evans, International Law, 3rd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 104.
9 Shaw, 2008, 109-113.
elucidating the nature, history and practice of the rules of law.”10 This study examines 
the discord between how international law is taught and what is state practice as relating 
to jus cogens or peremptory norms in international law. This engages a conflict between 
two of the fundamental sources of international law.
The rhetoric of the international legal system, as seen in the teachings of 
publicists, is that the rules of jus cogens are peremptory in nature and thus give rise to 
more expansive duties and obligations. The reality, as seen in the practice of 
international actors, is that many acts that violate these basic tenets of international law 
occur around the world every day. Despite the general acceptance of jus cogens as 
universal and robust by the international community of lawyers, thus not merely 
aspiration, the significant occurrence of and slavery beyond mere enforcement problems 
and the willingness of states to avoid their obligations demonstrates that the empirical 
gap between the reality and the rhetoric regarding jus cogens is vast.
DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW MATTER?
International law is important. It has “greatly increased in public prominence,” 
thus “it has never been more important for all those with an interest in world affairs to 
come to grips with the workings of the system of international law.” 11 International law, 
as a system, affects not only states, but “increasingly, intergovernmental and 
nongovernmental organizations, individuals, and other actors in world politics.”12 The
10 Shaw, 2008, 113.
11 Scott. 2010, ix.
12 Scott, 2010, 1.
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increased prominence of international law since World War II highlights the importance 
of this “system of rules, principles, and concepts.’"13
Some argue that international law is not important or does not provide for an 
understanding or the international system in general because state behavior trumps the 
idealistic nature of international law. Most of these arguments revolve around a few 
main themes that questioned the importance of international law. In other words, why 
does international law matter? If it does matter for the behavior of states, does 
international law matter for individuals of the world beyond being merely subjects of 
states? International law does matter because it provides stability and predictability of 
the international system, it encourages the modification of behavior of states, and 
provides an understanding of world relations. The key arguments against the import of 
international law are addressed below.
International Law is not Law: An Erroneous Tenet
The first argument is the claim that international law is not really law, but merely 
aspirational thoughts on the international level because it does not mirror most domestic 
legal systems. This is a common observation about international law in an attempt to 
dismiss the legal nature of international rules and regulations that fall into the category of 
international law. There are two main lines of argument to support this contention. Both 
of these lines of argument revolve around the nature of international law as it compares to 
features of domestic legal systems.
One common argument about international law is that the rules of international 
law are not promulgated by a legislature or other law-making body. While this could be
13 Scott, 2010, 1.
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considered to be true if the only way for law to be created was to have an elected 
parliament, this discounts the actions of states when they agree to international norms that 
develop through either treaty or custom. The states act as the promulgating body in their 
words and deeds. While there is not a set body of legislatures, there is an international 
community that is comprised of state actors that work together to create a legal 
framework. Legal frameworks, domestic or international, are based upon the idea and 
values as expressed through interrelated rules.14 The different manner in which these 
rules are created, parliamentary or through state agreement, does not diminish the legal 
nature of either system.
Another argument that questions the legal nature of international law is that there 
is no enforcement agency, such as a global police force. The enforcement of 
international law is also done by the international community of states. This self- 
enforcing system of a legal framework is based on reputational decisions of states and 
negative consequences imposed by the rest of the international legal community for 
failure to comply. International law is a legitimate legal system that is treated as such by 
both the international communities of states and lawyers. The lack of an independent 
enforcement agency does not change the view that international law is legitimate because 
the states do provide enforcement mechanisms in either treaty regimes, reputation on the 
international political stage, or self-regulation.
State Behavior is all that Matters: A Missuided Argument
The second argument is that it does not matter what states are called upon to do in 
the international legal system, they are going to do what they want anyway because that
14 Scott, 2010, 289-292.
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is the nature of state behavior. While there are indications that states do accept 
international law for state interest reasons, it is irrelevant of their motivations. Once a 
state buys into the system, it can reasonable assumed that states are willing to bind 
themselves to the tenets of the system as seen in the actions of international actors. 
Evidence of the willingness of states to follow international law can be seen in everything 
from states joining the United Nations and participating in various conferences and 
forums to adhering to rules in the international legal system, such as territorial sea limits. 
A historical example that highlights the importance of at a bare minimum the appearance 
of adhering to international law is that “even Hitler pretended that he was acting 
consistently with Germany’s international obligations at the time of his most terrible 
violations.”15
As these arguments are often cited or relied upon by individuals who attempt to 
minimize the role of international law, to address them in this introduction provides a 
way for this research project to concentrate on the importance of the gap between sources 
and the impact this gap has on international law. While some do argue against 
international law, the importance of the international legal system is seen in the actions of 
states and individuals. Overall, in the view of governments, which are the subjects, 
enforcers, and codifiers of international law, hundreds of years of international legal 
tradition “surely testifies that in their view international law matters.”16




Non-Compliance Equals Illegitimacy: A Questionable Premise
This project focuses on the acceptance of international law as a legitimate system, 
thus an acceptance of the principles and obligations that arise from the system. The 
international legal system creates obligations upon states. In the case of jus cogens, these 
obligations require that states do more than just passively ignoring the illegal actions that 
fall into this category. Some see the lack of compliance with international law as 
evidence that it is not truly law. While not all states comply with international law at all 
times, this does not eliminate international law as a legitimate legal source. A lack of 
compliance to a law does not disaffirm the law. Laws are broken all the time, but this 
does not mean that the law ceases to exist, becomes invalid, or is not law.
While the disregard of legal rules does show a gap between the rhetoric and 
reality of the international legal system, the legal nature of law is not diminished based 
upon disobedience of a particular law. For example, the crime of murder or homicide is 
still illegal in domestic legal systems, despite the fact that some people are still killing 
others. The fact that individual laws are being broken does not negate the law, it merely 
shows that there is a need for continued enforcement of the law through the established 
mechanisms, which domestically is the police force arresting a murderer.
The gap discussed in this project is not an enforcement issue per se as, but is an 
indication of the enforcement mechanism of state obligations not being fulfilled. States 
have heightened duties as they relate to peremptory norms according to the nature of this 
category of international law. Despite these obligations and duties, a high level of piracy 
and slavery still occur; however, this is not only due to a lack of enforcement. In some
9
cases, as seen in Chapters IV and V, state officials have colluded with criminals 
participating in illegal actions or committed these illegal acts.
INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS AND THE JUS COGENS GAP
On one side of this gap is the rhetoric created and perpetuated by the community 
of international lawyers. An epistemic community is “network of professionals” who has 
“expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy­
relevant knowledge within the domain or issue-area.”17 International lawyers form an 
epistemic community because they are professionals who work in the domain the 
international legal system. This community influences and advises on the policy and 
judgments of states and courts, including the International Court of Justice, through the
1 ftuse of community knowledge. This community’s members are also the publicists in the 
aforementioned Article 38.
The international legal community’s epistemic viewpoint is a key to 
understanding the gap between rhetoric and reality. The view of international legal 
community is that it has “expanded into the sphere of government, resulting in a 
penetration pacifique of ideas from the nongovernmental into official channels.”19 The 
rhetoric of the international legal community has “penetrated into official edicts, 
judgments and conventions.”20 This penetration of ideas and extension of the epistemic 
community of international legal experts provides the foundational underpinnings for the
17 Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination.” 
International Organization 46, no. 1 (Winter, 1992), 1-35, 3.
18 Shirley V. Scott, International Law in World Politics: An Introduction, 2nd Ed., (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2010), 133.
19 Oscar Shachter, “The Invisible College o f  International Lawyers,” Northwestern University Law Review, 
72, No. 2 (1977), 217-226, 217.
20 Schachter, 1977, 225-226.
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development of the international legal system. This community is relatively uniform. 
Members “function with the same intellectual apparatus” regardless of “whether lawyers 
are academics in universities, diplomats, legal advisors to foreign offices, judges of the 
I.C.J. (International Court of Justice) or whatever.”21 This shows while they may not be 
as powerful as internally observed, there is a distinct viewpoint of the community of 
international lawyers.
The intellectual background of these legal experts is also important due to the 
overwhelming influence of the Western’s worlds influence on the international legal 
system. As discussed by Andreas and Nadelmann, “virtually all of the norms that are 
now identified as essential ingredients of international law and global society have their 
roots in the jurisprudence... notions and patterns of acceptable behavior established by
'j 'y
more powerful Western states.” Even “non-European States bowed to Western 
‘superiority’ and eventually submitted to the rules elaborated by European countries and 
the U.S.”23 The combination of a consistent intellectual framework and the Western 
background of thought has provided a homogenous epistemic international legal 
community, as further discussed in Chapter III.
INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND THE JUS COGENS GAP
The other side of this gap is the general practice of state actors. In terms of the 
sources of Article 38, this is the international custom as perpetrated by states in the 
international system. International custom is shown through the general practice of state
21 Anthony Carty, The Decay o f  International Law? A Reappraisal o f  the Limits o f  Legal Imagination in 
International Affairs, (Dover, NH: Manchester University Press, 1986), 21.
22 Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in 
International Relations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 20.
23 Antonio Cassese, International Law in a D ivided World, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 40.
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actors in the international legal system. In relation to this project, this will be detailed in 
Chapters IV and V.
Stability and predictability is provided in the international legal system by the 
perpetuation of norms and continued action by state actors in support of international 
legal norms. What does it mean for the international legal system if states are not 
supporting the most fundamental norms? The lack of action by states to curb violations 
of jus cogens principles is troublesome for the international legal system. The persistence 
of piracy and slavery in and of itself does not demonstrate the weakness of jus cogens-, it 
is demonstrated by the states failing to satisfy their obligations to take action under 
international law. Insufficient state compliance with these precepts can be seen in 
negligence by the state, as well as in higher levels of inaction or counteraction, such as 
state inattention, dereliction, or complicity, as demonstrated in Chapters IV and V. 
Peremptory norms require positive actions by states. In the case of piracy and slavery, 
these actions are not occurring and jus cogens' obligations are falling short because states 
are willing to look the other way.
The striking differential between the rhetoric of the international legal community 
and reality of the international system goes to the heart of a significant problem in 
international law.
JUS COGENS: A UNIQUE SET OF NORMS
Jus cogens is a crucial case to demonstrate the gap between rhetoric and reality 
because of its perceived status as a unique set of rules within the international legal 
system. Jus cogens are considered to be a vital component of international law because 
norms with this designation are viewed to not allow any derogation from and create an
12
obligation on the part of states to enforce these norms in a universal fashion. Jus cogem
is a crucial case because it “provide[s] the most definitive type of evidence”24 as
compared to supposed lesser norms. Peremptory norms are supposed to be the most
robust norms within the international legal system. These norms call upon states and
other international actors to fully support them, have the ability to overcome issues of
jurisdiction, proscribe behavior by international actors and individuals, provide predictive
elements to the international legal system, and have both historical precedents and
continuing epistemic to support them. As fundamental norms, these specialized tenets of
international law are the extreme examples of tenets within the international legal system.
In other words, these norms are considered to be the “most-likely case” to be supported
by state action, or a crucial case.25 However, as demonstrated by the gap, they are not.
Peremptory norms are not a new phenomenon in relations among states; however,
the concept of jus cogens has grown in the international legal literature and rhetoric in its
meaning and breadth from its beginnings prior to the evolution of the modem day
international legal system, as further evidenced in Chapter II. The principle of jus
cogens has also been expanded from its original codification source, Article 53 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). According to this treaty:
“a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community o f States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted and which can only be modified by a subsequent 
norm of general international law having the same character.”26
24 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Study and Theory Development in Social Sciences, 
(Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2004), 120.
25 John Gerring, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 220.
26 “Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties,” May 23, 1969, United Nations Treaty Series 1155, 331.
13
In addition to being an important component of international law, the norms of jus 
cogens are perceived by the international legal community to be both robust and 
universal obligations. The two most firmly established of these norms are the 
prohibitions against piracy and slavery. Jus cogens provides the guiding principles from 
which no variance is supported in the international legal system. The fundamental nature 
is the basis of universality and robustness of jus cogens and provides for the obligations 
that states and other international actors should support in word or deed. If jus cogens is 
elemental in its nature as stipulated in the VCLT, the reality of the support for these 
principles should be evident in state behavior.
Understanding the concept of jus cogens is indispensable to gaining insight into 
efficacy and stability the international legal system as a whole. This is an area of 
international law that rhetorically, at least, is considered to be most universal and robust, 
but is surprisingly neither in practice. Since the community of international lawyers 
view the concept of jus cogens as largely settled, its analysis in the modem era has been 
less extensive than other areas of international law. The failure of the epistemic 
community to adequately examine these norms is important because jus cogens is 
considered to be the strongest area of international law. Given that the lawyers are 
perpetuating the norms through legal argument, writing, and the gap between practice and 
pedagogy is an obvious obstacle.
The one area of scholarship related to the explication of jus cogens the epistemic 
community focuses on is the consideration of a wider range of substantive issues to be 
included under this principle. Since peremptory norms provide for obligations on 
international actors, there is a tendency to want to expand the number of norms that are
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considered jus cogens. The two oldest norms that fall into this category are the 
prohibitions of piracy and slavery. Other norms are now accepted in this category, but 
they do not have the well-established nature of the aforementioned prohibitions. These 
categories and the related literature are discussed in depth in Chapters II and III.
High level obligations placed upon state actors to adhere to the legal concepts of 
jus cogens and accept the prohibition on derogation makes these legal principles excellent 
indicators of the state of law in the international legal system concerning peremptory 
norms. The prohibitions of piracy and slavery do often get into high levels of politics and 
state interests which can force state interest to override compliance. However, 
international law is created when there is “necessity and mutual consent.”27 Peremptory 
norms have been created to deal with the prohibitions of piracy and slavery and can be 
viewed as being created by this consent and necessity. In addition, it should be noted that 
“the great majority of the rules of international law are generally observed by all nations 
without actual compulsion, for it is generally in the interest of all nations concerned to 
honor their obligations under international law.”28 Given the perceived robust nature of 
peremptory norms, as seen in Chapter II, and the general observation of international law 
by states, the gap between the reality and rhetoric in this area is intriguing.
The rhetoric of the international legal community suggests that the concepts and 
precepts of jus cogens are so well-established that they do not have to be examined. The 
rhetoric of jus cogens may be strong and developed, but it has failed to translate into 
reality that affects behavior in the international community : the gap between the rhetoric 
of jus cogens and the reality of state behavior. The rhetoric that is employed by the
7 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle fo r  Power and Peace, 4th Ed. (Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc., New York, 1967), 266.
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epistemic community posits a deep-rooted support for the existence and obligatory nature 
of jus cogens, yet, a mere skimming of the headlines in the daily press or browsing CNN 
shows the disconnect between the international legal responsibilities and the actions of 
state actors.
WHY EXAMINE JUS COGENS?
The concept of jus cogens is generally viewed as settled in the modem era, 
therefore the examination of the basis or source of jus cogens has not been a typical 
subject of international legal scholarship. As a result, there is an assumption in the 
literature that jus cogens is supported by international actors, despite a lack of research 
into its reality. This project will provide an examination of the empirical reality as it 
relates to the core prohibitions of piracy and slavery.
The international legal system is also explored by international relations theorists 
in their scholarship because it is an exemplary normative system that is viewed as 
influencing the behavior of states. However, the consideration of jus cogens in 
international relations has been less extensive than other areas of international law, such 
as sovereignty and power. The current project intends to address the lack of a scholarly 
examination of jus cogens in international relations literature. While international 
relations scholarship has expanded in the last few decades to include aspects of socially 
constructed analysis that shows how “power and state interest are fundamentally formed
■JQ
by ideas and social interaction,” there has not been any analysis of the status of jus
28 Morgenthau, 1967, 283.
■>9
Robert Jackson and Georg Sorensen , Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, 3rd Ed., 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 169.
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cogens norms. The disconnect between the rhetoric and reality concerningyms cogens 
exposes the limitations and the political nature of international law.
RHETORIC V. REALITY: WHY IS THIS IMPORTANT?
This is an examination of how the area of international law that is widely 
expected to be the most robust in practice is falling short of the intentions of the 
international legal system. Why is jus cogens considered to the most robust and strongest 
area of international law? There are a number of reasons that will briefly be discussed.
Peremptory norms are viewed as not allowing for any derogation, regardless of 
state of emergency or war. They thus seem to have the ability to override the sovereignty 
of states is by preventing states from entering into contracts or treaties with other states if 
these agreements will violate jus cogens. Other areas of international law do not have the 
same ability, thus showing the perceived paramount nature of these peremptory norms in 
the international legal system. The ability of the principles of jus cogens to prevent the 
freedom of contract between state actors contributes to the strength of these peremptory 
norms.
Furthermore, they are viewed as providing an underlying sense of morality or 
justice within the international legal system. This apparent underlying ethical framework 
is used by international actors to not only justify behavior but to provide guidance to the 
entire system, which is not the goal of the majority of rules. This added seeming value of 
morality or justice highlights the robustness of jus cogens principles as compared to other 
principles and norms in the international legal system.
Also, these norms have taken on a professed constitutional nature that places them 
above less superior rules in international law. This can be seen in how these norms
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presumably cannot be overridden or modified by any norm that does not have the same 
peremptory nature. These norms also ostensibly cannot be opted out from through the 
process of persistent objection, unlike other norms in international law. The supposed 
constitutional nature of these peremptory norms contributes to the perception that jus  
cogens is the strongest and most robust area of the international legal system.
Finally, these norms profess to confer responsibilities and obligations upon state 
actors regardless of issues that would normally mitigate such obligations. For example, 
states have a theoretical responsibility to seek redress for violations of these norms 
irrespective of where the violation takes place, thus overcoming jurisdictional issues that 
might prevent recourse for lesser norms. All of these elements show how robust and 
strong peremptory norms are seen to be in international law.
OVERVIEW OF THE CORE OF JUS COGENS
To fully understand this gap, this project details the gap between the rhetoric 
contained in legal instruction and the reality of state practice through the two different 
core prohibitions. The first core prohibition is against piracy. Piracy is an important 
prohibition as it is one area of the international legal system that has been considered 
illegal for generations. Piracy has been around as long as there has been travel and trade 
by waterways. Legal measures to support the suppression of piracy have been occurring 
for centuries and continue today.
While piracy has enjoyed different levels of popularity as a career path, this 
scourge of the high seas has never truly disappeared. Since the criminal nature of piracy 
has been a legal concept for centuries, prior even to the naming of jus cogens, it can be 
seen as a truly fundamental principle in international law. As a fundamental principle
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that has been championed by legal scholars and state actors alike for centuries, the reality 
of the increase in piracy, especially over the last several years, underscores the gap 
between publicists and states. The prohibition against piracy is one of the traditional 
areas of peremptory norms and the legal aspiration to suppress it has a long history.
While some recent events may show an increase in the willingness of states to 
participate in anti-piracy measures, overall, the record of states concerning the 
suppression of piracy is surprisingly poor given the fundamental nature of the 
prohibition. For example, in 2008, incidents of reported piracy increased by eleven 
percent worldwide; however, the incidence of piracy is estimated to be two to three times 
higher than reported.30 The rate of attempted and successful pirate attacks worldwide has 
nearly doubled from 2008 to 2011.31 While the incidence of piracy is increasing around 
the globe, the response of many governments has not been to follow the tenets of jus 
cogens and to prosecute the individual pirates, but instead it has typically been to pay the 
pirate ransoms or to release the offenders without prosecution. These concepts are 
further explored in Chapter IV dedicated to this disconnect between sources of 
international law concerning piracy.
The second area that demonstrates the jus cogens gap between sources is the 
prohibition against slavery. Slavery is another international phenomenon that has existed 
for as long as humans have been interacting with each other. A general acquiescence of 
the practice existed for centuries prior to the modem era of the international system.
30 Daniel Sekulich, “A Look Back at 2008’s Piracy Incidents,” in Modern Day Pirate Tales: Notes on the 
World o f  Piracy from Journalist Daniel Sekulich (2009).
3! ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Arm ed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 1 January 
- 3 1  December 2011, (London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2012). See also ICC International 
Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 1 January - 3 1  December 
2008 , (London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2009).
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Slavery has been a hot-button issue since 1788, when international petition campaigns
' X ' )began calling for the end of the practice. While many individuals in the world think 
that slavery has been largely abolished, the reality is much different than what plays 
through the modem day mind. Not only are there estimates that as many as 2.5 million 
modem day slaves are new victims each year, but there are probably more slaves today 
than at any other time in history.33 While many victims languish in the grips of servitude, 
the international legal rhetoric on this crime follows the pattern of jus cogens. The 
number of countries that have passed laws against slavery and slave-like practices has 
continued to rise since the 1800s; however, the reality paints a much different picture, in 
which governments are not prosecuting these violators. A more detailed examination of 
this gap and the details of this problem are provided in Chapter V.
TEXTBOOKS: THE WRITTEN RECORD OF THE COMMUNITY
The question when examining epistemic communities is one of how to 
demonstrate their values and ideals. This project is demonstrating these values and ideals 
through their perpetuation to the next generation of the community by using educational 
materials, specifically international legal textbooks. Textbooks are similar to “cultural 
artifacts” that provide “a core of cultural knowledge which future generations are 
expected to assimilate and support.”34 This viewpoint also applies to the continuation of 
the culture and knowledge of the epistemic community of international lawyers as 
contained in international legal textbooks. By highlighting the aspects of international
32 Ian Clark. International Legitimacy and World Society, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 40.
J Alexandra Poolos, “Modem Day Slavery on the Rise,” http://ac360.cnn.com/2009/02/19/modem-day- 
slavery-on-the-rise/.
34 Keith Crawford, “The Role and Purpose o f  Textbooks,” International Journal o f  Historical Learning, 
Teaching and Research 6, no. 2 (July 2003), 5-10, 5.
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legal education that deal with jus cogens, insight is gained into how norms in the 
international legal system are perpetuated among the epistemic community.
The current analysis contained within this project finds the evidence of the 
perpetuation of norms in international legal textbooks. By a detailed survey of the top 
textbooks in international law, the current state of international legal education can be 
ascertained, thus determining the current state of rhetoric. As the architects of the 
international legal system, the epistemic community of international lawyers is 
continually passing their beliefs and collective thoughts onto the next generation, 
consequently perpetuating the rhetoric without regard to the reality beyond a general 
acknowledgement that international actors do not always follow the rules. This 
pervasiveness and entrenchment is evidenced throughout international legal textbooks. 
The faith and belief in the concepts of jus cogens as being as fundamental as breathing is 
evident in the rhetoric provided by international legal textbooks. The abundance of 
support and consistency in the rhetoric shows that it is not merely “the writer introducing 
whatever ideas he wishes,”35 but the establishment of a pattern of thought. These basic 
tenets increase the significance of the gap between the rhetoric and reality of peremptory 
norms.
Both Louis Henkin and Wemer Levi remind us in the late 1970s that there is a 
difference between the view of lawyers and their textbooks and the diplomat and 
governments. Henkin specifically examines how diplomats ignore international law in 
favor of international interests while international lawyers see international law as a
35 Levi, 1976, 144.
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respected and growing juridical system.36 Levi claims that there is a difference between 
textbook law and “living law.” The difference between these two types of law are that 
“the writer can introduce whatever ideas he wishes,” but “living law is what nations
3 7
actually practice as they struggle to survive.” Under these claims, international lawyers 
and textbooks can expound upon the concepts within the international legal system 
without necessarily suffering consequences. While these are providing legitimate points 
to the difference between textbooks and actions by states, the international legal system 
“exists ultimately as a body of customary ideas and practices, but these ideas and 
practices are those of international lawyers as well as statesmen.”38 By viewing the 
international legal system in its entirety, the importance of understanding the 
international community of lawyers’ rhetoric, as demonstrated by international law 
textbooks, is evident.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE JUS COGENS GAP
The persistence of piracy and slavery throughout the world beyond problems of 
mere enforcement by state actors demonstrates the reality of the international system.
The robustness of peremptory norms and the related concepts is a central characteristic of 
the epistemic community’s stance on jus cogens. There is a gap between these two 
positions that raises a number of implications concerning the international legal system 
and the community of international lawyers. The strong disconnect between the 
international legal community, who are the architects and perpetuators of the system, and
~’6 Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Columbia University 
Press, 1979), 24-27.
37 Werner Levi, Law and Politics in the International Society. Vol. 32. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage
Publications, 1976), 144.
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the reality, creates the potential for the perceived ineffectiveness and instability in the 
international legal system. Given the treatment of these two norms and other jus cogens 
in international legal literature, the tendency for state passivity and, in some cases, 
collusion is a failure to live up to the modem day conceptual framework of jus cogens. 
What does this disconnect mean in the understanding behavior of the international legal 
community and the international legal system? If the publicists of the system, who 
perpetuate the continued functioning of the current system through teaching new 
generations, are operating under different assumptions than reality, what does this say 
about jus cogens ?
The international legal system depends upon basic shared and accepted rules to 
function. Peremptory norms are the crucial case within international law. They are 
crucial because they are considered to be the most robust and fundamental. The failings 
of these norms raise concerns about other norms within the international legal system. If 
jus cogens is found to be a mirage, what does this indicate about other aspects of the 
international legal system, such as universality and sovereignty? If jus cogens is so 
robust and strong it can theoretically overcome the will of states, but it is not living up to 
its potential, what is the status of lesser principles in the international legal system?
The international legal system is designed to promote a framework for state and 
individual action. How can it be relied upon for either predictive or proscriptive 
information if the fundamental principles of the system are not supported by international 
actors? When the strongest principles of international law are being ignored or even 
violated by international actors, the ability of the international legal system to provide
j8 Terry Nardin, Law, Morality, and the Relations o f  States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1983), 177.
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guidance as to the behavior of states and others diminishes. The decrease in the ability of 
the international legal framework to provide indications as to the reality of peremptory 
norms creates an effect of diminishing the ability of international actors to rely on the 
rhetoric of the international legal community, which may have greater consequences than 
the lack of enforcement of jus cogens principles.
An additional implication is based upon the pressure for the continued expansion 
ofjus cogens rhetoric. As jus cogens rhetoric is expanded in both content and force by 
the international community of lawyers, what will happen to the fundamental principles 
that are fulfilling the promise of jus cogensl What effect does the lack of reality in these 
fundamental principles say about the evolution and future of international law and the 
international legal system generally? Some of the evolving aspects of international law, 
such as gender issues and environmental protection, are implicated in the lack of support 
for the current fundamental principles.
The final implication concerns the moral basis of international law. Many view 
jus cogens as a basis for the morality or ethics of the international legal system; however, 
if the morals/ethics are so far separated from the reality of the international legal system, 
how does the international system legitimize goals that fall into the category of morality, 
such as justice and peace? Does this analysis do nothing more than support the 
proposition that has been argued for years that states merely use norms to legitimize 
themselves and their nefarious actions or self-interest and not to provide for a higher 
purpose? Since many in the international community believe that “international law puts 
a significant brake on the pursuit of...interests”39 by states, thus invoking a possible
’9 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits o f  International Law  (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 15.
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morality, the loss of the most robust and conscience-based principles, jus cogens, could 
put this assumption into question.
PREVIEW OF UPCOMING CHAPTERS
This current project is divided into a total of seven chapters. The goal of this 
chapter has been to provide the general overview of the project, the importance of the 
project and to dispel some of the common arguments against the scholarly examination of 
the international legal system and international law for insight into the international 
arena. Chapter II provides a developmental history of the jus cogens concept from its 
inception to a modem development in the VCLT to the current status of jus cogens as an 
autonomous concept with international obligations placed upon states. This 
establishment of the theoretical origins and progression of jus cogens to the modem day 
concept is vital for the reader to fully understand the principle status of peremptory norms 
and the necessity of examining this concept in the international legal system. This 
examination provides greater understanding of norm formation and establishes the 
perpetuation that has created this rhetoric/reality gap concerning the most robust and 
strongest norms in the international legal system, jus cogens.
Chapter III examines the rhetoric in international legal education concerning the 
concept of jus cogens. It shows the extent and depth of the perpetuation of a particular 
rhetorical standpoint regarded these principles. The education that is provided to these 
future members of the international legal community is the basis of the ideas and 
thoughts that are used in doctrine and documents. The systematic perpetuation of ideas is 
demonstrated by an examination of some of the most popular international law textbooks 
and an evaluation of the rhetorical patterns that develop from these texts. This chapter’s
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discussion starts with the importance of examining the legal rhetoric as continued through 
the community of international lawyers through legal conclusions. The chapter then 
concentrates on the methodology used to choose the textbooks, the criteria used for 
analysis, and general information about the textbooks used. Next, the chapter explores 
the results of the detailed analysis of the textbooks by discussing the rhetorical patterns 
that develop. Finally, a brief summary of what the rhetoric means is provided. This 
chapter and Chapter II will allow the reader to become well-versed in the rhetoric of jus 
cogens, thus completing the construction of understanding of the first half of the 
rhetoric/reality gap.
Chapter IV concentrates on the jus cogens prohibition on piracy, which “occurs in 
many parts of the world and although all nations have agreed to discourage and punish it, 
pirate acts are on the rise with every passing year and at an alarming rate.”40 The 
continued rise in piracy, as seen in the recent actions not only in Somalia, but around the 
world, indicates that the reality of the jus cogens prohibition is found lacking in 
comparison to the rhetoric of the international legal system. In addition to the rise in 
piratical acts at a variety of locations, the continued lack of prosecutions, enforcement, 
and state collusion is discussed.
Chapter V examines at the jus cogens prohibition of slavery. Slavery, slave-like 
practices, and/or human trafficking are a crucial case for this analysis as it is not only one 
of the oldest prohibitions in the international system, but it “affects virtually every 
country in the world and is one of the fastest-growing areas of criminal activity.” Given 
the extent of human trafficking and the well-established understanding that it is
40 Jack A. Gottschalk and Brian P. Flanagan, Jolly Roger with an Uzi: The Rise and Threat o f  Modern 
Piracy, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000).
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prohibited in international law, slavery is a prime example of the reality of jus cogens 
falling short of expectations provided for by the rhetoric that is perpetuated by the 
epistemic community of lawyers.
Both examples found in Chapters IV and V are developed in similar fashions.
The first section of these chapters deals with the development and history of the 
prohibition of participating in the international crimes of piracy and slavery. The second 
section examines the rhetorical patterns that show the rise of these two legal tenets to the 
current level of jus cogens prohibitions and how these are perceived in international legal 
literature. The third section looks at the current state of affairs concerning piracy and 
slavery in the international community. The final section looks at the gap between 
rhetoric surrounding the prohibitions of these international crimes as seen in the 
rhetorical patterns and the relation to the reality of current affairs.
These two chapters narrow the exploration of jus cogens to two specific and vital 
cases of the rhetoric/reality gap in the international legal system. Each of these chapters 
provides a brief discourse on the historical development of these prohibitions as jus 
cogens concepts; however, this analysis is not intended to be either a comprehensive 
study of the complete history of piracy or slavery or to provide an empirical study of 
these general subjects. Instead, this analysis is provided to demonstrate the reality 
portion of the rhetoric/reality gap, as indicated by not only the “blind eye” that states turn 
towards these issues but continues up to the point of over state participation or collusion 
in these international crimes. Any point along this reality continuum is a violation of jus 
cogens principle and a shirking of state international obligations as detailed at the end of 
both chapters.
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Chapter VI details the implications that develop from the gap between the rhetoric 
of the international legal system and the reality of the international arena. These 
implications deal with the stability, basic principles, and morality of the international 
legal system.
Chapter VII presents the final conclusions of the project. In addition to an 
overview of the conclusions, this chapter deals briefly with policy questions that arise 
from the implications examined in Chapter VI. The central policy question is how to 
actually create a reality more closely aligned to the rhetoric in the international legal 
system.
The final chapter also looks at areas of future research that would be beneficial in 
order to expound upon the implications and conclusions of this project. One of the most 
promising areas of research would be a cross-culture survey o f concepts contained in 
non-Westem legal traditions that are historically similar to jus cogens. Another area of 
possible future research would be to examine the interaction between increasing 
globalization and grass-roots interaction on the rhetoric of jus cogens in the international 
system.
CONCLUSION
The main goal of this project is to provide insight into the nature of the 
international legal system and the behavior of actors in that system, both states and the 
international legal community, given that this system has been established and 
perpetuated to provide predictability of actions and stability o f the interaction between 
international actors. Overall, this is an interesting and important puzzle that has not been 
examined by the current literature in either international law or international relations.
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CHAPTER II 
THE HISTORY OF JUS COGENS
A  review of the source and basis of jus cogens is vital to fully understand how 
peremptory norms have achieved a special place in the lexicon of international law. The 
putative robustness and strength of jus cogens goes directly to why it is a crucial case in 
international law that can be used to examine the state of the international legal system. 
This chapter explains the basis of these norms. It does not provide a complete treatise on 
jus cogens development.1 This review is intended to provide a background of the 
definitions, concepts and development of peremptory norms in international law. An 
understanding of the nature and place of jus cogens in international law is shown by 
surveying the history of peremptory norms.
The importance of these norms cannot be underestimated because they 
demonstrate underlying principles, such as equity and justice that serve as the foundation 
for the international legal system. This system, like any system of laws, is based upon a
■y
convergence of ideas and rules that are tied together with an underlying philosophy. Jus 
cogens is a fundamental or constitutional concept for the underlying philosophy of the 
international legal system.
Jus cogens is viewed as more than just a fundamental part of the international 
legal system in theory. It also has professed practical implications and questions that
1 This is a brief background due to the number o f treatises on the subject that already exist in international 
legal literature, such as the expansive compilation by Hannikainen that covers the concept from the early 
1800s through 1988. Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens,! in International Law: Historical 
Development, Criteria, Present Status (Helsinki: Finish Lawyers’ Publishing Company, 1988). See also  
Alexander Orakhelasvili, Peremptory Norms in International Law  (New York: Oxford University Press,
2006).
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arise from the behavior of states concerning these peremptory norms. This concept will 
be revisited in Chapter VI of this project.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The historical development of jus cogens as a premier concept in international law 
can be traced back to the pre-modem era. This section will briefly review the historical 
background of the development of jus cogens prior to its common discussion in the 
international legal discourse. By providing a brief history of the development of 
peremptory norms, the impact of these concepts on the international legal system and the 
rhetoric of the international legal community is demonstrated and provides a basis for the 
understanding for the information and arguments contained in the following chapters.
Positivism v. Naturalism and the Source o f Law
The story of jus cogens has been part of the age-old debate between positivists 
and naturalists in international law. The understanding of the positivism and naturalism 
debates go to the heart of a number of issues of peremptory norms, including the use of 
view of jus cogens as a fundamental moral baseline for state action and the ability to 
change the codification of treaties that violate peremptory norms. This debate is seen 
throughout the conversations concerning jus cogens and has greatly influenced the 
community of international lawyers, especially since World War II.
Positivism is an underlying philosophy of international law that “holds that 
international law consists only of those rules by which states have consented] to be
2 Shirley V. Scott, International Law in World Politics: An Introduction, 2nd Ed., (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2010). 75-80.
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bound.”3 This consent may be codified in an international treaty or implied by a 
preponderance of state practice. Positivists profess “a great deal of sanctity accorded to 
the written text,” because “the treaty is the law,” and “generally express great skepticism 
about treaties being superseded or altered by anything other than another treaty.”4
Naturalism, on the other hand, claims that international law comes from some 
higher power or overarching reasons of justice or morality.5 The dominance of natural 
law sources for international law was greatly diminished in the nineteenth century, when 
its counterpoint, positivism became the dominant legal philosophy.6 The differences 
between the positivist tradition and the naturalist tradition dominated the historical 
development of international law and carried over into the evolution of jus cogens.
This project is not purporting to take a theoretical stand on the different schools of 
thought. The concentration of this analysis is based on the manifestation of rhetoric as 
demonstrated in the perpetuation of information and knowledge by the epistemic 
community and the occurrence of instances that fall within the umbrella of jus cogens. 
Even though this project does not follow either school of thought, it is necessary to 
understand the development of jus cogens in light of these two viewpoints.
3 Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary, 3rd Ed., (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC- 
Clio, Inc., 1982), 284.
4 Anthony Amed Clark, Legal Rules and International Society, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999), 71.
5 There are references in literature to naturalists being referred to as “normativists.” For the context o f  this 
project, the more customary label o f  naturalists will be used.
6 Benedict Kinsbury, and Adam Roberts, “Introduction: Grotian Thought in International Relations,” 33 in 
Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts (eds.), Hugo Grotius and International Relations, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 1-64.
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First Steps o f the Concept -  Naturalist Roots
One of the original sources ofjus cogens is arguably jus naturale, which Roman 
legal scholars referred to as “something which natural reason had established among all
7 fimen.” Jus naturale was endowed with “the greatest possible authority as law.” Some 
scholars also find support for notions of peremptory norms in the “international 
community of states conforming to 18th century European notions of the international 
community itself being itself a civil society.”9 This civil society was well-established in 
the European context, but not throughout the rest of the world. Concepts resembling jus 
cogens, while not labeled as such, did “play a significant role in American jurisprudence” 
to maintain a just result that may not have occurred solely on current legislation since the 
founding of the United States.10
World War I was a turning point in the development of the idea of overarching 
universal norms, which had been generally absent, with the important exception of the 
prohibitions against piracy and slavery, up until this point.11 One reason for this lack of 
universality in international law was the underdeveloped nature of the international 
system. The “community of states” did not fully mature as a recognized concept until 
after World War I, and thus was unable to provide the necessary conditions for 
universality to develop. Another reason was a rise in the positivist view on international 
law. Since international law was becoming dependent upon explicit state consent, the
7 P.E. Corbett, Law and Society in the Relations o f  States, (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company,
1951), 4.
8 Corbett, 1951, 19.
9 Alfred P. Rubin, “Actio Popularis, Jus Cogens and Offenses Erga OmnesT' New England Law Review  
35, no. 2 (2001), 265-280,278.
10 Karen Parker, “Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law o f  Human Rights,” Hastings International and 
Comparative Law Review 12, no. 2 (1989), 411-463, 456.
32
rules and restraints on state action that would eventually become jus cogens in the 
modem lexicon had not fully been established. Based on a positivist view of jus cogens, 
“it is understandable that the notions of jus cogens and peremptory norms did not have 
the occasion to come forward as matters of importance within the society of States 
because there were only a few treaties regarding which it could possibly be alleged that 
they had infringed norms of an absolute character.”12
After World War I, the international community of states became more 
established as an international legal system. In beginning of the twentieth century, the 
concept of peremptory norms was introduced without using the term jus cogens through 
the use of analogous theories during the interwar period.13 This shift in the legal rhetoric 
and the increase in the interaction between states, was priming the international legal 
community for the concept of jus cogens.
Introduction to the Rhetoric o f Jus Cosens
The concept of jus cogens was first introduced into the modem international law 
lexicon in an article by Verdross in 1937.14 George Finch also wrote in 1937 about the 
sources of international law and referring to “obligations of natural law.”15 These 
obligations “exist independently of the consent of men” and are considered to be 
“fundamental principles of international law so universally recognized as to be regarded
11 Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical Development, 
Criteria, Present Status, (Helsinki, Finland: Finish Lawyers’ Publishing Company, 1988).
12 Hannikainen, 1988, 112.
13 George D. Haimbaugh, Jr., “Jus Cogens: Root & Branch (An Inventory),” Touro Law Review  3, no. 2 
(1987), 203-227.
14 Alfred von Verdross, “Forbidden Treaties in International Law,” American Journal o f  International Law 
31 (1937), 571-577.
15 George A. Finch, The Sources o f  Modern International Law, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, 1937), 44, 60.
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as being based upon the consent of all states,” that “bind the states without their explicit 
consent.”
The evolution of jus cogens began in earnest after World War II and the 
Nuremberg Trials. The need for a more explicit sense of the fundamental norms in the 
international system was heightened in the eyes of many after the atrocities of the Nazi 
regime and others were brought to light. At this point, “the work of natural lawyers and 
liberal political theorists” that had often been ignored in the international arena, “almost 
overnight so it seems, became a central and universally accepted part of the established 
international legal order.”16
In addition to the call for an international sense of justice, the schism in 
international law philosophies between the positivists and the naturalists began to shrink 
after World War II. This shift developed into what has been referred to as the “Grotian 
tradition,” which is defined as “a tradition that sees international law as a system of law 
that serves the interests of the international community as a whole and the interests of 
humanity rather than the narrow interest of state sovereignty.” 17 This tradition, which 
does not follow a purely positivist or purely naturalist approach, has become increasingly 
popular since World War I.18 Nonetheless, the schism remained a point of discussion 
when the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was negotiated. The central issue 
was the source of jus cogens.
16 Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics, (New  
York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 125.
17 John Dugard, “The Future o f  International Law: A Human Rights Perspective -  With Some Comments 
on the Leiden School o f  International Law,” Leiden Journal o f  International Law, 20 (2007) 729-739, 738.
18 Hedley Bull, “The Importance o f Grotius in the Study o f  International Relations,” 79, in Hedley Bull, 
Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts (eds.), Hugo Grotius and International Relations, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), 65-94.
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THE MODERN RULE OF JUS COGENS: VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW 
OF TREATIES (VCLT)
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) marks the 
beginning of the modem era ofjus cogens in the international legal system. This 
development followed the obvious atrocities perpetrated during World War II when 
certain fundamental aspects of justice had become “a matter of international concern.”19 
This concern was carried into the negotiations for a number of treaties, including the 
VCLT.
During the negotiations of the VCLT, the article concemingy'w.v cogens “proved to 
be one of the most controversial and vividly discussed.”20 The debate between the 
positivists and naturalists again reared its head. One of the manifestations of this debate 
was an argument about the source of jus cogens. Where do these peremptory norms 
come from in the understanding of international law? As discussed in Chapter I, modem 
international law sources are typically referenced from Article 38.1 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice. Within Article 38.1, the four main sources of international 
law are: international conventions; international custom as a general practice accepted as 
law; general principles recognized by civilized nations; and, judicial decisions and 
teachings of the most highly qualified jurists.21 If jus cogens was developed by treaty, 
such as the VCLT, then how could one treaty be viewed as superior to another treaty? If 
jus cogens is derived from general principles of international law or custom, then how 
could it be codified to satisfy the positivist perspective in international law? How do
19 Hennery Schem ers, “Different Aspects o f  Sovereignty,” 186 in Gerard Kreijen (ed.), State, Sovereignty, 
and International Governance, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 185-192.
20 Jerry Sztucki, Jus Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties: A Critical Appraisal, (New  
York: Springer-Verlag/Wein, 1974), 2.
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these concepts of peremptory norms, which are viewed as part of morality or equity 
under the law, be reconciled with the need for positivist support? The debate on the 
source of jus cogens was a primary factor in the negotiations of the VCLT and eventually 
would influence the continued evolution of jus cogens.
The term jus cogens was introduced at the negotiations by Gerald Fitzmaurice, an 
International Law Commission Rappoteur, when he distinguished “between ‘those rules 
which are mandatory and imperative in any circumstances (jus cogens) and those (jus 
dispositivum) which merely furnish a rule for application in the absence of any other 
agreed regime.” G. I. Tunkin, the leading Soviet jurist, viewed these principles as 
“created” by the will of states, thus “completely distinct from principles of ordre public 
propagated by natural law doctrine which are not dependent upon the wills of states.”23 
This viewpoint allowed for the justification of the natural order by using positivist 
arguments.
The VCLT provides for the invalidation of treaties that violate the parameters 
established by jus cogens. In Article 53, the VCLT defines a peremptory norm of general 
international law as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.”24 Article 53 also states that “a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it
21 “Charter o f  the United Nations and Statute o f  the International Court o f  Justice,” 1945, United Nations 
Treaty Series.
22 Christopher A. Ford, “Adjudicating Jus Cogens,” Wisconsin International Law Journal 13, no. 1 (1994- 
1995), 145-181, 157.
23 G.I. Tunkin, Theory o f  International Law, Translated by William E. Butler, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1974), 158.
24 “Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties,” May 23, 1969, United Nations Treaty Series 1155, 331.
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.”25 In Article 64 of the 
VCLT posits that “if a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any 
existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates.”26
The final pronouncement of the VCLT on jus cogens has been seen “as the most
• 77significant instance of progressive development in the Convention as a whole.” Even 
those states that “voted against or abstained did admit the existence of jus cogens in 
contemporary international law and disagreed only on issues connected with 
implementation.” Eventually, ]us cogens took on the character “almost like a kind of 
sacred cow of international law” that “must be, and is, paid due lip service of true 
attitudes” because ‘the uneasiness in raising voice against jus cogens was apparent, as if 
one who would criticize it were running the risk of being declared a grave offender of 
international legality.”29 The concept of jus cogens became more accepted as a method 
of treaty invalidation, despite the lack of practical application. Thus, while states were 
considered “competent to make treaties on whatever matter they please,” the “content of 
the treaty must not conflict with a norm of general international law which has the 
character of jus cogens.” A full resolution about the source of jus cogens was never
fully reached. Whether it flowed from general principles of international law or custom 
is not specified, but both appear to be accepted as sources of peremptory norms. When 
this shift began, the debate had centered on questions involving sources of international
25 Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties.
26 Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties.
27 Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties, 2nd Ed., (Dover, NH: Manchester University 
Press, 1984), 17.
28 Levan Alexidze, “Legal Nature o f Jus Cogens in Contemporary International Law,” 231 in Acad^mie de 
Droit International, Recuiel des Cours: Collected Courses o f  the Hague Academy o f  International Law, 3rd 
ed., (Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), 219-270.
29 Sztucki, 1974, 157.
30 Hans Kelsen, Principles o f  International Law, (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1959), 322-323.
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law; however, these questions were to be replaced with questions of the content and 
extent of jus cogens in the post-VCLT era.
The Modern Rule o f Jus Cosens: Evolution Post-VCLT
The conceptual debate changed significantly after the establishment of jus cogens 
in the VCLT and moved from general acceptance to a more encompassing concept that 
went beyond mere treaty nullification. Jus cogens evolved to being an autonomous 
concept in international law, beyond the shadow of the VCLT. The VCLT is still the 
main starting point for any discussion of jus cogens in modem international law; 
however, the tenor of the conversation has fundamentally changed compared to a few 
decades ago as jus cogens has “begun to have a persuasive influence on branches of 
international law other than the law of treaties.”31 These concepts, as they continually 
evolved, went beyond the previous discussion of the sources of jus cogens and are seen as 
“part of positive law” by commentators. In addition to becoming an autonomous 
concept in international law Ju s cogens “is now being referenced elsewhere by a variety 
of actors, not only states, but also NGOs and individuals.” The restrictions, 
prohibitions, and guidance provided by jus cogens are both a limit on the actions of 
international actors, such as the United Nations Security Council, and a justification for 
action on the international stage.34
3̂  Sinclair, 1984,215.
32 Manfred Lachs, The Development and General Trends o f  International Law in Our Time, (Boston, MA: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1984), 204.
33 Kyoji Kawaski, ‘international Jus Cogens in the Law o f State Responsibility,” In.Law 10, no. 1 (2007), 
6-22, 6.
34 Alexander Orakhelashvilli, “The Impact o f  Peremptory Norms on the Interpretation and Application o f  
United Nations Security Council Resolutions,” The European Journal o f  International Law  16, no. 1 
(2005), 59-88.
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Once the concept of jus cogens found a foothold in the rhetoric of international 
law, the debate began to shift the questions of content, rather than simply existence, 
outside of treaty law. This movement was one that was “paid scarce attention” by most 
commentators and jurists at the time of the adoption of the VCLT.35 The concept of 
peremptory norms has decidedly gone beyond one of dealing specifically and narrowly 
with treaty law. The conversation has become one of the interaction of jus cogens with 
other international law concepts, content within the ju s cogens concept, and the enhanced 
responsibilities and obligations of states.
Jus cogens evolved into a concept that is no longer specifically tied to the narrow 
discussion of the VCLT. Viewpoints, such as the Rapporteur of the International Law 
Commission, Sir Humphrey Waldock’s, that “the existence of an international public 
order containing rules having the character of ius cogens” have been gaining strength 
since in the early 1960s.36 With the end of the Cold War, “the global norm building 
process” has greatly accelerated in a number of areas, including jus cogens.
There have also been pronouncements by varying judicial bodies that “have
-10
endorsed unreservedly the view that jus cogens applies outside of the treaty context.”
One of the most commonly noted cases is the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua. While the International Court of Justice (ICJ) did use non-jus cogens 
customary law for its decision, the case does show jus cogens in a favorable light in the
35 Ian Sinclair, Hierarchy in International Law: The Human Rights Dimension, (Antwepen: Intersentia, 
2001), 56.
36 Werner Levi, Contemporary International Law: A Concise Introduction, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1979), 36.
37 Edward C. Luck, “Gaps, Commitments, and the Compliance Challenge,” 305 in Edward C. Luck and 
Michael W. Doyle (eds.), International Law and Organization: Closing the Compliance Gap, (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2004), 303-330.
38 Sinclair, 2001, 58.
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important separate opinions of two judges.39 Another noted judicial body is the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) whose understanding 
is “that the jus cogens character of norms carries direct legal effects vis-a-vis the legal 
character of all official domestic action.”40 While some have claimed that this is “a 
return to natural law from positivism,”41 it can be seen as a natural progression of the 
concept of jus cogens. To fully understand these more recent developments, the 
following examination includes the content and expansion issues that have been raised 
post-VCLT concerning peremptory norms.
The Contested Content o f  Jus Cosens
The biggest concern about jus cogens is the content of the canon of peremptory 
norms. The basic tenet of jus cogens is that the norm must be accepted by the 
international community as a whole and affect the interests of the world community 42 
There are four categories of jus cogens that have been given support, “the rules protecting 
the foundations of international order,” “the rule concerning peaceful cooperation in the 
protection of common interests and the rule protecting the most fundamental and basic 
human rights,” and “rules for the protection of the civilians in time of war.”43 These 
norms can be difficult to identify as they are “rules of abstention” that are “prohibitive in 
substance.”44 Despite these difficulties of definition, state intent and the content of jus
39 Sinclair, 2001,60-61.
40 Sinclair, 2001, 59.
41 John Quigley, “Law for a World Community,” Syracuse Journal o f  International Law and Commerce 16, 
no. 1 (Fall 1989), 1-38, 30.
42 Yu Fu, “Review o f  Chinese Reviews: Selected Article Recently Published in Chinese,” Chinese Journal 
o f  International Law 6, no. 2 (2007), 515-522.
43 Kamrul Hossain, “The Concept o f  Jus Cogens and the Obligation Under the U.N. Charter,” Santa Clara 
Journal o f  International Law 3, (2005): 72-98, 84-85.
44 American Branch o f the International Law Association, Report o f  the Committee on the Formation o f  
Customary Law, (January 28, 2988), 118.
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cogens can still be seen custom and in other methods, such as proclamations and treaties. 
The most commonly accepted peremptory norms are prohibitions against genocide, 
piracy, crimes against humanity, slavery and slave-like practices, war crimes, torture, 
apartheid, and war of aggression.45
While the existence of contemporary international law may be impossible without 
certain principles, such as pacta sunt servanda, not all scholars view this as jus cogens, 
but instead as the starting point of international law because it “rests upon and proceeds 
from this norm.”46 Other scholars do view this principle as part of peremptory norms in 
international law, as the failure to comply with this principle would undermine the 
function of the entire international legal system.
These debates are important to the understanding of peremptory norms and, as 
seen below, the expansion of is also highly debated, but these do not change that certain 
central tenets as well-established. In other words, the debate concerning the content of 
jus cogens does not apply to the core tenets, including the prohibitions against piracy and 
slavery.
The Expansion o f Jus Cozens
Another area of important debate involves the expansion of jus cogens. As 
warned by Weil, the problem of the content of jus cogens is still debated to this day.
What qualifies as a rule of jus cogens? What norms have already reached the status of 
peremptory norms? This is a trend that “excites” some international lawyers, who are
45 Jane E. Stromseth (Ed.), Accountability fo r  Atrocities: National and International Relations, (Ardsley, 
NY: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 2003).
46 Tunkin, 1974,223.
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doing their “best to expand and extend” these peremptory norms.47 For example, there 
are other “international crimes” that have not risen to the status of jus cogens but may 
within time, including the theft of nuclear materials, the destruction or theft of national 
treasures, and bribery of foreign officials.48
At what point does an international norm become jus cogens? According to 
Verdross, “the criterion for these rules consists in the fact that they do not exist to satisfy 
the needs of the individual states but the higher interest of the whole international 
community.”49 One formula to determine if a norm is jus cogens requires the satisfaction 
of two elements, the norm must be of “general international law” and it “has been 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted.”50 Another formula is to introduce jus cogens 
through “soft law instrumentalities,” which then develop into non-derogable norms 
through the acceptance of such status by the international community as a whole.51
It has been suggested that the label of jus cogens is applied to legal positions 
because the label “confers pathos on legal arguments that otherwise would appear less 
convincing.” This is especially noticeable when “little evidence has been presented to
47 Dugard, 2007, 731.
48 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “The Normative Framework o f  International Humanitarian Law: Overlaps, Gaps 
and Ambiguities,” 10-11 and 47 n. 92 in Michael N. Schmitt (ed.) International Law Across the Spectrum  
o f  Conflict: Essays in Honour o f  Professor L. C, Green on the Occasion o f  His Eightieth Birthday, 
(Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000), 1-56.
49 Alfred Verdross, “Jus Dispositvum and Jus Cogens in International Law,” The American Journal o f  
International Law, 60, No. 1 (Jan. 1966), 55-63, 58.
50 Christos L. Rozakis, The Concept o f  Jus Cogens in the Law o f  Treaties (New York: North-Holland 
Publishing Company, 1976, 45.
51 Christine Chinkin, “Normative Development in the International Legal System,” 40 in Dinah Shelton 
(Ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The Role o f  Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 21-42.
52 U lf Linderfalk, “The Effect o f  Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora’s Box, Did You Ever 
Think About the Consequences?” The European Journal o f  International Law 18, no. 5 (2008), 853-871, 
855.
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demonstrate how and why the preferred norm has become jus cogens.”53 Another 
possible reason a norm is claimed to be peremptory is to “override the will of persistent 
objectors to the emergence of the norm as customary international law.”54
The legitimacy of expanded of jus cogens is questioned by Anthony D’Amato 
when he discusses how any writer is enabled to “christen any ordinary norm of his or her 
choice as a new jus cogens norm, thereby in one stroke investing it with magical 
power.”55 While D’Amato is taking the argument to an extreme to prove his point, he 
does legitimately raise the concern about the continuous expansion of this category. This 
continued expansion could weaken the robustness o f the category of peremptory norms, 
as discussed further in Chapter VII.
While this is important for the understanding of the cannon of peremptory norms, 
these issues do not apply to the well-established core tenets that are the focus of this 
study, the prohibitions of piracy and slavery.
THE HIERARCHY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF JUS COGENS
The key provisions of peremptory norms are its hierarchical provisions and the 
responsibilities and obligations that emanate from the nature of these norms. These 
provisions also add to the uniqueness of jus cogens in the international legal system. This 
is particularly evident in the prohibitions against piracy and slavery.
53 Dinah Shelton, “Normative Hierarchy in International Law,” The American Journal o f  International Law 
100, no. 2 (April 2006), 291-323, 303.
54 Shelton, 2006, 304.
55 Anthony D’Amato, “It’s a Bird, It’s a Plane, It’s Jus Cogens!” Connecticut Journal o f  International Law  
6, no. 1 (1991).
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The Hierarchy o f  Legal Norms
How does jus cogens interact with other norms and aspects of international law? 
This has led to an understanding of a hierarchy of norms with jus cogens as the pinnacle. 
Peremptory norms are “generally expected to be supreme, and that is how they operate if 
they are effective.”56 The label of jus cogens allows for “a principle whose perceived 
importance, based on certain values and interests, rises to a level which is acknowledged 
to be superior, and thus capable of overriding another norm, rule, or principle.”57 This 
superior nature and ability to override another norm or principle clearly indicates that jus 
cogens is at the top of the hierarchy of international law. Despite the existence of the 
hierarchy in international law, there is a question of the practical ability of jus cogens “to 
sweep away lower ranking rules of international law.”
According to the well-known positivist Prosper Weil, the creation of hierarchy “is 
one doomed to flabbiness, one that in the end will be reduced to a convenient term of art, 
covering a great variety of realities difficult to grasp.”59 His main disappointment 
appears to be less one of not agreeing with the existence of a hierarchy, but more 
questioning what will fall into this hierarchy and its lack of specificity. Weil warns that 
“to succumb to the heady enticements of oversubtlety and loose thinking is to risk 
launching the normative system of international law on an inexorable drift towards the
56 Jordan Paust, “The Reality o f  Jus Cogens,” Connecticut Journal o f  International Law  7, no. 1 (1991), 81 - 
85, 84.
57 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “A Functional Approach to ‘General Principles o f  International Law’,” Michigan 
Journal o f  International Law 11, no. 3 (Spring 1990), 768-818, 805.
58 Andrea Blanchi, “Human Rights and the Magic o f  Jus Cogens," The European Journal o f  International 
Law  19, no. 3 (2008), 491-508, 501.
59 Arend, 1999,72.
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relative and random.”60 While there is a disagreement among some about the 
establishment of the hierarchy of norms that has developed with jus cogens at the 
pinnacle, the majority of scholars and jurists do follow the logical conclusion that if a 
norm is peremptory, then it must be stronger and more robust than norms of a lesser 
category.
Responsibilities Flowing from Jus Cosens
Beyond the discussions of scope/content, expansion possibilities, the impact upon 
other norms, and the hierarchy of law, the current status of jus cogens provides for states 
to fulfill obligations erga omnes that develop from these peremptory norms. These 
obligations require “the enforcement of the positive law prohibiting the violation of a jus 
cogens right, i.e. the redress of any such violation falls within the competency of each 
and every state comprising that community.”61 These obligations were reinforced by the 
ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case that distinguished between “the responsibilities of the 
state vis-a-vis another state (diplomatic protection) and the responsibilities of a state vis- 
a-vis the international community as a whole (prohibition of aggression and genocide; 
protection of human rights)” which “the latter are in the interest of all states.” These 
obligations are a critical and distinctive element of peremptory norms.
In the cases where the peremptory norm in question is an international criminal 
law, states have been charged with enhanced responsibility. This enhanced responsibility 
is based on the notion that “states should not only have the right but the duty to demand
60 Prosper Weil, “Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?” The American Journal o f  
International Law  77, no. 3 (July 1983), 413-442, 440-441.
61 Sinclair, 2001, 106.
62 H.A. Strydom, “Ius Cogens: Peremptory Norm or Totalitarian Instrument?” South African Yearbook o f  
International Law  14, (1988-1989), 42-58,46.
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observation” of peremptory norms “and, within the limits of the law, see to their 
enforcement.”63 In addition to the duty to see to their enforcement, “each state should 
have jurisdiction to prosecute those who commit such a crime.”64 Once an action has 
been designated as being prohibited by jus cogens, states must not “grant impunity to the 
violators of such crimes,” regardless of “where they were committed, by whom 
(including Heads of State), against what category of victims, and irrespective of the 
context of their occurrence (peace or war).”65
From these duties, flow issues of jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction is claimed to 
apply to international crimes that fall into the category of jus cogens. Universal 
jurisdiction allows for “any state to exercise jurisdiction over” violations of peremptory 
norms, “wherever they take place and whatever the nationality of the alleged offender or 
victim.”66 In some circumstances, the duty has surpassed the mere application of 
universal jurisdiction. Some judicial bodies, such as the Supreme Court of Mexico, have 
concluded that “a domestic amnesty granted as regards a jus cogens crime cannot affect 
the jurisdiction of a third state.”67 Despite this support for universal jurisdiction and the 
duty to prosecute, the recognition that universal jurisdiction mandates prosecution is still 
unsettled because it appears to have not been accepted by the international community as
63 Werner. 1979,239.
64 Sinclair, 2001, 106.
65 M. Cherif Bassiouni, “International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes,” Law and 
Contemporary Problems 59, no. 4 (Autumn 1996), 63-74, 65-66.
66 Anthony Aust, Handbook o f  International Law, 2®* Ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
44.
67 Leila Nadya Sedat, “The Effect o f  Amnesties before Domestic and International Tribunals: Morality, 
Law and Politics,” 233 in Edel Hughes, William A. Scahbas and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), Atrocities and  




a whole. While it may not be seen by a minority as completely settled, the general 
trend combined with the robust nature of jus cogens implies a duty to prosecute and 
universal jurisdiction to fulfill such a duty.
THE UNIQUE STRENGTH OF JUS COGENS NORMS
The strength of jus cogens comes from more than just the declaration that these 
norms are fundamental. It also comes from the responsibilities and obligations that 
appear to flow from the modem concept of jus cogens. The concept of peremptory 
norms, which allow no derogation, is considered hierarchically superior to the other 
concepts in the international legal system, as will be examined in greater detail below. 
These two features of jus cogens create a perception that these norms are the strongest 
and most robust principles in international law with the ability to both overcome 
sovereignty and require states to perform duties.
According to the international legal community, one of the main strengths of jus 
cogens is its ability to provide restraint on the unfettered sovereignty of states. This is 
now presented as a “legal reality.”69 These peremptory norms limit sovereignty and 
confirm “the cosmopolitan character of the global legal system.”70 In other words, 
“modem international law can no longer be regarded as giving the protection of State
68 Michael P. Scharf, “Trading Justice for Peace: The Contemporary Law and Policy Debate,” in Edel 
Hughes, William A. Scahbas and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), Atrocities and International Accountability: 
Beyond Transnational Justice, (New York: United Nations University Press, 2007), 246-274.
69 Yasuhiko Saito, “International Law as a Law o f the World Community: World Law as Reality and 
Methodology,” in Joint UNITAR -  Uppsala University Seminar o f  International Law and Organization 
(1983), 233-249.
70 Jean L. Cohen, “Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law,” Ethics & International Affair 
18, no. 3(2004), 1-24, 9.
sovereignty absolute primacy over the protection of life.”71 By limiting sovereignty, the 
hierarchical superior position of jus cogens is secured in the international legal system.
Another strength of jus cogens is its acceptance by nearly the entirety of the 
international legal community. While there are some debates and questions concerning 
expanding the content and practical applicability of peremptory norms, the overall 
concept has been fully accepted and is used by members of the international legal 
community to call for action against perpetrators who flaunt the prohibitions contained 
within the label. In particular, the prohibition of piracy and slavery, which are the focus 
of this research project, are not questioned. Simply stated, jus cogens is viewed as the 
strongest and most robust portion of international law. And within jus cogens, the 
prohibition against piracy and slavery are the oldest and most entrenched of these norms 
within the international legal system.
ANTI-JUS COGENS VIEWPOINTS
While the overwhelming majority of scholars view the concept of jus cogens as 
well-established, a minority of strict positivists exist that need to be addressed. These 
individuals still consider jus cogens as useful only when invalidating a treaty and do not 
believe that they have achieved a separate status legitimacy beyond the VCLT. These 
viewpoints, while in the extreme minority, do add to the greater understanding of both 
consistency of jurisprudence involving peremptory norms and of the shift to prodigious 
acceptance in the international legal system of jus cogens.
71 Christopher Greenwood, “International Law and the Conduct o f  Military Operations: Stocktaking at the 
Start o f  the New  Millennium,” 186-187 in Michael N. Schmitt (ed.) International Law Across the Spectrum 
o f  Conflict: Essays in Honour o f  Professor L.C. Green on the Occasion o f  His Eightieth Birthday, 
(Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2000), 179-202.
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The denial of an autonomous concept of jus cogens creates two main outcomes. 
The first is that jus cogens is an issue if and only if two or more states enter into a treaty 
that explicitly allows the prohibited norm. In the view of John Rogers, “if the conduct is 
truly reprehensible, and widely considered reprehensible, it is unlikely that states will 
enter such treaties,” thus rendering peremptory norms “not particularly significant.”72 
This may be a valid point for strict positivists in the modem era. It is worth noting, 
however, that historically states regularly entered into treaties to condone slavery and 
other prohibited actions.
The second outcome is that the traditional peremptory norms thought to be 
universal, such as the prohibitions against piracy and slave trading, “are not necessarily 
violations of public international law at all,” but merely actions that allow for prosecution 
because jurisdictional issues have not been violated.73 In other words, it is not universal 
jurisdiction flows from the fact that these are peremptory norms, but they fall into other 
possible categories of jurisdiction. By viewing peremptory norms in such a fashion, there 
is a basic denial of the development and acceptance of these norms in the international 
legal system. The underlying purpose of jus cogens is not mere treaty nullification, but 
has risen to be a source of international law from which no derogation is permitted from 
in either words or deeds, as demonstrated throughout this project.
In addition to these two outcomes, there are a few scholars and jurists who argue 
that jus cogens is nothing more than “arguments of public order” used “to avoid
72 John M. Rogers, International Law and United States Law, (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.. 
1999), 16-17.
73 Rogers, 1999, 117.
49
disrupting existing power arrangements.”74 In other words, state actors use jus cogens for 
blatant self-interest or to maintain the status quo as it is benefiting them. It is viewed by 
some that “states rarely take to heart the fulfillment o f international obligations when 
none of their direct interests [are] involved.”75 This is an argument that is also applied to 
international law generally. This perspective does not take into account the lip-service 
provided by states, especially concerning the prohibitions against piracy and slavery. The 
jurists who fall into this category are in the minority as demonstrated in Chapter III.
The final criticism of jus cogens that is commonly discussed is the lack of 
significant case law from the ICJ and other international judicial bodies. In addition to 
the limited number of cases addressing jus cogens, in some readings of these cases where 
it has, the ICJ “seems generally to demonstrate a very cautious approach towards the 
concept.”76 These criticisms concentrate on the expansion of jus cogens into areas of law 
that are not historically considered peremptory. This is an important criticism that is 
worthy of further consideration, but does not impact the conception of jus cogens used in 
this project because of the concentration on the core content of jus cogens, the 
prohibitions against slavery and piracy which is much less vulnerable to this critique. 
While the ICJ has not pronounced on this particular subject as often as some scholars 
might prefer, it has been accepted in the rhetoric of the international legal system as 
discussed throughout this chapter and in the following chapters.
74 Gordon A. Christenson, “Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International Society,” Virginia 
Journal o f  International Law 28, (1987-1988), 587-648, 639-640.
75 Giorgio Gaja, “Jus Cogens: Beyond the Vienna Convention,” 290 found in Academie de Droit 
International, Recuiel des Cours: Collected Courses o f  the Hague Academy o f  International Law, 3rd ed., 
(Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), 271-316.
76 Jacob Werksman and Ruth Khalastchi, “Nuclear Weapons and Jus Cogens: Peremptory Norms and 
Justice Pre-empted?” 182-182 in Laurence Boisson De Chazoumes and Philippe Sands, (eds.) International 
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1999), 181-198.
50
The Special Status o f the Prohibitions Against Piracy and Slavery
While the development of “truly universal norms” that could be considered jus  
cogens did not mature prior to World War I, there were some areas that developed
77enough to give rise to some international obligations. In particular, two areas of the law 
that had grown to the point of possibly being considered universal or peremptory were 
the prohibitions against piracy and slavery, which are the focus of this study, and the 
acceptance of the freedom of the high seas. Evidence of these prohibitions can be seen 
throughout international legal history prior to the shift of the jus cogens post World War 
I. Regardless of the debates about the content and expansion of jus cogens, the 
peremptory nature of the norms concerning the prohibitions against piracy and slavery 
are currently not debated. These prohibitions are the longest standing and most well- 
established prohibitions as seen in the discussions of these cases in Chapters IV and V.
CONCLUSION
Despite some controversies around the edges, peremptory norms are considered in 
international law to be both robust and strong. The norms had their beginnings in legal 
concepts going back as far as the Roman Empire and are continuing to evolve today.
This evolution, which was formalized in the VCLT, has been overwrought with issues of 
the classical debate between the positivists and the naturalists. Despite this ongoing 
discussion of sources of international law, the concept of peremptory norms “finds
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reception and recognition in all the principal legal systems of the world.” These 
peremptory norms have become an autonomous concept, which has far reaching
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consequences in the rhetoric and expectations of the international legal system, most 
importantly universal jurisdiction and duties to enforce these tenets. This is the primary 
concentration of the literature in the field of peremptory norms, thus demonstrating that 
the general concept of jus cogens has been fully accepted. The lack of a well-established 
content does raise questions as to the breadth of peremptory norms, the expansion of the 
category of norms, and what will be the long-term consequences, as seen in chapter 
seven. However, the basic concept and its approach to the prohibitions against piracy and 
slavery are now essentially taken for granted.
According to Rozakis, the introduction of jus cogens has created “a remarkable 
step forward towards a more disciplined legal order” that “entered the scene of 
international legal relations exactly at the time that the need of such protection is urgently 
felt.”79 The protections that are provided by these norms are rhetorical significant in that 
they provide the ability of the international legal system to protect individuals and to 
overcome the presumption of sovereignty that has in the past created violations of human 
rights and international criminal law.
These norms also create an underlying sense of justice within the international 
legal system by providing for “certain greater values” above the traditional value of
Q S \
power in the international legal system. This “moral order in international relations” 
has been generally accepted and can be seen as justification for “rules seeking to prevent
77 Lauri Hannikainen, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical Development, 
Criteria, Present Status, (Helsinki, Finland: Finish Lawyers’ Publishing Company, 1988), 28, 37.
78 Alexidze, 1982, 235.
79 Rozakis, 1976, 194, 193.
80 Stefanie Schmahl, “An Example o f  Jus Cogens: The Status o f  Prisoners o f  War,” 56 in Christian 
Tomuschat and Jean-Marc Thouvenin (eds.), The Fundamental Rules o f  the International Legal Order: Jus 
Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes, (Leiden, The Netherlands, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006), 41- 
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conduct contra bonos mores,”81 The importance of this introduction of a moral order 
should neither be overstated nor underestimated. The rhetoric provides an outlet for 
behavior or condemnation that would otherwise not necessarily be supported prior to the 
full development of jus cogens. Questions that flow from this acceptance of the 
underlying ethical system contained within the international legal system, such as the 
legitimization of evolving goals, will be further detailed later within this project.
While the concept of jus cogens is robust and strong in the international legal 
system, there are questions surrounding the full implications of the gap between the 
reality of the international legal system and the rhetoric provided by the international 
legal community. The concept of jus cogens has become a fundamental pillar in the 
international legal system and the lack of realistic support within the international 
political system shows the potential fragility of a legal system. As the following chapters 
will demonstrate, the rhetoric surrounding peremptory norms is uniform and generally 
accepted by the international legal community.
In the next chapter, the perpetuation of the rhetoric of jus cogens as seen in the 
legal textbooks that are used to teach the next generations of the international legal 
community will be demonstrated. Textbooks provide a written record of the international 
community of lawyers. Understanding the perpetuation of the ideals and values of this 
community through these textbooks will demonstrate one of the sources of Article 38, the 
teachings of publicists. This written record will show the viewpoints of the community 
of international lawyers, thus giving insight beyond the theory presented in this chapter.
81 Wladyslaw Czaplinski, “Ius Cogens and the Law o f Treaties,” 97 and 83 in Christian Tomuschat and 
Jean-Marc Thouvenin (eds.), The Fundamental Rules o f  the International Legal Order: Jus Cogens and  




Jus cogens is a part of international law where a discontinuity of sources as found 
in Article 38 of the Statute o f the International Court o f Justice exists. This disconnect is 
found in the difference between the rhetoric of the community of international lawyers 
and the reality as perpetrated by state actors.
This chapter intends to provide a perspective on the ideals of the international 
legal community concerning jus cogens through an empirical examination of legal 
textbooks. By examining this rhetoric, a greater understanding of the international legal 
community’s knowledge and ideals is possible. These ideals and knowledge, as seen in 
Chapter I, are one of the sources of international law under Article 38. Specifically, the 
ideals and knowledge of the international legal community are evidenced in the “judicial 
decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations.”1
This chapter provides further explanation of the importance of the epistemic 
community of international lawyers and how it relates to this project. The community’s 
written record, textbooks, is analyzed to show the rhetoric of peremptory norms. The 
rhetoric contained within these books indicates one side of the rhetoric/reality gap.
THE EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS
The epistemic community of international lawyers is composed of individuals 
who are a “network of professionals” who have “expertise and competence” in the issue
1 “Charter o f  the United Nations and Statute o f  the International Court o f  Justice,” October 24, 1945, (New
York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1985), 26.
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area of international law.2 The community is bound together by “their shared belief or 
faith in the verity and applicability of particular forms of knowledge or specific truths.”3 
In the case of the community of the international lawyers, this is evidenced by the 
continuity and near unanimous understanding parts of the international legal system, 
specifically peremptory norms. As the ideals and values are “transmitted from one party 
to another” the influence of epistemic communities in “institutionalizjed].”4 The 
members of this community influence and advise the policy and judgments of states and 
courts, including the International Court of Justice. The examination of the transfer of 
knowledge and its resulting influence concerning peremptory norms in the international 
legal system by the epistemic community generates new understanding.
Epistemic communities also “help frame and structure collective understanding 
and action” creating “the most meaningful notion of learning in international relations.”5 
In terms of jus cogens, the different rhetorical themes used by the community of 
international lawyers provides both a general understanding of peremptory norms and 
their development in the international legal system. This collective understanding is 
composed of the ideals and values of the epistemic community. These ideals and values 
are manifested as one of the sources of international law under Article 38 contained in 
international legal textbook, as detailed below.
\ Haas, 1992,3.
J Haas, 1992, 3, footnote 4.
4 Emanual Adler and Peter M. Haas, “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation 
o f  a Reflective Research Program,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 1, Knowledge, Power, and 
International Policy Coordination (Winter 1992), 367-390, 374.
5 Adler and Haas, 1992, 385.
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WHY TEXTBOOKS?
Textbooks are the written record of the formal instruction of the epistemic 
community of lawyers. The rhetoric of this group can be determined as it is being 
transmitted to the next generation of members through textbooks and teaching by 
examining textbooks. The community writes the textbooks and interprets the 
documentation, including scholarly writing, texts, and cases. Using textbooks as the 
basis of this study provides direct evidence of the values and norms of the community 
and indicates what the community thinks is important enough to be perpetuated.
While there is a factor of on-the-job training that takes place, these newly-minted 
members are taught by individuals who are already part of the established epistemic 
community. This process perpetuates the ideals and values o f the current community.
An examination of the method of indoctrination into the community is necessary to fully 
understand the basis of the international legal community. This can be accomplished by 
examining the legal education that lawyers receive, in particular, through the written 
record found in legal textbooks.
A comprehensive analysis of international law textbooks has not been performed, 
thus there is a need for this analysis to fully understand how the perpetuation of concepts 
and ideas within the international community of lawyers occurs. This study concentrates 
on textbooks to establish how knowledge is transferred throughout the community.
While non-textbook sources, such as treaties and cases, are used in this study to provide 
the legal and historical basis for some of the concepts, the purpose of this study is to look 
at the difference between the rhetoric as demonstrated by the perpetuation of knowledge 
through educational materials of the epistemic community and the reality of the
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international legal system. This concentration provides a big-picture look that has not be 
previously provided within the current scholarship.
In addition to being a novel method of examining the international legal system, 
using textbooks instead of sources, the purity of the rhetoric of the epistemic community 
is preserved without the overlay of interpretation. In other words, textbooks provide an 
unfiltered look at the norms and ideas of the community. The importance of 
understanding the norms and ideas of this community is necessary as these are the 
individuals influencing policy, laws, treaties and other instruments, while providing the 
foundation of the international legal system through their rhetoric.
Western Concentration
This study concentrates on Western viewpoints, teachings, and sources due to the 
natural bias created by the Western domination of Western practitioners and scholars in 
this field. As noted by Gaubatz and Mac Arthur in a 2001 study on the intemationality of 
international law, “the practice of international law remains the province of a handful of 
Western states.”6 In addition to the empirical evidence provided by this study as to the 
Western bias of international law, the bias is also evidenced in viewpoint expressed by 
Andreas and Nadelmann. These authors state that “virtually all of the norms that are now 
identified as essential ingredients of international law and global society have their roots 
in the jurisprudence of European scholars of international law and in the notions and 
themes of acceptable behavior established by the more powerful Western European
6 Kurt Taylor Gaubatz and Matthew MacArthur, “How International is ‘International’ Law?” Michigan 
Journal o f  International Law, 22, no. 2 (Winter 2001), 239-282, 278.
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states.”7 Given that this appears to be the prevailing viewpoint of most practitioners and 
scholars in the field of international law based upon my research, the concentration on 
English language textbooks is a necessary limitation on the expanse of this portion of this 
project.
METHODOLOGY
The following discusses the method of textbook selection and the criteria used to 
analyze the textbooks to determine the epistemic community’s rhetoric on jus cogens. 
These textbooks are used to look at the overall rhetoric of peremptory norms. The 
following chapters present the rhetoric contained in these books as it relates specifically 
to the two examples of jus cogens, the prohibitions against piracy and slavery.
Textbook Selection
The textbooks were selected based upon popularity on Internet book purchasing 
sites. Internet sales have continued to grow and is becoming a dominate force in the sale 
of textbooks. According to some industry measures, the total growth of online book sales
o
is over sixty-eight percent in the last few years. In addition to becoming an increasingly 
prevalent method of obtaining books, internet bookselling outlets provide matrices that 
measure the popularity of individual books. Since this study is examining the 
perpetuation of knowledge, the greater the distribution of the resource that is used to 
provide this knowledge, the more pervasive the viewpoint contained within this resource
7 Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in 
International Relations (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), 20.
8 Association o f  American Publishers, “Online Retail,” found at www.publishers.com.
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through the community. In order to narrow the scope of this study, the most popular 
textbooks are used to indicate the rhetoric of the epistemic community.
A search for the top eleven sites for book purchasing based on a Google search 
for keywords “law textbooks” was conducted. A search of these sites was concentrated 
on either “general international law” or “public international law” as the subject -matter. 
The top fifty listed were chosen to form a list of the top textbooks from each site.9 Any 
textbook that appeared on a minimum of four sites was added to the final list. Books 
published more than fifteen years ago were excluded and, if necessary, used as 
supporting material in other sections of this project. The majority of these texts 
published within the last ten years, with some within the last year.10 In some cases, the 
last two editions were used to show the continuity of the knowledge contained within 
these texts. However, a number of these texts only have a single edition. These 
textbooks provide sufficient evidence of the teaching rhetoric used by the epistemic 
community of lawyers.
Analysis Criteria
The analysis of the textbooks is based on the preponderance of discussion, the 
different case law references, the support of the individual concepts ofjus cogens and the 
overall tenor of the information that is provided to the student. Each textbook was 
examined to determine if there was any discussion of the following concepts: jus cogens, 
universality, sources of international law, international criminal law, slavery, piracy, erga 
omnes, peremptory norms, treaty law, the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties,
9 For a detailed list o f  the purchasing sites and the textbooks’ titles, authors, and publishing years, see 
Appendix.
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state obligations, state responsibility, and human rights. These key terms provide the 
reader of these textbooks an understanding of the author’s stance on peremptory norms as 
an international legal concept. When the textbooks are analyzed for these key terms, a 
series of rhetorical themes develops. As will be seen below, no single text outright 
dismisses the concept of jus cogens, which is a shift from the initial stages of the 
understanding of jus cogens in the international community as discussed in Chapter II 
above. However, there are variations in the strength, extent, scope, and import of the 
rhetoric of jus cogens.
General Textbook Information
The sample of textbooks represent a wide variety of style and philosophical 
orientations. While some of the textbooks are more traditionally for legal texts organized 
with edited readings from other authors followed by questions for the individual student, 
others are written more as supplements or general outlines for quick reference for the 
student or practitioner. Some texts concentrate more on the interaction between United 
States law and international law. Other texts provide a broader, all-encompassing 
viewpoint that includes cases from the United States, the International Court of Justice, 
and other judicial bodies, such as the European Court of Human Rights. The different 
philosophical orientations are noticeable in case selections and provided discussions 
and/or questions. The variety of textbooks provides further support for a generally 
accepted understanding of jus cogens rhetoric, as there are still general themes of rhetoric 
that are shared by all of the writings.
10 For further information concerning the selection o f  individuals textbooks, see Appendix.
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All of these texts are written for individuals who will become part of the 
epistemic community, either in international law or international relations. These are the 
individuals who will continue the perpetuation of the international legal system by 
becoming advisors, practitioners, legal scholars, legal educators, or policy influencers.11 
The texts start with an assumption that individuals using these books are just starting to 
develop their understanding of the international legal system and continue to build on 
basic concepts through the entire book. This approach provides a clear blueprint of the 
method of indoctrination of the new members of the epistemic community. This 
blueprint also provides an understanding of the rhetoric of jus cogens for this study.
None of the textbooks examined failed to discuss jus cogens and all of them 
viewed the subject as a well-established legal concept. Jus cogens is treated in all the 
texts as a legal concept deserving of its fundamental status. The most important 
rhetorical themes presented in these textbooks are examined in greater depth below.
RHETORICAL THEMES
There are several common rhetorical themes that emerge in the understanding of 
jus cogens presented the international law textbooks. These rhetorical themes 
demonstrate the common understanding of jus cogens conveyed in the epistemic 
community of international lawyers. The following five themes are common to the 
discussion of jus cogens in textbooks examined as part of this study. These themes 
survey the role of treaties, the evolution of jus cogens to an autonomous concept, issues 
of jurisdiction, the philosophical underpinnings, and the scope and extent of peremptory 
norms. Each one of these five themes is a portion of the overall belief system that shapes
n Scott, 2010, 133-135.
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the understanding of jus cogens and is fully demonstrated by the writing in these 
textbooks, thus being perpetuated through the education of new lawyers. The following 
examines each of these theses in greater depth.
Theme One: Jus Cosens. VCLT and Treaty Law
The importance of the VCLT to the acceptance and establishment of jus cogens is 
the first noticeable theme. Every textbook that was examined looked at the interaction 
between treaty law and jus cogens in light of the VCLT. As previously mentioned, 
Articles 53 and 64 of the VCLT provided for the formalization of jus cogens. Different 
approaches were used by the authors to convey the relationship between the VCLT and 
jus cogens. Some authors provide historical approaches for the basis of their discussions; 
other authors examine specific treaties that would be invalided by peremptory norms 
under current international law. The non-historical approach is typically a statement of 
the legal concepts contained within the articles of the VCLT as relating to peremptory 
norms as an accepted notion in international law. Both of these general methods 
concentrate on the relationship between jus cogens and treaty law, in particular the 
interaction between the concepts of jus cogens and the provisions provided in the VCLT.
Historical Approaches
There are two types of historical approaches that fall into this rhetorical theme. 
The first is a historical examination conducted by some authors that highlights the role of 
the VCLT as the catalyst for the modem development and acceptance of peremptory 
norms in the international legal system. Another historical approach is to provide the
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reader with examples of treaties throughout history that would now fall into a category of 
violating peremptory norms, thus being voided under current international law.
In the first historical approach, the common theme of discussion is to look at what 
the VCLT states, how it was negotiated, and what its effects are on possible treaties and 
on local and special customary law when using a historical analysis. In the international 
law system prior to the establishment of jus cogens, a state could enter into any 
agreement or treaty with any other state with any subject matter, regardless of the content 
or unconscionable nature of the subject. This restriction is discussed by Buergenthal and 
Murphy in Public International Law in a Nutshell when they discuss jus cogens as “the 
only limitation” on the “absolute freedom” of states to enter into treaties.12 This 
restriction is exemplified in International Law and International Relations when one of 
the authors asserts that how jus cogens is a binding rule that “creates an especially strong 
legal obligation, such that it cannot be overridden even by explicit agreement among 
states.”13 This is a fundamental change in the international legal system from the 
historical practice. Prior to World War II, states enjoyed freedom of treaties. It is not 
surprising then, that Aust notes that the concept of jus cogens “was once controversial.” 14 
The controversial history of jus cogens is the beginning point for these authors, not the 
end, thus the existence of jus cogens is no longer considered controversial, as seen below.
The employment of historical analysis by the textbooks’ authors provides a 
starting point for the introduction of jus cogens to the readers. These textbooks that rely
12 Thomas Buerganthal and Sean D. Murphy, Public International Law in a Nutshell (St. Paul, MN: West 
Publishing Company, 2007), 123.
' ’ Kenneth W. Abbot, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaugher, and Duncan Snidal, 
“The Concept o f  Legalization,” 116 note 2 in Beth A. Simmons and Richard H. Steinberg (eds.), 
International Law and International Relations, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 115-130.
14 Aust, 2010, 10.
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on this historical analysis, such as International Law, Norms, Actors, Process: A 
Problem-Oriented Approach, provide both treaty-based and state-consent support for jus 
cogens.15 The historical approach looks at the role of self-interest in the VCLT 
negotiations and how the issues raised there connect to the general international law 
debates, such as the positivism versus naturalism.16 If the existence jus cogens is treated 
as controversial, then it generally revolves around this period of the development jus 
cogens. The debate has now shifted to the scope of jus cogens}1 This historical 
approach has also been used to show the once controversial emergence of jus cogens as 
“principles and rules of international law with a higher legal status than the other parts of 
international law.”18
In the second historical approach, concrete examples are used to provide further 
understanding of the effects of the VCLT. For example, the treaty from 1762 between 
the Netherlands and the Saramak agreeing to “capture any slaves that have deserted, take 
them prisoner and return them to the Governor of Suriname, who will pay them 10 to 50 
florins per slave” is cited by the authors of International Law in Contemporary 
Perspectives. 19 Another historical example, provided by Slomanson, is of “Stalin and 
Hitler’s then secret 1939 agreement to divide Europe,” as it violates the prohibition of 
force. While it may be difficult for the student to conceive of a state promulgating 
such a treaty today, these historical examples do demonstrate not only the need for the
15 Jeffrey Dunoff, Steven Ratner, and David Wippman, International Law, Norms, Actors, Process: A 
Problem-Oriented Approach, 2Dd Ed., (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2006).
16 Dunoff, Ratter, and Wippman, 58-60.
17 Dunoff, Ratner, and Wippman, 59.
18 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th Ed., (New York: Routledge, 
2003), 30-31.
19 Michael W. Reisman, Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, Siegfried Wiessner, and Gayl S. Westerman, 
International Law in Contemporary Perspectives, (New York: Foundation Press, 2004), 1301.
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VCLT’s explicit formalization of jus cogens, but also the historically unfettered power of 
the states to enter into agreements, regardless of public policy or notions of justice and 
equality.
The Non-Historical Approach
Other authors concentrate less on the historical background of the VCLT 
choosing instead to highlight the invalidation of treaties that flows from peremptory 
norms as specified by the VCLT. They accept that the VCLT is an essential foundation 
for understanding treaty law and then go on to explain the different aspects of the VCLT,
■y |
including the provisions on jus cogens. Malone, for example, concentrates the majority 
of the discussion of the VCLT and jus cogens around Articles 53 and 64 as it relates to 
the invalidation of treaties that conflict with peremptory norms, thus glossing over the 
historical development of the VCLT. Dixon, McCorquodale, and Williams also avoid a 
discussion of the development of the VCLT but provide analysis by dividing the treaty 
into individual sections and adding scholarly writings and case law that cover broad 
topics, such as invalidity of treaties and interruption of treaties. These authors also 
assert that the provisions contained within the VCLT are “a limitation on State 
sovereignty” and have been broadly accepted throughout the international community.24
Authors also use this approach to show the fundamental aspect of peremptory 
norms, in which, these norms prevent the derogation by states, even if this is a state’s
20 William R. Slomanson, Fundamental Perspectives on International Law, 5th Ed., (Belmont, CA: 
Thomason-Wadsworth, 2007), 374.
21 Shaw, 2008, 125.
22 Linda A. Malone, Emanuel Law Outlines: International Law, (Larchmont, NY: Emanuel Publishing 
Corp., 2008).
23 Dixon, McCorquodale, and Williams, 2011, 55-100.
24 Dixon, McCorquodale, and Williams, 2011, 93.
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will, including preventing a state from “passing contrary legislation.”25 This approach is 
also used to demonstrate the inability for persistent objection to exempt a state from
being bound by a customary rule of international law if it contravenes a peremptory
26norm.
VCLT and Peremptory Norms
Regardless of the approach taken by the authors, the main point that these 
textbooks make is that jus cogens has the ability to invalidate treaties. The peremptory 
norm in question can be a long-standing norm or a recently developed norm as long as it 
meets the requirements of being peremptory. The invalidity of a treaty under the VCLT 
is compared by Bederman, Shaw and Lowe to public policy exceptions to contracts and 
laws within the domestic legal system, where these instruments are found to be invalid 
due to violations of public policy.27 According to Malone, when a treaty is found to be in 
conflict with a jus cogens norm, “the entire treaty is void and there is no separability” of 
the offending provisions or sections of the treaty in question.28 According to the majority 
of the discussed texts, the invalidation of treaties has also been extended to the invalidity 
of local customs or international customs if they are found to be in conflict with 
peremptory norms.
The epistemic community appears to be this treaty for the establishment of jus 
cogens, with the occasional reference to historical cases and Verdross’s seminal article
25 Epps, 2009, 11.
26 Epps, 2009,21.
27 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 5th Ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also 
Vaughn Lowe, International Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) and David J. Bederman, 
International Law Frameworks, (New York: Thomason Reuters/Foundation Press, 2010).
28 Linda Malone, International Law, 2nd Ed., (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2011), 37.
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from 1937, “Forbidden Treaties in International Law.” While there may be some 
disagreement about the nature and status of jus cogem  before the VCLT, there is near 
unanimity in the epistemic community about jus cogens since then. Some authors, such 
as Malanczuk, do venture far back into the development of jus cogens by starting with its 
natural law roots before moving to more modem foundations found in the VCLT and the 
related negotiations.30 While the VCLT is the starting point for the development of jus 
cogens in modem international law according to the rhetoric, the evolution of jus cogens 
does not stop with the VCLT.31
Theme Two: Jus Cosens as an Autonomous Concept
The second theme to emerge is the acceptance of jus cogens as a well-established 
autonomous concept in international law. Authors Von Glahn and Taulbee place jus 
cogens in a “category of rules deserv[ing] special attention” because they are “considered 
so fundamental and significant to the structure and functioning of the international 
community that they bind states even if the state has not given formal consent.” This 
special category of rules is not related to the VCLT in their analysis. Despite the fact that 
the jumping off point for jus cogens discussion is the VCLT, the consideration ofjus 
cogens as an autonomous concept can be seen in the discussion provided by the examined 
textbooks.
29 Alfred von Verdross, “Forbidden Treaties in International Law,” American Journal o f  International Law 
31 (1937), 571-577.
30 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th Ed., (New York: Routledge, 
2003).
31 Evans, 2010.
32 Gerhard Von Glahn and James Larry Taulbee, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public 
International Law, 10th Ed., (Boston: Pearson, 2010) 59-60.
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The first evidence that jus cogens is a stand-alone concept is the discussion of the 
hierarchy of international law norms being highlighted in a majority of these textbooks. 
This hierarchy or normativity discussion does not refer to jus cogens in relation to the 
invalidation of treaties, but looks at the place of jus cogens in general international law. 
As Murphy states in Principles o f International Law, “one way to think about jus cogens 
is as ‘super’ customary international law -  law so fundamental to the inter-relationship of 
states that a state cannot, through its treaty practice or otherwise, deviate from the law.”33 
This “international constitutional law” is filled with norms that “set the very foundations 
of the international legal system.”34 Another example in Shaw’s International Law 
centers the discussion of International Court of Justice.35 According to this analysis, jus 
cogens “are substantive rules recognized to be of a higher status.”36 This higher status is 
also recognized by Aust when he acknowledges that it “seems to be generally accepted 
that provisions in Security Council resolutions must not be incompatible with jus 
cogensf37
The second evidence of the autonomous nature of jus cogens is the discussion of 
peremptory norms as a source of prescription for behavior, such as a deterrent for action, 
and obligations, such as extradition of violators. The VCLT provides the simple 
invalidation of treaties, not for the increased state responsibility that is currently being 
advocated by the epistemic community of international lawyers. For example, Brownlie 
in Principles o f Public International Law deals with the issue of recognition of a breach 
of peremptory norms by examining certain provisions of Chapter III of Part Two in the
33 Sean D. Murphy, Principles o f  International Law, (St. Paul, MN: Thomason-West, 2006), 82.
34 Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law, 4 th Ed., (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2003), 66.
35 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, 6th Ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 123-126.
36 Shaw, 2008, 125.
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Articles Relating to the Responsibility o f  States. These provisions fall into the category 
of “Serious Breaches of Obligations Under Peremptory Norms of General International 
Law,” which the author quotes at length and then cautions that the “normative structures 
look very progressive on paper but, in certain political circumstances, the result may be to 
give the appearance of legitimacy to questionable policies based on objectives collateral 
to the enforcement of the law.” Despite the warning against using /ws cogens 
obligations for political motives, Brownlie firmly supports the existence of jus cogens as 
an autonomous concept in international law as evidenced by his description and 
discussion of peremptory norms as a group of “overriding principles of international law” 
as supported by “both doctrine and judicial opinion” where “the major distinguishing 
feature of such rules is their relative indelibility.”39 Cassese’s middle of the road 
explanation of the effect of jus cogens on the international system is further evidence as it 
states that these norms “primarily pursue a deterrent effect,” but he reminds the reader 
that “one should not underrate the role [that] peremptory norms may play in guiding and 
channeling the conduct of States.”40 This deterrent effect, or shift in “the attitudes of 
states,” impacts the international legal system as it changes how a number of issues are 
addressed, such as the legitimate use of force 41 The influence of jus cogens on the 
attitudes, obligations, and duties of states flows from the autonomous nature of jus 
cogens beyond the VCLT.
37 Aust, 2010, 277.
38 Ian Brownlie, Principles o f  Public International Law, 7th Ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 515.
j9 Brownlie, 2008, 510.
40 Antonio Cassese, International Law, 2nd Ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 210.
41 Martha Finnemore and Stephen J. Toope, “Alternatives to ‘Legalization’: Richer Views o f  Law and 
Politics,” 191 in Beth A. Simmons and Richard H. Steinberg (eds.), International Law and International 
Relations, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 188-204.
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The final evidence of the autonomous nature of jus cogens is change in the 
controversial questions surround peremptory norms. The controversy that used to 
surround jus cogens was one of existence; however, the controversy is no longer based on 
mere existence as that has been accepted, but revolves around other concepts, such as the 
scope and nature of jus cogens. This shift in the nature of the debate shows that the 
concept has moved beyond its original slightly controversial status in the VCLT to a 
solidified legal concept breadth of which is still being hammered out in the international 
legal community.42 As jus cogens is viewed as “customary law considered so 
fundamental and significant to the structure and functioning of the international 
community that they bind states even if the state has not given formal consent,”43 it no 
longer is bogged down in the issue of only being applicable to states that have agreed to 
the VCLT and is now an autonomous concept.
Theme Three: Jus Cosens and Jurisdiction
The third theme is the application of jus cogens to overcome a variety of 
jurisdictional issues. Peremptory norms fall into a specialized jurisdictional category 
known as the universal principle or universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction means 
any state can prosecute regardless of the location of the incident, the perpetrator’s 
nationality, or the victim’s nationality. Universal jurisdiction is a fundamental aspect of 
peremptory norms.
When applying jus cogens, the textbooks discuss two main reasons that traditional 
jurisdictional standards are circumvented by this application. The first is the concept of
42 Anthony Aust, Handbook o f  International Law , (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 11.
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hierarchy in international law. As previously discussed, the hierarchy of international 
law places jus cogens at the pinnacle of the mountain. This special place within the 
international legal system provides for the ability to supersede jurisdictional restrictions, 
such as territorial jurisdiction.
The second concept is one of justice or morality contained within the law. The 
morality or justice that is contained within jus cogens indicates “common values” of the 
international community that allow for universal jurisdiction for certain international 
crimes that fall into the category of peremptory norms.44 According to Slomanson, “the 
universality principle is not applied to a ‘common crimes’ such as murder, because it is 
not sufficiently outrageous.”45 The heinous nature of the crime is “the jurisdictional 
linchpin” to allow States to exercise jurisdiction.46 In addition to the heinous nature of 
these concepts, if the action is considered to have “a corrosive effect on international 
society,” then they will be subject to universal jurisdiction.47
Jus cogens has been applied by the courts, especially in the United States, in a 
variety of cases. One of the most common uses is to contravene the Act of State Doctrine 
in civil actions.48 The immunity against civil actions provided to sovereigns acting as 
state leaders has been waived based upon concepts of jus cogens. Peremptory norms also 
allow international law to be applied for “claims against individuals that are based on a 
handful of particularly egregious offenses.”49
43 Gerhard Von Glahn and James Larry Taulbee, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public 
International Law , 8th Ed., (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007), 68.
44 David Armstrong, Theo Farrell and Helene Lambert, International Law and International Relations, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 181-182.
45 Slomanson, 2007, 245.
46 Slomanson, 2007, 245.
47 Aust, 2010,250.
48 Buergenthal and Murphy, 359-360.
49 Buergenthal and Murphy, 2007,207. See also Buergenthal and Murphy, 2011.
In addition to overcoming issues of sovereign immunity and applicability, jus 
cogens also “carries the duty to prosecute or extradite offenders,” and cannot be 
“superseded by international agreements or policy decisions.”50 This duty overcomes 
territorial jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, thus allowing for prosecution for jus 
cogens offenses and creating universal jurisdiction. These nonderogable norms, thus 
norms that “cannot be denied or suspended] under any circumstances,” include the 
prohibitions against piracy and slavery.51
Theme Four: Positivist and Naturalist Approaches to Jus Cosens
The fourth theme is that the controversy over jus cogens and its content is still 
tied to the debate between the positivists and the naturalists as to the sources and nature 
of international law. While most authors do not rehash the last five hundred years of 
international law in their textbooks, there is at least some discussion of the battling 
theoretical underpinnings of the international legal system. In the context of the 
development of the peremptory norm prohibiting slavery, Bederman looks at the different 
underpinnings of this evolution. The naturalists looked at slavery as “an abomination” 
that State conduct would be subordinate.52 He then explains that in the case of 
positivists, the case was not as simple and had to eventually be decided by the United 
States’ and English courts by claiming a necessity for an explicit agreement.53 While it 
has been claimed that “most international lawyers...are willing to go beyond treaties and 
custom to general principles of law, natural law,/ws cogens, and equity to find
50 Christopher C. Joyner, International Law in the 2T ' Century: Rules fo r  Global Governance, (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 135.
51 Joyner, 2005,135.
52 Bederman, 2010, 4.
53 Bederman, 2010,4 .
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international law,”54 the use of the classic debate between the positivists and the 
naturalists as to the source of international law principles has come to the forefront when 
discussing the existence and expansion of jus cogens due to its nonconsensual, yet 
binding nature.
The concept of jus cogens naturally lends itself to this discussion because of the 
expansion of the concept beyond the VCLT and the fundamental nature of peremptory 
norms. Many authors refer to jus cogens as being constitutional in nature or fundamental 
to the operation of the international legal system or similar to public policy. These can be 
seen as rhetorical pseudonyms for natural law since the treaty basis of jus cogens has 
been rhetorically left behind. For example, Janis and Noyes open their discussion of jus 
cogens by noting “historically, one of the most important sources of the law of nations 
was natural law, but nowadays the function of this avowedly non-consensual source has 
been largely replaced by the notion ofjus cogens”55
Since the ascending of positivism over the last two centuries, most of the 
international legal community would hesitate to suggest that obligations arise without 
direct treaty support or support from well-established customs; however, jus cogens 
opens the door for the insertion of natural law precepts, such as ethics or morality, into 
the international legal system. This insertion is in direct contradiction with the positivist 
tradition, thus providing new life to the age old debate between the two philosophies. 
Some authors, such as Scott, suggest a trend in international legal debate where the 
increased acceptance of jus cogens creates a situation in which “legal positivism must
54 Mark W. Janis, International Law, 5th Ed., (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2008), 45.
55 Mark W. Janis and John E. Noyes, Cases and Commentary on International Law, 3rd ed., (St. Paul, MN: 
Thomason-West, 2006), 138.
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either evolve to make room for such a notion or be replaced.”56 This renewed debate is 
labeled “the last ground for potential conflict between treaties and custom.”57 Despite this 
renewed debate, it is of note that even authors, such as Dixon, who are staunch supporters 
of positivist sources of international law, support the jus cogens rhetoric.
Theme Five: The Content o f Jus Cosens
The fifth theme revolves around the scope and potential expansion of the content 
of jus cogens content. Beyond the prohibitions against piracy and slavery, there is a lack 
of full consensus on the individual norms that fall into the category of jus cogens, but a 
number of norms that are consistently used as examples. This uncertainty has kept some 
states from ratifying the VCLT, such as France.59 This is viewed by some textbooks as a 
shortcoming of peremptory norms because of the vague boundaries that prevent a well- 
established list of norms that are part of jus cogens, thus decreasing specificity in the 
international legal system. Despite the lack of consensus on what norms are peremptory, 
“few would now doubt that the rules of jus cogens do exist” and at a minimum “take 
precedence over all treaties.”60 Despite this ambiguity as to the breadth of jus cogens, 
there is agreement in some areas.
This research project concentrates on the two oldest peremptory norms in 
international law: the prohibitions against piracy and slavery. These are not the only 
prohibitions that are considered by the epistemic community to be an unambiguous part
56 Shirley V. Scott, International Law in World Politic: An Introduction, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2004), 301.
57 David J. Bederman, International Law Frameworks, 2nd Ed., (New York: Foundation Press, 2006), 31.
58 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law, 6th Ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
59 Lowe, 2007, 76.
60 Martin Dixon and Robert McCorquodale, Cases & Materials on International Law, 4th Ed., (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 43.
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of the jus cogens cannon. For example, the prohibition on genocide is often cited as
having “clearly reach the level of a peremptory norm.”61 The status was affirmed by the
International Court of Justice in Congo v. Rwanda in 2006.62 Since the prohibition
against genocide is jus cogens, then it cannot be derogated by treaty.63 Another
prohibition that is considered to have risen to the status of jus cogens is torture. Torturers
are also viewed as “enemies of all mankind” like pirates and slavers.64 This observation
comes from seminal case concerning the prohibition on torture’s place among
peremptory norms, thus allowing for the application of universal jurisdiction.65 In Kadic
v. Karadzic, the Second Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals found that the
prohibition on torture was jus cogens and therefore imposes obligations erga omnes,
which is highlighted by Dixon, McCorquodale and Williams in their chapter on
international human rights law.66 Prohibiting war crimes has also been considered a 
(\1peremptory norm. War crimes are considered by Carter, Trimble and Bradley to be one 
of the few “clear-cut cases of universal jurisdiction.”68 Crimes against humanity, 
terrorism, and war crimes are also subject to universal jurisdiction and obligations erga 
omnes.69 Janis and Noyes, quoting The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America from September 2002, highlight that terrorism is “behavior that no respectable 
government can condone or support and all must impose” to provide continued support
61 Epps, 2009, 81.
62 Evans, 2010, 150.
63 Bederman, 2010, 103.
64 Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner o f  Police fo r  the Metropolis and  Others Ex Parte Pinochet,
House o f Lords, U.K. (24 March 1999). See also Janis and Noyes, 24.
65 Dixon, McCorquodale and Williams, 2010, 151-152.
66 Dixon, McCorquodale and Williams, 2010, 202-203.
67 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d. 163 (2d Cir. 2009).
68 Carter, Trimble and Bradley, 654.
69 Scott, 2010, 25.
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for placing terrorism in the same category of “slavery, piracy, or genocide.”70 The 
prohibition against the use of force is often characterized as having the character of a 
peremptory norm.71 The most commonly accepted norms that are consistently mentioned 
as jus cogens are the prohibitions on the use of force, genocide, slavery, piracy, torture, 
and apartheid and the right to self-determination.
Since the scope of jus cogens is not rhetorically well-established, there have been 
attempts to expand the number of norms that fall into this category. A number of authors 
stressed the continued expansion of the concept of peremptory norms and an increase in 
the use of jus cogens to punish individuals and states for their behavior in external and 
internal matters. In addition to attempts to add new norms, there is rhetoric indicating 
that there will also be greater application of the norms to new actors, such as international 
organizations. In Evans’s International Law, Thirl way looks at how a norm would 
qualify as peremptory by stating “it is accepted that the status of peremptory norm 
derives from the importance of the content of the norm to the international community: 
an example is the prohibition of genocide.” How these norms are determined or what 
meets the level of importance to the international community is not fully developed in 
any of the textbooks, but is discussed by a number of authors, with the only conclusion 
being that it is still controversial.
New peremptory norms are put forth in the international legal system, such as 
prohibition of environmental degradation. Authors of International Law and World 
Order: A Problem-Oriented Coursebook claim that “there conceivably may be some
70 Janis and Noyes, 568.
1 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua: Nicaragua v. United 
States, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits).
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norms of good environmental behavior so basic and fundamental to the future of the 
planet that nations cannot do as they please about following them.”73 As the expansion of 
the content of jus cogens is still controversial, Epps discusses a lack of support for 
considering environmental damage to be part of the corpus of jus cogens.1* Other 
prohibitions that have been raised as peremptory norms include using nuclear weapons,75
7  f t  77drug trafficking, and self-determination as it applies to situations of colonialism.
One textbook incorporates the expansion of jus cogens discussion throughout a 
number of other addressed subjects. In International Law: Cases and Materials, 
Damrosch, Henkin, Pugh, Schachter, and Smit look at cases involving everything from 
international criminal law (torture and slave trade) to the principle of sovereignty of 
national resources in opposition to “remote sensing” in that the sensing state has “an 
obligation to obtain the prior to consent of the sense state before data based on the
•  •  78sensing could be obtained or disseminated.” By examining the expansion of the content 
of jus cogens throughout the text and its relationship to a wide variety of different other 
legal concepts or situations, these authors are demonstrating how pervasive jus cogens 
can be in the international legal rhetoric. While this textbook is on one end of the 
spectrum of jus cogens expansion, it is also one of the more popular texts and represents 
the possible strength of jus cogens rhetoric.
72 Hugh Thirlway, “The Sources o f  International Law,” 141-142 in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), International 
Law, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 117-144.
73 Bums H. Weston, Richard A. Falk, Hilary Charlesworth, and Andrew L. Strauss, International Law and 
World Order: A Problem-Oriented Coursebook, 4th Ed., (St. Paul, MN: Thomason-West, 2006).
74 Valeris Epps, International Law, 3rd Ed., (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2005).
75 Legality o f  the Threat or Use o f  Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (Advisory Opinion) found in Epps, 
2009,462.
76 Epps, 2009,210.
77 Dixon, McCorquodale and Williams, 2010, 222.
78 Lori Fisler Damrosch, Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter, and Hans Smit, 
International Law: Cases and Materials, 4th Ed., (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 2001), 1561.
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Even though there is a push by many in the international legal community to 
expand and piggy-back onto the concept of jus cogens, McCaffrey cautions “there are 
still only a very few norms of jus cogens, which means that states are free to contract out 
of the overwhelming majority of rules of general international law.”79 Although 
McCaffrey is correct to be cautious in discussing expansion, the amount of textbook 
rhetoric that is devoted to this concept shows that this is a growing area of discussion in 
the international legal community. Overall, the increased content and application debates 
are a natural progression from the existence debate that was the former center of 
controversy concerning peremptory norms. Despite the fact that the rhetorical scope of 
jus cogens is not as strong as the general rhetoric for the existence of peremptory norms, 
the epistemic community is consistent in accepting that it does not fully know the scope.
CONTINUITY WITHIN THE RHETORIC
The understanding of jus cogens in the epistemic community is further 
illuminated by viewing the community’s written record over time. This is possible 
because a number of international law textbooks used for this research project released 
subsequent editions. In many cases, the authors have continued their viewpoints 
concerning jus cogens. No authors narrowed their discussion of peremptory norms and, 
in some cases, expanded their viewpoint to encompass additional subjects under the 
umbrella of jus cogens or to provide more support for the concepts surrounding 
peremptory norms. This provides a measure of evidence that a continuity exists within 
the rhetoric of the epistemic community. Often the authors selected the same cases, 
documents, wording, and viewpoints between the different editions of their textbooks.
79 Stephen C. McCaffrey, Understanding International Law, (Newark, NJ: LexisNexis, 2006), 125.
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In Valerie Epps’ International Law, the difference between the 2005 and 2009 
editions is negligible concerning the subjects relating to jus cogens. For example, she 
discusses the “certain amount of agreement over core activities that trigger universal 
jurisdiction,” such as “piracy [and] slave trade” and provides support with the case 
Attorney General o f the Government o f Israel v. Eichmann.80 This is the exact wording 
and case that is provided in both editions.81 Shirley Scott expanded her second edition by 
including more information on the law of armed conflict. Her book maintains a 
continuity of her analysis of jus cogens, its place within the international legal system, 
and the offenses that are deemed peremptory norms.82 Some authors do not provide any 
changes concerning peremptory norms in international law, thus maintaining exact 
continuity concerning these subjects. This continuity is also apparent in Bederman’s 
editions. He provides the exact same information conceming/w.s' cogens, universal 
jurisdiction, piracy and slavery. Malone also does not expand her discussion of jus 
cogens in her updated version of International Law despite a difference of over ten years 
between editions.84
In Public International Law in a Nutshell, the authors concentrate on how treaties 
that contravene peremptory norms are null and void over the course of three editions.85 
Once Kadic v. Karadzic had been decided in 1995, between the second and third editions 
of the textbook, the authors added more information about individual liability under 
international law. This shows that, if anything, the rhetoric of jus cogens in this series of
80 Epps, 2005, 106 and 111 and Epps, 2009, 115 and 119.
81 Epps, 2005, 106 and 111 and Epps, 2009, 115 and 119.
82 Scott, 2004 and Scott, 2010.
83 Bederman 2006 and Bederman, 2010.
84 Malone, 2011. See also Malone, 1998.
85 Buergenthal and Murphy, 1990. See also Buergenthal and Murphy, 2007 and Buergenthal and Murphy, 
2011 .
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international texts is becoming more expansive and stronger. Another example of the 
strengthening of the jus cogens rhetoric is seen in Von Glahn and Taulbee’s tenth edition. 
Between their 2007 and 2010 textbooks, they added that “the current widely accepted 
view asserts that peremptory norms do exist” and eliminated some of the discussion on 
the possible controversy surrounding the scope of the category of peremptory norms.86 
Aust also added information on jus cogens that strengthened the rhetoric of the 
peremptory norms based on the continued support for obligations erga omnes found in 
ICJ decisions and advisory opinions published after his first edition.87 Dixon, 
McCorquodale and Williams also added more resources and information to support the 
expansion of jus cogens by including documentation that was not available when the 
previous edition was printed that supports the concepts contained in the rhetoric of jus
D O
cogens. Another author who added more information concerning peremptory norms 
between editions was Malanczuk by increasing the of documentation support for jus
on
cogens. These authors are not only providing continuity of their original rhetoric 
provided in their textbooks, but are adding to the robustness of jus cogens.
One of the most expansive increases in a concentration on peremptory norms 
issues can be seen in Shaw’s 2011 edition of International Law. He includes an entire 
chapter on the “Individual Criminal Responsibility in International Law” that was not 
available in the previous edition.90 He examines the development of individual 
responsibility as it flows from its creation to deal with pirates and slave traders to its
86 Von Glahn and Taulbee, 2010. See also Von Glahn and Taulbee, 2007.
87 Aust, 2010, 7 n. 20 and 10.
88 Dixon, McCorquodale and Williams, 2010, 204, and 528-529.
89 Malanczuk, 1997. See also Malanczuk, 2003, 57-60.
90 Shaw, 2011, xxi and 397-443.
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expansion under the Nuremberg Tribunal.91 This chapter also covers the establishment of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in 1993 and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994. 92 After establishing a history of 
judicial bodies created to deal with violations of peremptory norms, such as the Bosnia 
War Crimes Chamber and the Iraqi High Tribunal, Shaw then explains what crimes fall 
into this category, such as genocide and aggression. This chapter provides overall 
picture of these recent developments in jurisprudence. Evans also added information on 
responsibility in international law, known as “R2P” or “the responsibility to protect.”94 
This chapter, written by Spencer Zifcak, provides the history of the doctrine, including its 
“intellectual and political development both before and after the adoption of the World 
Summit resolutions that embodied it.”95 The chapter states that there is “a responsibility 
individually and collectively [among United Nations members] to protect their peoples 
from the commission of mass atrocity crimes.”96 While there is an acceptance of the 
responsibility, R2P is still on unsure footing in the international community and is 
considered by many states to be “a doctrine of primarily of a political rather than legal 
character.”97 According to the author, this is “but a fledgling rule of international 
customary law” that has “some considerable way to go” prior to it being “regarded as 
having been adopted in practice and obtained the requisite international acceptance to be 
considered as fully formed.”98 The information contained in Shaw’s and Evans’ 
textbooks concerning responsibility and action on the part of the international community
91 Shaw, 2011. 398-402.
92 Shaw, 2011,402-410.
93 Shaw, 2011,410-440.
94 Evans, 2010, xxvii and 504-527.
95 Spencer Zifcak, “The Responsibility to Protect,” 504-527, 504 found in Evans, 2010.
96 Zifcak, 521 found in Evans, 2010.
97 Zifcak, 523 found in Evans, 2010.
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could be seen as the beginning of a new principle relating to peremptory norms in 
international law. It is an interesting development, but does not appear to have achieved 
the status of rhetoric in the epistemic community.
WHAT DOES THE RHETORIC MEAN?
Overall, the rhetorical themes provide a picture of the current accepted 
understanding of peremptory norms in the international system. The starting point for 
most jus cogens discussion was the codification in the VCLT where the power of these 
norms to invalidate treaties was established. Even though some of these norms had 
existed prior to codification, the consent of states to be bound by the notion of jus cogens, 
while originally controversial, has become generally accepted. The concept of jus cogens 
moved from being a rather narrowly confined concept that related only to the invalidation 
of certain treaties to an autonomous concept. The autonomous concept is based on 
notions of hierarchy and normativity in international law and has moved beyond the 
concept of controversy among the international community of lawyers. As an 
autonomous legal concept, jus cogens now obligates states to perform certain duties and 
fulfill the policy aspects of peremptory norms by not derogating from these norms in 
either treaty, custom or public policy actions. This robustness and strength that has 
developed can be used to overcome jurisdictional issues. The robust nature of 
peremptory norms allows for these to be considered a fundamental or constitutional part 
of the international system.
Despite the robustness and hierarchical superiority of these peremptory norms, the 
legal concept is not without controversy in the international legal system. The content of
98 Zifcak, 524, found in Evans, 2010.
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what constitutes a peremptory norm, with the exception of norms like the prohibitions 
against piracy and slavery, is still a matter of great debate. There is a movement to 
expand the scope of jus cogens beyond the more traditional norms. The source of new 
peremptory norms is also hotly debated as the differences between the notions of 
positivism and naturalism come to the forefront. While the scope of the content of jus 
cogens is not necessarily established, the existence of peremptory norms in the 
international legal system is no longer debated, and is being used by many to try and 
boot-strap in a number of new norms into the category to achieve the same robust nature 
as the traditional norms in this area. The exceptions to this debate of scope are the 
prohibitions of piracy and slavery, as they are well-established and accepted peremptory 
norms.
This examination shows that in the view of international lawyers, as repeated in 
textbooks, jus cogens is the most robust category in international law, even if the full 
extent of the scope is not known. The lack of specificity that has developed over the 
scope is not likely to be resolved anytime soon. This robust nature places duties upon 
international actors to comply with these peremptory norms outside of considerations of 
individual state-interest, as they are fundamental to the international legal system. The 
epistemic community of international lawyers treats the overall concept as settled and 
fundamental. Despite controversies about the full content of jus cogens, the community 
treats the prohibitions against piracy and slavery as core components of jus cogens, which 
will be expanded in Chapters IV and V.
These rhetorical themes have significant impacts on the understanding of the 
international legal system. Since there is a general consensus among the community of
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international lawyers, the perpetuation of the rhetoric is likely for future generations of 
the members. This provides for continuity of concepts within the system. This 
continuity can also be viewed as the foundation of the values and ideals of the 
community that have maintained an enduring strength. Since “international law is, in
OQ •essences, a system of interrelated ideas,” the ideals of the community become the 
foundation of the international legal system. Viewed in this context, the rhetoric found 
within international legal textbooks, as the written record of the aforementioned ideals, 
becomes vital to understanding the system.
CONCLUSION
The pervasive rhetoric of jus cogens is demonstrated in the above examples of 
international legal textbooks. The rhetoric shows that jus cogens is a well-established 
concept that is expected to provide a deterrent effect and is the basis for obligations for 
enforcement. While at the margins the scope of jus cogens is not fully established. There 
is no debate about the prohibitions against piracy and slavery. It is tempting as a reader 
of these textbooks to reduce everything to a mere philosophical debate between 
positivists and naturalists; however, even though the debate has been revived, the 
existence of jus cogens is no longer questioned, just the scope and effects of peremptory 
norms. In general, the jus cogens language has strengthened over time. Taken as a 
whole, the rhetoric of jus cogens cannot be denied and the extent of its influence on the 
epistemic community of international lawyers is significant.
In the next two chapters, the rhetoric is examined in relation to two of the oldest 
peremptory norms, the prohibitions against piracy and slavery. Since these are core
"Scott, 2010, 289.
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norms of jus cogens, and peremptory norms are the strongest and most robust, reviewing 
these central tenets provides insight. The rhetoric of each peremptory norm is specified 
and then an examination of the reality of piracy and slavery is given to show that a 
significant gap exists between the rhetorical stance of the epistemic community and the 




Piracy is the subject of one of the oldest prohibitions in international law and has 
clearly achieved the status of a jus cogens norm. The piracy, as examined in this chapter, 
goes beyond the recent popular attention to the events around the coast of Somalia. The 
incidents of piracy in other areas such as South America and the South China Sea have 
been increasing as has the violence associated with these events.1 Piracy is one of the 
oldest prohibitions in international law and is also one of the longest standing peremptory 
norms that create obligations upon states to prosecute. The increase in piracy around the 
world is troubling for the individual seafarer and the shipping industry, but also for states. 
Seafarer could suffer from their possessions stolen or may even be maimed or killed 
during a pirate attack. The shipping industry has responded by instituting different 
practices and shipping routes, increasing insurance premiums, or hiring armed guards. 
States have allocated military resources to patrolling certain piracy-riddled areas to 
protect vessels.
The prohibition against piracy is the part of the core of peremptory norms. Given 
that it is one of the oldest international prohibitions and part of jus cogens, this norm is a 
crucial to determining the effectiveness of peremptory norms in the international legal 
system.
1 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Arm ed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 1 January - 3 1  
December 2010, (London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, January 2011). See also  International 
Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 1 January — 31 December 
2011, (London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, March 2012).
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This chapter establishes the inconsistency between the two sources of 
international law contained in Article 38 of the Statute o f the International Court o f  
Justice: international custom as seen in the practice of states and the opinions and 
writings of publicists as seen in textbooks. Just because of the persistence of piracy 
throughout the world as seen through the lack of state action, it does not mean that it must 
actually be legal in the international system according to this study. Peremptory norms 
give rise to obligations. In particular, the prohibition against piracy requires states to 
seek out redress against violations. Current state practice falls short of the obligations to 
act against piracy. Even leading states, such as the United States, view the current reality 
as not having a regime for prosecuting pirates. As will be shown below, some states go 
further by colluding and sponsoring piracy around the world. This reality demonstrates 
an inconsistency between state practice and the legal rhetoric concerning piracy.
The following examines the gap between reality and rhetoric of international law 
with regard to piracy. By providing the historical context of the prohibition against 
piracy, the development of this norm into one of the core tenets of the canon of jus 
cogens is demonstrated. This understanding also provides credence to the crucial case 
methodology. Since jus cogens is a crucial case in the international legal system, as 
discussed in Chapter I, the historical support for the illegality of piratical acts indicates 
that this was one of the best examples to examine. This chapter then moves onto a 
detailed discussion of both sides of the rhetoric/reality gap. To determine the 
international legal community’s side of the gap, the rhetoric that is discernible in 
international legal textbooks concerning piracy and its jus cogens status is surveyed. The
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contemporary reality of piracy is analyzed to ascertain the opposite side of the gap. 
Finally, the implications of the rhetoric/reality gap in the context of piracy are provided.
WHAT IS PIRACY?
Since mankind took to the waterways for private and public endeavors, piracy has 
been an issue. In 69 B.C., Pompey the Great was commissioned to subdue pirates, who 
were viewed as enemies to the sovereignty of Rome.2 During Cicero’s time, around 75 
B.C., “pirates were seen as falling outside the otherwise universal norm that promises 
made under oath should be honored” because “with a pirate there is no common basis for 
either faith or oaths.”3 And in Great Britain, written records from before the Middle 
Ages describe “Eustachius, the black monk, who terrorized the English Channel around 
1200.”4 These early examples caused pirates to be labeled as enemies of all mankind and 
for it to be noted that, “to pirates and wild beasts no territory offers safety.”5 In 1413, 
England passed a law that “defined piracy as high treason.”6 References to the word 
pirate and related words increased in frequency during the sixteenth century, culminating 
in a statue in 1700 in Great Britain that allowed “the holding of Admiralty Commissions
•j
to try pirates outside of England.” This statute allowed for the prosecution of both the 
individuals who were pirates and those who “shall conceal such Pyrates, or receive any 
Vessel or Goods piratically taken, shall be adjudged accessory to such Pyracy, and suffer
2 Alfred Rubin, The Law o f  Piracy, (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1988), 7.
3 Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert, 2007, 39.
4 Dirk Meier, translated by Angus McGeoch, Searfarers, Merchants and Pirates in the Middle Ages, 
(Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2006), 7.
5 Alberico Gentili as quoted in Rubin, 1988, 23.
6 Janice Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in 
Early Modern Europe, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 23.
7 Rubin, 1988, 100.
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as Principals;” however, its spread to all of the colonial ports was not until 1721, thus 
ending the Golden Age of piracy.9
The original Golden Age of Piracy was ushered in the 1690s. It arose for two 
main reasons. The first reason was the profit margins to be had in breaking the East India 
Company monopoly in trade with the American colonies.10 The second reason was the 
end of the wars between England and Spain eliminated the opportunities for privateers 
sailing under letters of marquee. Prior to the issuing of letters of marquee, “the terms 
freebooter, buccaneer, sea rover, and privateer were employed synonymously with the 
word pirate.”11 During this period, a significant legal distinction existed between 
privateers and pirates. Letters of marquee allowed the holder of the letter to be following 
the law but pillage and plunder the recognized enemy of the letter issuer. Privateers had 
the benefit of the “veneer of legality,” unlike pirates who “were simply outlaws.” 12 
When the treaty between England and Spain was signed, the groups of men who were 
only trained to be pirates, decided to simply make “the transition from legal booty to 
illegal plunder.. .for it involved no great changes in habits or mental attitudes,”13 thus a 
large number of pirates plowed the seas. Eventually, piracy in the Atlantic was 
significantly diminished to end the Golden Age of piracy in 1725, but piracy, including 
some of the same individuals, continued to flourish in the South China Sea at similar 
levels. It is important to remember that piracy has never completely disappeared.
8 Daniel Defoe, A General History o f  the Robberies and Murders o f  the Most Notorious Pyrates, (New  
York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1724, Reprint 1972), 320.
9 Hugh Rankin, The Golden Age o f  Piracy, (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), 157.
10 James G. Lydon, Pirates, Privateers, and Profits, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: The Gregg Press, Inc., 1970), 
45.
11 Lydon, 1970, 25.




Eventually privateering was also outlawed with the Declaration of Paris in 1856. While 
the swashbuckling pirates of yesteryear are not sailing around in schooners any longer, 
modem day piracy has taken up the mantel of looting and plundering.
There have been historical discussions of piracy that claim that many who were 
accused of piracy were actually not pirates, but either falsely accused for 
political/economic reasons or suffering from a change in legal status from privateers to 
pirates. While these accusations often resulted in great harm to those who were accused, 
this is not a modem day problem or an overly common problem throughout history. It is 
mentioned here because of the pervasiveness of historical accounts of individuals, such as 
Captain Kidd, who arguably fell victim to a lack of communication of the change in the 
laws at the time, enemies in high places, and English parliamentary politics.14
Contemporary Definitions
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III), which 
is the current dominant treaty law, piracy is covered in Articles 100-107.'5 Modem day 
piracy is often viewed as an “illegal act of violence or detention onboard a vessel on the 
high seas or outside the jurisdiction of the state,” which is in line with Article 101 of 
UNCLOS III.16 This definition does suffer from some controversy as it only includes 
actions that occur outside the territorial waters of a state, which some individuals claim 
unfairly limits the scope of piracy. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has a more
14 Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., The P ira tes' Pact: The Secret Alliances Between H istory’s Most Notorious 
Buccaneers and Colonial America, (New York: McGraw Hill, 2008), 239-240.
15 United Nations: Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law o f  the Sea Office o f Legal Affairs, The Law o f  
the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea: Agreement relating to the Implementation o f  
Part XI o f  the United Nations on the Law o f  the Sea with Index and Excepts from the Final Act o f  the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law o f  the Sea, (New Y ork: United Nations, 2001), 57-58.
expansive definition that identifies piracy as “an act of boarding or attempting to board 
any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent 
intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.”17 The difference between 
the two definitions is one of territorial jurisdiction. In the first definition, the act must 
occur on the high seas and the second definition allows for the act to occur if the ship is 
at sea, at anchor or berthed.
According to the IMB, there are six categories of modem piracy: Asian, South 
American, phantom ship, military/political attacks, attack on the high sea, and ransom.18 
While two of these types of piracy have been assigned geographical designations, these 
types of piracy are not confined to the indicated geographical locations. Asian piracy is 
typically the least violent of all six types because violence is only used in direct response 
to attempted resistance. Such piracy is often successful because the targets are the cash 
and valuables of the crew members and the crew does not realize that the pirates are on 
board because of their skill in getting on and off the ship undetected while in port, straits, 
or other territorial waters. In January 2011, a container ship was boarded in Costa Rica 
and robbed of the ship’s equipment and stores and escaped without being detected.19 
This type of piracy does not meet the UNCLOS III definition of piracy as it occurs within 
the territorial jurisdiction of a state.
South American piracy is characterized by highly violent, pre-planned attacks that 
are used to take crew cash and valuables, navigation equipment from the ship, and cargo
16 Niels West, Marine Affairs Dictionary: Terms, Concepts, Laws, Court Cases, and International 
Conventions and Agreements, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 470.
17 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Arm ed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report I January 
- 3 1  December 2008, (London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2009), 3.
18 International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: A Special Report, (London: 
International Chamber o f Commerce, 1997), 7-10.
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from the hold. It involves collusion by port authorities because heavy equipment is often 
needed to off-load the cargo. For example, in January 2011, twelve men armed with 
guns, knives, axes and crowbars boarded a ship at anchorage outside of Lagos Port in 
Nigeria.20 The crew was badly beaten and severely injured. The pirates escaped after 
having taken personnel belongings and the ships’ cash reserves. While it occurs in 
territorial waters, ports or at anchorage, the local law enforcement typically does not have 
the manpower, competency, or political will to prevent or investigate these matters.
Phantom ship piracy occurs solely on the high seas by armed gangs who have pre­
planned the attack. The gang will board the ship and either set the crew adrift or throw 
them overboard. This occurred, for example, in March 2011 on the South China Sea 
when a tug named the Marina 26 was hijacked en route from Singapore to Cambodia by 
more than ten pirates who had long knives.21 They released the crew with some food, 
water, and their passports in a life raft after they repainted the tug green and disabled the 
satellite tracking system. Once the gang has control over the ship, they will rename the 
ship to match falsified papers and registration and sail to a port with a pre-arranged buyer 
for the cargo. Once that cargo has been disposed of, the gang will use the fake registry to 
steal more cargo from unsuspecting shippers.
Military/political attacks are another type of piracy that occurs in any location by 
armed gangs with some pre-planning. These are considered to be terrorist attacks 
because the motivation behind these actions are political and not specifically for financial 
gain. These types of attacks often receive significant law enforcement response. For
19 International Maritime Bureau, Reports on Acts o f  Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Acts 
Reported during January 2011, (London: International Maritime Bureau, February 2011).
20 International Maritime Bureau, February 2011.
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purposes of this research project, terrorism is considered to be a violation of international 
law distinct from piracy.
The high seas attack occurs only on non-territorial seas by armed gangs coming 
from “mother ships.” The crew is over-powered and the ship is diverted from course. 
The entire cargo is unloaded over several days to either a safe-haven harbor or onto the 
mother ship, and then the ship and crew are released after the cargo transfer. In October 
2011, the Halifax, an oil product tanker, was hijacked off the coast of Nigeria and sailed
")'yto an awaiting barge where the ship’s cargo was transferred. The twenty-five crew 
members were taken hostage and eventually released with no injuries. The location, 
speed, and lack of communication of this kind of attack almost completely prevent any 
chance of a shore-based response.
The final type of piracy is the ransom attack or Somali piracy. Again, using 
mother ships, gangs of pirates on speed boats attack the crew on the high seas. The crew 
is over-powered and then the entire ship is held for ransom from either the shipping 
company or the flag state. The ship is either kept out at sea or is sailed into a safe harbor. 
Two examples of this type of piracy occurred in August 2011, when the Tribal Kat, a 
yacht, was hijacked and its crew members taken hostage off the coast of Yemen.23 Less 
than a week later, a product tanker, the Mattheos I, was hijacked off the coast of Benin 
and the twenty-three crew members were taken hostage.24 The location of both ships is 
unknown and the successful payment of ransoms has not been reported.
21 International Maritime Bureau, Reports on Acts o f  Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Acts 
Reported during March 2011, (London: International Maritime Bureau, April 2011).
22 International Maritime Bureau, Reports on Acts o f  Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Acts 
Reported during October 2011, (London: International Maritime Bureau, November 2011).
23 International Maritime Bureau, Reports on Acts o f  Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Acts 
Reported during August 2011, (London: International Maritime Bureau, September 2011).
24 International Maritime Bureau, September 2011.
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Modem day piracy resembles old piracy in a number of ways. The motivations 
for many of the pirates of today are the same as they have been for the last thousand 
years: freedom, ability to use skills that they have, attempt to escape a miserably living 
situation, and ability to earn a higher profit than would ever be possible in a legitimate 
line of work. As one modem pirate from Bantam stated, he got into piracy “partially for 
the money, but it is fun and adventure, like James Bond.”25 Another similarity is the use 
of the most modem technology, while still relying on basic seafaring skills. The pirates 
of yesteryear often had modified ships that were the fastest and most technologically 
advances on the seas. Today, pirates often have modified ships with advanced weaponry, 
such as rocket-propelled grenades. These weapons may not be as advanced as the United 
States Navy, but are definitely more advanced than the weaponry aboard the attacked 
ships. Both the pirates of today and in the past relied on not just technological 
advantages, but also on being superior sailors who typically are very well-versed in the 
waters in which they attack. Often times, pirates of centuries ago would fly false flags to 
lure in another ship, which is a tactic that has been adopted by modem pirates, who use 
deceit, such as faking engine trouble or pretending to be a small, local fishing boat to 
avoid suspicion.
Another similarity is that piracy, no matter the century, depends on lax 
enforcement on land, thus allowing for safe haven or places to trade and dock. In the past 
and today, ships need to replenish supplies, repair their ships, and spend their ill-gotten 
bounty. Save havens for pirates throughout history have allowed piracy to flourish.
While there are no examples of modem day letters of marquee or any other legal 
exceptions provided by states for pirates, the actions of states through either collusion or
25 Peter Gwin, “Dangerous Straits,” National Geographic, 112, No. 4, (October 2007), 126-149, 146.
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lax enforcement provides the necessary ingredients for successful piracy, such as 
information on cargos and locations for resupplying.
The underlying causes of piratical acts have not shifted significantly in over a 
thousand years. While modem day pirates have access to global positioning and rocket 
propelled grenades, they are still following the same tides that have pushed individuals 
into piracy for centuries.
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL TEXTBOOK RHETORIC
Developments in international law concerning piracy in the last century give the 
appearance of being static and well-settled. The perpetuation of norms in the epistemic 
community is also specific to individual jus cogens norms, such as the prohibition against 
piracy, and can be seen in the discussions contained within international law textbooks. 
These textbooks pass along information about peremptory norms in general, and the 
distinct aspects of each norm contained in this overall category. This is an examination 
of a particular peremptory norm as seen through the lens of the community of 
international lawyers. The following characteristics of this norm as demonstrated in the 
rhetoric found throughout textbooks concerning the jus cogens nature of the prohibition 
against piracy.
Prohibition Against Piracy as Jus Cosens
The strength of the prohibition on piracy as a peremptory norm is put forth within 
international legal textbooks. This is based on both modem law and historical precedent 
since the prohibition on piracy is a fundamental norm under international law. As 
previously discussed, piracy has been historical been viewed as a crime that is threatening
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to both individuals and states. The status of the prohibition of piracy as a jus cogens 
norm has been well-established and is commonly referenced as a peremptory norm.26
The prohibition on piracy has been declared for centuries and has continued to 
become ingrained within the legal system. An oft-quoted and referenced case United 
States v. Smith from 1820 is a prime example of the prohibition of piracy as part of “the
77law of nations.” In this case, Justice Story included over twenty pages of footnotes 
showing that piracy was against the law of nations, including quotations from the likes of 
Grotius, Bacon and Martens 28 Another example, from 1817, is provided in International 
Law in Contemporary Perspective, from the English case Le Louis stating, “With 
professed pirates there is no state of peace [as] they are enemies of every country, and at 
all times; and therefore are universally subject to the extreme rights of war.”29 Pirates 
have even been referred to as individuals who are “committing the original ‘international’ 
crime against humanity;” however, some see the prohibition on piracy developing into 
part of the law of nations as nothing more than “merely safeguard[ing] a joint 
interest.. ..of all States to fight a common danger.”31 While this does appear to regulate 
the crime of piracy to a lesser international law standard, the survival of the prohibition 
and the strong support throughout the international legal community indicates that this 
prohibition has grown beyond a mere interest safeguard.
Piracy is viewed by the overwhelming majority of the international community of 
lawyers as an international crime or a “universal crime” that triggers universal
26 Epps, 2009. See also Shaw, 2008 and Aust, 2010.
27 Janis and Noyes, 2006, 139.
28 Mark W. Janis, The American Tradition o f  International Law: Great Expectations 1789-1914, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2004), 65.
29 Reisman, Arsanjani, Wiesner and Westerman, 2004, 651.
30 Solmanson, 2007, 196.
31 Cassese, 2005, 15.
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jurisdiction and criminal liability of individuals. Piracy is “the clearest example” of an
international crime that places pirates “beyond the pale of protection by any nation.”33 
The rhetoric of the epistemic community is that the prohibition on piracy is a jus cogens 
norm and gives rise to treaty restrictions, extended jurisdiction, and international 
obligations.
Piracy and Treaty Law
The international law textbooks highlight the reliance on the UNCLOS III to 
define piracy and provide treaty-based support for the customary international law that 
has developed over centuries. In some cases, such as Malanczuk’s Akehurst’s Modern 
Introduction to International Law, piracy is referenced only under treaties that provide 
for the provisions of the international crime, such as the 1982 UNCLOS treaty, but these 
references still include jus cogens elements like universal jurisdiction. In some cases, the 
shift to UNCLOS III definitions is beneficial in that it expands the motivations for piracy 
to be more encompassing, as seen in Von Glahn’s explanation of how “acts of piracy may 
be prompted by feelings of hatred or revenge and not merely by desire for gain” as was 
the case in customary law, but it is still required to be motivated for private ends.34 In 
other cases, authors recognize that the definition of piracy under UNCLOS III can also be 
viewed as more narrow because of the elements required to be classified as a piratical act, 
such as the location of attack must be on the high seas or cannot be perpetrated by 
mutineers.35
32 Epps, 2005, 106 and 144.
j3 Bederman, 2010, 76.
34 Von Glahn, 1996, 259.
35 Malcolm D. Evans, “The Law o f the Sea,” found in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), International Law , (New  
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 623-656.
International law textbooks accept UCLOS III as the main treaty to determine 
what rights and obligations individuals and states have in dealing with the international 
crime of piracy. While the concentration on piracy’s definition and limitations due to 
UNCLOS III are provided, the textbooks also demonstrate how the prohibition against 
piracy is a peremptory norm in international law with all the obligations that flow from 
such a designation.36 Within this context, authors also recognize that piracy is an 
international crime that creates expanded jurisdiction and international obligations for 
both individuals and states.
Piracy and Jurisdiction
Another constant within the international legal textbooks is the consensus that 
acts of piracy give rise to universal jurisdiction. Piracy is considered to be the “first 
international crime warranting universal jurisdiction.”37 Universal jurisdiction is more 
expansive then other forms of jurisdiction that rely upon a tie to the individual who 
committed the crime or the individual who was the victim of the crime. For example, a 
state may exercise jurisdiction over an individual who commits a crime within their 
borders under the principle of territorial jurisdiction. The ability to apply jurisdictional 
claims over pirates has expanded beyond the need for a link between the prosecuting state 
and the crime. This is based upon the nature of piracy. Vaughan Lowe states that 
“some crimes are regarded as so serious that all mankind has legitimate interest in 
repressing them” and that “piracy is the archetypal example.”39 Piracy is viewed as 
hostis humani generis, the enemy of all mankind, and is consistently referenced as such
j6 Epps, 2009. See also Dixon, McCorquodale, and Williams, 2011, Evans, 2010, and Shaw, 2008.
37 Joyner, 2005, 137.
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in international legal textbooks, thus providing a basis for universal jurisdiction.40 
According to Janis in 2008, universal jurisdiction is best illustrated by the traditional 
jurisdiction that every state has held over pirates and slave traders.41
A number of texts highlight how the exclusive nature of the flag state jurisdiction 
on the high seas is overcome by the universality of jurisdiction over piratical acts. The 
practical application of this jurisdiction means that “any State is empowered to bring to 
trial persons accused.. .regardless of the place of commission of the crime, or the 
nationality of the author or the victim” which was “first proclaimed in customary 
international law in the seventeenth century, with regard to piracy.”42 Universal 
jurisdiction also creates an exception “to the exclusivity of the flag state’s jurisdiction” as 
“all states may exercise jurisdiction over pirate vessels.”43 For some strict positivists, 
piracy is only a municipal crime and the only influence of international law is on the 
jurisdictional questions concerning enforcement.44 This is not a predominant view in the 
international law rhetoric which has moved away from being strictly positivist or strictly 
naturalist in nature.
Overwhelmingly, the rhetoric in the international community of lawyers provides 
that “it is long been recognized and well-settled that persons and vessels engaged in 
piratical operations on the high seas are entitled to the protection of no nation and may be 
punished by any nation that may apprehend or capture them.”45 This means that any 
nation can assert jurisdiction, thus “the set of possible prosecuting nations is extended
38 United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F.Supp.2d 189, (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
39 Lowe, 2007, 177.
40 McCafFery, 2006, 184. See also Carter, Trimble, and Bradley, 654.
41 Janis, 2008, 335.
42 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 284.
43 Murphy, 2006, 350. See also Buergenthal and Murphy, 2011.
44 Janis and Noyes, 2006.
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beyond that of the perpetrator’s State of nationality or the nation where the offense took 
place.”46 In other words, the conduct of pirates are “sufficiently heinous to violate the 
laws of all states” regardless of where the “conduct started [or] completed,” thus allowing 
for prosecution by all states 47 In addition to the heinous nature of the piracy, the 
common interests of states led to the recognition of universal jurisdiction because “pirates 
usually operated beyond territorial waters with crews of mixed or uncertain
A Q
nationalities.’ The rhetoric of the epistemic community provides that the prohibition 
on piracy is a peremptory norm, which is limited by UNCLOS III, but has universal 
jurisdiction and gives rise to obligations under international law.
Piracy. Obligations and Enforcement
International legal textbooks emphasize the obligation of states to use the “power 
to prosecute and try the accused” or “alternatively to extradite the defendant to a State 
concerned.”49 This obligation has been reinforced in the rhetoric of international law 
through the consistent discussion of UNCLOS III and its requirement in Article 100 that 
“all states shall co-operate to the fullest extent in the repression of piracy.”50 These 
obligations are referred to by some as “obligations erga omnes,” or obligations that are 
towards all.51 These obligations are triggered when an action is “defined as a ‘universal 
crime’” and allow for “all states” to seek redress.52 The purpose of allowing for all states
45 Damrosch, Henkin, Pugh, Schachter, and Smit, 2001, 1136.
46 Bederman, 2010, 190.
47 Slomanson, 1995, 199.
48 Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert, 2007, 181.
49 Cassese, 2005,451 note 26.
50 United Nations Convention on the Law o f  the Sea (1982) 1146, found in Dmanrosh, Henkin, Pugh, 
Schachter,and Smit, 2001, 1146.
51 Scott, 2010,25.
52 Epps, 2010, 115. See also Shaw, 2010.
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to fulfill their obligations “rested on the joint interest of all States to fight a common 
danger (and consequent damage)” that “creat[ed] an [sic] universal terror and alarm” 
because pirates are “enemies of the human race, renouncing every country, and ravaging 
every country in its coasts and vessels indiscriminately.”53
In addition to the obligation that states have to prosecute pirates, authors, such as 
Bederman, discuss the mechanics of legal justifications for other enforcement measures, 
for example, “stop and seizure” of vessels participating in piratical acts.54 In Cases and 
Materials on International Law, the authors discuss briefly discuss the practical problems 
encountered by some states, such as Denmark, on prosecuting and enforcing piracy 
prohibitions. In the example of Denmark, there is an inability to extradite criminals when 
they may be subject to the death penalty and a political unwillingness to use a domestic 
tribunal for fear of immigration complications after the pirates had served their 
sentences.55 Despite these practical problems of prosecution, the discussions provided by 
international law textbooks clearly indicate that there is an obligation on states to do more 
than simply recognize the status of piracy in international law, but to also fulfill their duty 
to punish those who participate in piracy.
In addition to the discussion of obligations, some authors do acknowledge that 
enforcement has been spotty at best. The acceptance of the prohibition on piracy paints a 
picture of universal enforcement and this being an issue from the days of sailing ships 
and pantaloons. Some authors, such as Cassese in 2005 or Von Glahn and Taulbee in 
2007, discuss some modem day incidents of piracy, but the severity and frequency of 
such acts is still downplayed within the textbooks. Another example is Aust, who states
53 Le Louis, Forest, 1817 found in Cassese, 2005, 15.
54 Bederman, 76.
that piracy “is again a curse in several parts of the world, but concentrates his analysis on 
the definitional and jurisdictional issues of piracy with a very limited discussion of the 
increase in piracy in the last decade.56 While these few authors do recognize that there is 
still a problem with piracy throughout the world, the majority of international law 
textbooks use piracy as more of a historical examination of an international crime that 
gives rise to universal jurisdiction than as a current legal problem.
The obligation to prosecute and the ability for states to hold individuals 
accountable under international law for piratical acts have been well-established in the 
rhetoric of the epistemic community. The prohibition against piracy is considered to be a 
historical and modem peremptory norm in international law. The customary law 
prohibition on piracy has been codified in UNCLOS III and allows for prosecution under 
the terms of universal jurisdiction. The jus cogens nature of this prohibition also creates 
obligations erga omnes. These rhetorical patterns are demonstrated throughout the 
textbooks used to transfer knowledge to the new members of the international community 
of lawyers.
Meaning o f the Rhetoric
What story does this rhetoric tell? The illegality of piratical acts and the proper 
state response has been a matter for debate and discussion for as long as there has been 
piracy. Historically, piracy has been a crime where the perpetrators who were found 
guilty were hung until their death. However, publicized trials after the Golden Age of 
piracy are not very common. These historical judicial actions did create the basis for the
55 Dixon, McCorquodale and Williams, 2011.
56 Aust, 2005. See also Aust, 2010.
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modem law on pirates, such as in the case of United States v. Smith. The modem day 
laws have different punishments, ranging from life in prison to lesser sentences, 
depending on the location of the trial and the charges that are specified.
As discussed previously, piracy has become an international crime that falls into 
the category of jus cogens. This status confers universal jurisdiction and obligations to 
prosecute violations of this norm. This duty is reinforced in UNCLOS III, Article 100, 
which requires states to cooperate in repressing piracy to the fullest extent possible.
These enforcement duties are conferred upon all states equally in the international 
system. Given the jus cogens status of the prohibition against piracy and the strong state 
obligations to suppress piracy, the international community o f states should be 
prosecuting and punishing pirates, but this is not reality.
CONTEMPORARY REALITY
There are problems with tracking piracy. Unfortunately, one problem with 
reporting is that all the witnesses might be dead, so an account cannot be provided.57 
Another problem with adequately identifying the extent of piracy is the lack of reporting 
by shipping companies, who typically underreport, due to “fear of raising their insurance 
premiums and prompting protracted, time-consuming investigations.”58 A third problem 
is that such illegal acts sometimes involve collusion by law enforcement or port officials, 
which would tend to make shippers or victims reluctant to report these crimes to the same 
individuals supplying the pirates with intelligence and assistance. An example is 
provided by David Vann, who when his engine was stolen during a trip in Mexico, was
57 Martin N. Murphy, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: The Challenge o f  Piracy , (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008), 68.
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told by the port captain that it is a loss could be reported officially or unofficially. 
According to Vann, “officially meant he’d have six agencies come strip-search me” but 
“unofficially meant he would do nothing, even though I could tell him who’d stolen the 
engine and where it was being kept.”59 Also, in many parts o f the world, particularly in 
South East Asia, piracy is considered “a normal but illegal means of making money.”60 
In addition to regional acceptance, a number of states refuse to admit that they have any 
piracy within their region because of the possible cooling effects on shipping due to 
possible delays.61 Underreporting occurs because many attacks involving coastal 
fishermen and recreational boaters are not brought to the attention of the authorities. It
has been estimated that as many as seventy-five percent of attacks are not reported 
worldwide.
The Piracy Reporting Center (PRC), an arm of the IMB, tracks the incidents of 
piracy throughout the world. While the figure provided by the PRC is based upon self- 
reporting, it does provide insight into the extent of piratical acts. Between 2003 and 
2011, there were a total of 3,284 attempted and successful piratical attacks around the 
world.64 In 2008, the following states had five or more incidents that were reported: 
Bangladesh, Ghana, Gulf of Aden, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Peru, the 
Philippines, the Singapore Straits, Somalia, Tanzania and Vietnam.65 Of the 293 reported 
actual or attempted attacks in 2008, 200 were successful.66 These attacks resulted in a
58 Luft and Korin, 2004, 62.
59 David Vann, “Last Voyage o f  the Culin,” Outside Magazine, October 2008.
60 International Maritime Bureau, 1997, 3.
61 Murphy, 2008, 18.
62 Von Glahn and Taulbee, 2007, 362.
63 Michal McNicholas, Maritime Security: An Introduction, (Burlington, MA: Elserier, Inc., 2008), 172.
64 International Maritime Bureau, Annual Reports 2008,2009, 2010 and 2011.
65 International Maritime Bureau, 2009, 8.
66 International Maritime Bureau, 2009, 11.
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reported 1,011 deaths, kidnappings, or injuries to crew members.67 In 2009, a total of 
410 piracy attacks that were attempted or successful were reported.68 Of these attacks, 
202 were successful worldwide, resulting in 1,166 deaths, kidnappings, or injuries to 
crew members.69 In 2010, saw an increase in actual or attempted attacks to total 489 
incidents with 276 of these attempts to have been successful which resulted in 1,086 
deaths, kidnappings, or injuries.70 An increase was recorded in 2011, with 544 actual or 
attempted attacks, with 270 successful attacks.71 While only 582 deaths, kidnappings, or 
injuries occurred in these incidents, the number of deaths rose from 2 to 7 between 2010 
and 2011.72
These attacks often include the use of a weapon and the use of these weapons is 
continuing. From 2003 until 2007, the highest level of guns reported being used during 
an attack was less than thirty percent.73 In 2008, guns were reported to be used in over 
forty-seven percent of the attacks.74 The escalation continued as over fifty-eight percent 
of attacks in 2009 reported the use of guns.75 In 2010, almost half of the incidents 
reported weapons being used, including knives and steel pipes.76 The use of weapons 
continued into 2011, with a total of 186 incidents involving weapons.77 Many of these 
violent attacks were not in Somali, but centered on the opposite coast of Africa in the
67 International Maritime Bureau, 2009, 13.
68 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report I January 
- 3 1  December 2009, (London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2010), 6.
69 International Maritime Bureau, 2010, 10 and 12-13.
70 International Maritime Bureau, 2011.
71 International Maritime Bureau, 2012.
72 International Maritime Bureau, 2012.
73 International Maritime Bureau, 2009, 13.
74 International Maritime Bureau, 2009, 13.
75 International Maritime Bureau, 2010, 13-14.
76 International Maritime Bureau, 2011.
77 International Maritime Bureau, 2012.
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waters off of Nigeria where more violent attacks involving guns, knives and other 
weapons were successful.78
According to Peter Chalk, there are seven factors that have created an upswing in
70pirate attacks. A number of these factors are not controlled by international or domestic 
law. The first is continued increase in the amount of maritime traffic. Given that 
“roughly 80 percent of global freight moves by sea, much o f which takes the form of 
cargo that is transshipped on the basis of just enough, just in time inventory,”80 the 
opportunities available for pirate targets are numerous. Second, a large amount of the 
commerce has to pass through maritime chokepoints, such as the Malacca Straits and the 
Singapore Straits. Attempting to avoid these chokepoints will often add significant and 
possibly cost-prohibitive expenses and time delays, but these congestion areas provide 
opportunities for the pirate.81 Third, the global recession and economic gain, when other 
avenues of earning are cut off, piracy will increase. The fourth factor concerns the 
general issues of maritime surveillance. The high seas alone cover approximately 2.42 
times the planet’s terrestrial surface area with over 139,000,000 square miles, which is a 
large area to be successfully monitored.82 It has been estimated by Admiral Michael 
Mullen, former chair of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, that it would take “1,000 
ships to effectively fight piracy, more than the entire U.S. Navy fleet.”83 The final non-
78 International Maritime Bureau, 2012.
79 Peter Chalk, The Maritime Dimension o f  International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges fo r  
the United States, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), xi-xii.
80 Michael D. Greenberg, Peter Chalk, Henry H. Willis, Ivan Khilko, and David S. Ortiz, Maritime 
Terrorism: Risk and Liability, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006), 15.
81 David Hunt, “The Piracy Hotspots o f  Tomorrow,” Reinsurance Magazine, August 1, 2008, 13.
82 Chalk, 2008, 2.
83 David Osier, “Medvedev Calls for International Piracy Court,” Lloyd’s List, May 6, 2009, 2.
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legal factor is the “global proliferation of small arms [that] has provided pirates with an 
enhanced means to operate on a more destructive and sophisticated level.”84
Some of these factors are controlled by legal factors. The first legal factor is 
related to the need for fighting piracy on land. This factor is the lack of competent and 
sufficient security in port areas affects the level of piracy. In areas where a “combination 
of laziness, inefficiency, and corruption in port areas” exists, pirates “must surely feel a 
reasonable high degree of safety and security in their chosen means of commercial 
endeavor.”85 The final factor, which is discussed more in more depth below, is 
corruption and official collusion. This factor is directly related to the failing on the part 
of states to uphold their obligations under the prohibition of piracy.
Somali Piracy: A Well-Publicized but Not Unique Case
Since Somali piracy is one of the profitable and most published cases of piracy 
since the Golden Age of Piracy, it is examined in more depth than other piratical hot 
spots around the world, such as West Africa and the South China Sea. The intensity and 
extremism of piracy in Somalia has overshadowed many of the other troubled areas in the 
world. The purpose of this section is to address the problem of Somali piracy, but is not 
intended to limit the scope of this study by excluding the hundreds of other instances of 
piracy throughout the world. While Somalia has been dominating the piracy 
conversation for a number of years, it is not the only area of piracy. It does need a more 
extensive examination due to the increased international response to this region.
84 Chalk, 2008, xii.
85 Jack A. Gottschalk and Brian P. Flanagan, Jolly Roger with an Uzi: The Rise and Threat o f  Modern 
Piracy, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), 62.
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As of December 31, 2008, a total of 815 crew members had been taken hostage 
for ransom in Somalia. Since the beginning of the counter-piracy missions that started 
in December of 2008, a total of 2,317 seafarers have been held.87 As of December 1,
2011, a total of 200 crew members were being held hostage.88 In a state with a per capita 
GPD of $600, ransom payments have been estimated to total more than $410 million in 
the last few years, creating a lucrative industry that employs a large number of the Somali
OQ
population. There is even specialization within the industry. “Ex-fisherman, are 
considered the brains of the operation because they know the sea; ex-militiamen, who are 
considered the muscle... and the technical experts, who are the computer geeks and know 
how to operate the hi-tech equipment,” make up the average pirate gang.90 This ransom 
money is purchasing power and recognition, in addition to houses and cars, and turning 
these pirates into “folk heroes.”91 The President of Puntland in Somalia, Amdirahman 
Mohamed Farole, joked “that every young Somali boy now wants to be a pirate and every 
young girl wants to marry one.”92 As their confidence grows, the Somali pirates’ 
“opening demands had jumped ffom a range of $2.5m-$6m” in 2008, “to absolutely 
astronomical numbers, ranging from $5m to $15m” in 2009 93 In addition to becoming 
more brazen, Somali pirates have become more sophisticated, as explained by Rear 
Admiral Jones, “that the mother ships share information about ships sighted or to be
86 International Maritime Bureau, 2009, 22.
87 “Merchant Ship Crews Held Hostage in Somalia,” December 20,2011 found at 
http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/12/merchant-ship-crews-held-hostage-in-somalia/.
88 “Merchant Ship Crews Held Hostage in Somalia,” 2011.
89 Max Boot, “Pirates, Then and Now: How Piracy was Defeated in the Past and Can be Again,” Foreign 
Affairs, (July/August 2009), 94-107, 94-95.
90 Robyn Hunter, “Somali Pirates Living the Higher Life,” BBC News, April 19, 2009.
91 U y o d ’s List, “Piracy Must be Defeated in Courts and Banks, Not Just at Sea,” February 5, 2009, 4.
92 Steve Bloomfield, “A Politician on Pirate Turf,” Newsweek, May 4, 2009, 8.
93 L loyd’s List, “Ransom Demands Soaring to Astronomical Levels,” June 11, 2009, 16.
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attacked.”94 While the level of sophistication is increasing on one end of Somali piracy, 
at the other end, according to a former captain in Somalia’s long defunct navy, Abdullahi 
Omar Qawdan, “All you need is three guys and a little boat, and the next day you’re 
millionaires.”95
The Security Council of the United Nations has attempted to address the problem 
of piracy by passing five separate resolutions in 2008. Despite the signing of the 
December 2008 memorandum between Britain and Kenya that creates a formal 
relationship for the trials of captured pirates, the “dominant approach has been to avoid 
capturing pirates in the first place, or, if captured, releasing the pirates without charging 
them with a crime.”96 In 2009, Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, South Korea, The Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi 
Arabia, Russia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United 
States all deployed naval forces to the Gulf of Aden. Nevertheless, approximately $200- 
350 million will be needed to sustain naval vessels in the region annually and the 
effectiveness can legitimately be questioned.97 Despite these developments, Kenyan 
courts lack the resources to do more than have a handful of convictions and most states, 
including the Netherlands, Russia, and the United States, have simply released captured 
pirates.98 In other words, as stated by Rear Admiral William Baumgartner of the United 
States Coast Guard, “Somali pirates to date have suffered few consequences, even when
94 Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, “Pirates Becoming Better Organized,” Europolitics, May 28, 2009.
95 The Week, “Somalia: A State o f  Failure,” May 22, 2009, 11.
96 Eugene Kontrorovich, “International Legal Responses to Piracy O ff the Coast o f  Somalia,” American 
Society o f  International Law, 13, No. 2 (2009): http://www.asil.org.insights090206.cfm.
97 Raymond Gilpin, “Counting the Costs o f  Somali Piracy,” United States Institute o f  Peace Working 
Paper, June 22, 2009.
98 Boot, 2009, 106.
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they were apprehended.”99 In 2010, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
extended its counter piracy mission to the end of 2012, as the current mandate was set to 
expire at the end of August 2010.100
Recently, the international response against piracy has further weakened. NATO’s 
mission only has a limited number of warships from Britain, the United States, Italy, 
Turkey, and Greece, which, while the mandate has been extended, is not necessarily 
sufficient to make a significant difference in the number of attacks in the Gulf of Aden, 
especially as the Somali pirates are expanding their area of operation. Somali pirates are 
now hijacking boats more than 1,200 miles from the Somali coast, which is closer to 
India than Somalia.101
The Kenyan government has stated that it will no longer accept suspected pirates 
for prosecution despite the 2008 memorandum with the British government. An 
agreement between the Netherlands and Kenya was also recently suspended by the 
Kenyan government. Agreements that the Kenyan government had signed with the 
European Union, the United States, Canada and China are also expected to be cancelled 
very shortly. The Seychelles have agreed to take suspected pirates in an agreement with 
the European Union, but the pirates are required to serve their sentences in other states, 
thus providing a forum, but not necessarily the ability to punish the violators. Despite the 
existence of a forum to try pirates, pirates are still being set free. In March 2010, six 
pirates were placed in a skiff with fuel and water to reach shore after a gun battle and a
99 Boot, 2009, 107.
100 International Maritime Bureau, April 2010, 29.
101 Jeffrey Gettleman, “Somali Pirates Hijack Vessels 1,200 Miles Offshore,” The New York Times, April 
20 , 2010.
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chase on the high seas.102 This is a common occurrence. In May 2010, the Russian navy, 
after a 22-minute firelight, placed the captured pirates on their own ship and sent them 
home.103 The lack of enforcement of international law can be summed up by General 
Mikolai Y. Makarov, the chief of Russia’s general staff, when he stated, “It is much 
easier to catch pirates than to decide what to do with them.”104
The response to the problem of Somali piracy which appears to be having limited 
success, but given the increased range of many Somali pirates, this may be skewed.
While the number of the attacks has increased, the success rate of the pirates has 
diminished. In 2010, 172 vessels where attacked with a success ratio of twenty-nine 
percent or fifty completed hijacks.105 The success ratio of Somali pirates dropped to 11.5 
percent with only thirty-three successful hijackings o f the 286 attacks.106 Overall, the 
amount of attention in the world-wide media to this particular area has taken focus away 
from other areas of piracy that have significantly increased over the last two years 
showing that piracy is not a problem contained off the coast of Somalia, thus not a unique 
case.
Further Piracy Concerns Beyond Somalia
Other areas have caused concern in the international shipping community as 
piracy increases. In Peru, while vessel seizures for ransom are not an issue, the 
kidnapping of target personnel in the shipping industry from vessels is of increasing
102 Alan Cowell, “Pirate Suspects are Released by Naval Force,” The New York Times, March 25, 2010.
103 Ellen Barry, “Russia Frees Somali Pirates it had Seized in Shootout,” The New York Times, May 7,
2010 .
104 Barry, 2010.
105 International Maritime Bureau, 2012.
106 International Maritime Bureau, 2012.
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concern.107 It has been noted that “piracy incidents off Nigeria were increasingly very 
violent and incidents where seafarers are injured or killed were not very common,” 
despite a significant under-reporting of incidents to the IMB.108 Also on the Western 
coast of Africa, one of the world’s most lawless stretches is the Gulf of Guinea.109 While 
patrols of NATO ships have been continuing in the Gulf of Aden, off the coast of 
Somalia, pirates have simply moved their focus to areas where no patrols exist, the 
southern and eastern coasts.110 These concerns have spread throughout the Indian Ocean 
and recently caused an unprecedented loading and shipping of racing yachts on armed 
ships to avoid possible pirate attacks.111 The number of incidents in the South China Sea 
was reported at seventy-seven in 2009, 134 in 2010, and 113 in 2011, thus being a 
significant contributor to piracy in the world.112
On a brighter note, one of the rare cases of piracy in European waters recently 
resulted in a Moscow Court handing down a five-year sentence to an Estonian man, who 
plead guilty to hijacking a cargo ship off the coast of Sweden in August 2010.113 This 
prosecution is unusual. The story of the Felicity, a yacht sailing off the coast of 
Madagascar is a more common occurrence of the prosecutions of pirates.114 While the 
yacht was sailing in international waters, seven pirates with AK-47s boarded her from a 
speed boat. After taking all the personal belongings of the crew and passengers, two 
more pirates in a skiff met the Felicity. At this point, all crew and passengers, except the
107 Lloyd’s List, “Peru Crimewave Spreads to Ocean as Pirate Attacks Rise,” March 13, 2009, 12.
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Master, were locked in the bottom of the yacht. The pirates ordered the Master, after 
threatening to kill him and three women on board to navigate towards Tanzania, while 
attacking all vessels they came across. Eventually the Felicity ran out of fuel and 
supplies. The pirates continued to sail towards Mozambique after leaving the Felicity 
where they were arrested for attacking multiple ships in the sixteen day ordeal. The 
pirates were then released and not prosecuted.
Individual states also prevent international or regional enforcement through 
collusion or complicated and unnecessary procedures or fees. Indonesia is notorious for 
“complicity of government officials and members of the security forces who participate 
in, arrange, or otherwise facilitate low-and high-end attacks.”115 In January 2006, an 
Indonesian soldier was arrested during a piracy attack while kidnapping two crew 
members.116 It was a confirmation of long-held suspicions of the shipping community 
that “Chinese and Indonesian military have assisted or participated in piracy in Southeast 
Asia.”117 Often pirates obtain information about shipping routes and cargos from local 
port officials to allow for better planning and coordination of attacks. In the case of the 
phantom ship type of piracy, Consulates of Panama, Honduras, Belize and St. Vincent are 
known for taking a higher fee and registering these phantom ships.118 A specific case, the 
MV ANNA SIERRA is illustrative of a state frustrating the process of a successful 
enforcement against piracy.119 The ship was highjacked in South East Asia and luckily 
found intact with the pirates still on board by the Chinese authorities. The pirates were 
repatriated to a variety of states after a brief stay in a Chinese hotel without any legal
115 Chalk, 2008, 16-17.
116 McNicholas, 2008, 166.
117 McNicholas, 2008, 166.
118 International Maritime Bureau, 1997, 25.
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consequences. A bill was sent to the cargo owners and the ship owners for law 
enforcement activities, docking fees, processing fees, and cargo storage fees. A local 
official attempted to co-opt the cargo for resale with no consequences. Eventually the 
ship was left to rot and the cargo left to spoil because of the actions of the Chinese 
government. While this case is an extreme example of what can happen, the lack of 
cooperation by local authorities and in some cases outright collusion by officials 
frustrates the ability to combat piracy.
State collusion and failing to prosecute pirates manifest for a variety of reasons. 
State collusion often occurs because of corruption by individuals in positions of power, 
such as government officials who administer ports. This corruption allows for pirates to 
take advantage of favorable conditions and is currently leading towards ascendancy in 
West African piracy. 120
Failing to prosecute pirates occurs for a number of reasons. In some cases, the 
facilities, infrastructure, or resources to prosecute do not exist or are inadequate. In 
September of last year, Seychelles President, James Michel, stated that “with thousands 
of pirates in operation, however, it is clear that there is not enough prison capacity in this 
region to deal with this problem.”121 In other cases, it is a lack of evidence or properly 
obtained and maintained evidence that prevents prosecution. A witness statement from 
an affected seafarer is required for prosecution of a suspected pirate.122 Often states fail 
to prosecute because issues that would be raised in the domestic setting. For example,
119 International Maritime Bureau, 1997, 33-39.
120 Steve Phelps, “Safety at Sea International,” October 2011 found at International Maritime Organization, 
Current Awareness Bulletin, September 2011, Vol. XXIII, no. 9.
121 Global Travel Industry News, “President o f  Seychelles Calls for Intensified Efforts Against Piracy,” 
September 7, 2011 found at http://www.eturbonews.com/25062/president-seychelles-calls-intensified- 
efforts-against-piracy.
114
“the British Foreign Office reportedly warned the Royal Navy against detaining pirates 
since this might violate their human rights and could lead to claims of asylum in 
Britain.”123
Overall, modem day piracy remains a significant problem in the world. The 
economic and security costs aside, the human toll is significant for seafarers. Despite a 
few positive developments, such as the recent conviction in Russia and charges brought 
in the United States against eleven men who attacked to United States Navy vessels, the 
majority of piracy is going unpunished, often because of claims of a lack of legal ability 
to prosecute these individuals. The lack of prosecutions, despite the continued rise in 
piratical acts highlights the gap between the international legal principles and the 
situation on the ground.
RHETORIC/REALITY GAP
The existence of a gap between the rhetoric of piracy in the international legal 
community and reality is evident in “the popular perception that the international 
community has eliminated sea piracy,” which contradicts with the fact that “not only has 
piracy never been eradicated, but the number of pirate attacks on ships has also tripled in 
the past decade.”124 The recent increase and publicized Somali pirates definitely 
challenged this notion of piracy being a problem of the past. Unfortunately, given the 
current reality of the international law to prosecute pirates, the elimination of piracy as an 
international problem is not likely to come to fruition anytime soon.
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According to the community of international lawyers, there is a clear path for 
prosecution and enforcement contained within current treaty and customary international 
law. Any state, even one without a connection to the pirates or the victims, can claim 
jurisdiction and prosecute these individuals. This course of action is allowed under the 
jus cogens nature of piracy, the treaty codification of piracy issues in UNCLOS III, the 
applicability of universal jurisdiction, and the obligations of states assigned to 
peremptory norms, especially norms that are international crimes. According to the 
rhetoric provided by the epistemic community, the universal crime of piracy should be 
diminishing under the current international legal system.
Despite the rhetoric of the international community of lawyers, the reality of the 
situation can be summed up by looking at recent statements by a leading United States 
military official. “Admiral Michael Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, said “[o]ne of the challenges that you have in piracy, clearly, is if you are 
intervening and you capture pirates, is there a path to prosecute them?”125 This lack of 
understanding of the nature of piracy as a peremptory norm shows that a gap exists 
between the rhetoric of the international legal community and the reality as perpetrated 
by state actors. This inconsistency between these two sources of the international law, 
the practice of states and the teachings of publicists, highlights a significant issue within 
the international legal system.
In regards to the first part of the rhetoric discussed in this chapter, this gap 
focuses on the declaration of a norm falling into a category o f jus cogens is recognized, 
but that does not mean that there will be a practical application of the rhetoric. The
125 Thom Shanker, “U.S. Urges Merchant Ships to Try Steps to Foil Pirates,” The New York Times, 
November 20, 2008.
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history of piracy being illegal under the law of nations goes back for centuries, but the 
understanding of that acceptance by all states does not translate into a practical 
application of the duties that rhetorically flow from a jus cogens norm. The well- 
established and broad acceptance of piracy as a peremptory norm is seen throughout the 
international legal community, yet, it does not translate to the individuals who are on the 
front lines of the piracy fight.
The Gap Contained in Treaties and Definitions
The international legal textbooks review UNCLOS III as being the treaty base for 
the definition of piracy, but this also does not conform to the reality of the situation of 
piracy. Not all pirate attacks occur on the high seas. Nevertheless, a number of violent 
attacks and robberies occur when ships are at anchorage or in port. The United Nations 
agency, the IMB, does not even use the same definition as UNCLOS III and includes 
attacks that occur at berthing, anchorage, or territorial straits. The reason for this 
inclusionary definition is that an invisible line in the ocean will not make a difference to 
the seafarer who has just been kidnapped or killed. Leaving behind the issues of territory 
in the UNCLOS III piracy definition, in the case of Somalia, the territorial seas are 
enterable “for the purpose of repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea, in a 
manner consistent with such action permitted on the high seas with respect to piracy.” 126 
Given this latitude under the more restrictive UNCLOS III provisions, the number of 
prosecutions of Somali pirates is still relatively low.
126 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1816, June 2, 2008.
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The Gap o f Universal Jurisdiction
The nature of universal jurisdiction stemming from peremptory norms allows 
states the opportunity to prosecute those individuals who are participating in piratical 
activity. By overcoming issues of jurisdiction through the nature of peremptory norms, 
states have little legal obstacles in their path to prosecution. Despite the clear rhetorical 
availability of any jurisdiction in the world, states are still not prosecuting violators of the 
prohibition on piracy. The main purpose of universal jurisdiction is to allow states to 
pursue interests that serve the world as a whole. Since pirates are considered not only to 
be enemies of all mankind, but also cause significant problems that are shared by a 
number of states, such as increased shipping costs and death or injury to seafarers from a 
plethora of different jurisdictions, the application of universal jurisdiction is proper even 
if not being used by states.
The Gap o f  the Duties and Obligations o f States
A duty placed upon states to enforce the provisions of international law 
concerning piracy is the final rhetorical theme. “While every state has the right to arrest 
pirates on the high seas and arraign them under its own domestic laws, few do.”127 The 
lack of prosecutions and the continued freeing of violators of international law, despite 
the legal availability of a remedy and the lack of jurisdictional issues, demonstrates a 
shirking of the enforcement obligations and duties that flow from jus cogens. At a bare 
minimum, the fact that states are not prosecuting is a violation of their duty under 
international law according to the rhetoric of peremptory norms. The violations of
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international law by states are even higher when it is not just a failure to prosecute but 
when it is state or state actor collusion, which has been observed in a number of states. 
This state collusion is significant in that highlights extent of the schism that has 
developed between the rhetoric of international law and the practice o f state actors. If 
states are participating in the violations of peremptory norms by colluding with pirates or 
providing a safe haven, then the possibility o f state actors dismissing lesser principles of 
international law is significant.
CONCLUSION
The examination above provides evidence that a significant gap exists between 
the rhetoric of international law as advanced by the international legal community and the 
reality of state action in the international legal system. This gap has been demonstrated 
through an investigation of the values and concepts being disseminated and taught to the 
next generation of the community of international lawyers concerning piracy as a 
peremptory norm as compared to the actions taken against piratical acts throughout the 
world. The existing disconnection between the system perpetuators and educators of the 
international legal system, the epistemic community, and the actions of international 
actors is evident and leads to further examination. This gap raises the question of what 
this means for the future of the international legal system if one of the oldest and most 
established jus cogens prohibitions is not fulfilled? The implications of this gap will be 
detailed in Chapter VI below.
127 Martin N. Murphy, Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The Threat to  International 
Security, Adelphi Paper 338, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 16.
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These issues are not limited to the prohibition against piracy. The following 
chapter examines slavery as another example of a strong rhetorical support of a norm that 




The following focuses on slavery, which is the second traditional peremptory 
norm that demonstrates the gap that exists between the rhetoric of the international 
community of lawyers and the reality of state practice. Slavery is a prohibition in 
international law that has been debated for nearly three centuries. The prohibition is 
considered a jus cogens norm and is viewed as a well-established and settled part of 
international law. Often slavery is thought of as an institution of the past where 
“negroes” were sold on the open market, especially in the United States.1 However, it 
has a long history that includes many societies and their nation states. Since slavery is 
one of the longest standing prohibitions international law, the gap between the rhetoric of 
the epistemic community and the reality of those still suffering in bondage and servitude 
is troubling for the international legal system.
As with the prohibition against piracy, the ban on slavery is part of the core of jus 
cogens. The review of the rhetoric and reality concerning the application of this norm is 
important to determining the state of the international legal system with regard to 
peremptory norms. As previously determined,/ws cogens is a crucial case in understating 
the international legal system. The prohibition against slavery, like the prohibition 
against piracy, it is unique in the international legal system and it provides definite 
evidence of the state of affairs concerning7 cogens. By using the prohibition against
1 Ivan E. McDougle, “The Development o f  Slavery,” The Journal o f  Negro History 3, no. 3 (July 1918), 
214-239.
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slavery, as it is one of the most well-established tenets of peremptory norms, insight is 
garnered concemingyw.v cogens and the international legal system.
This chapter continues the analysis of the inconsistency in the Article 38 of the 
Statute o f  the International Court ofJustice sources of international law. Again, this is 
not an argument that the modem persistence of slavery, or piracy, creates a situation 
where the laws have been invalidated. On the contrary, this shows how these laws are 
considered to be both mature and settled, but current state practice does not fulfill the 
obligations required under these norms. Since state practice is one of the sources of 
international law, the lack of consistency between the rhetoric of the community of 
international lawyers and the reality of the actions of states is significant.
The following also mirrors the examination on the prohibition against piracy. The 
chapter reviews what constitutes slavery, analyzes the rhetoric on slavery developed by 
the international legal community in textbooks, and discusses the modem reality of 
slavery. As in the case of piracy, the gap between the rhetoric of the legal community 
concerning slavery and the reality of the actual practice will be discussed.
WHAT IS SLAVERY?
One of the earliest known discussions of slavery as concept occurred ancient
times, when Aristotle in “The Politics” examined the differences between slaves and
•  •  •  •  1freeman in political life and nature. The acceptance of slavery continued through the
Age of Enlightenment as seen the writings of Montesquieu who viewed servitude as a
2 Aristotle, “The Politics” in Chris Brown, Terry Nardin, and Nicholas Rengger (eds.), International 
Relations in Political Thought: Texts from  the Ancient Greeks to the First World War, (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 61-82.
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right if it would preserve a conquest. Slavery was widespread and all-encompassing 
until at least the early seventeenth century, when there was a shift to being based more 
upon race, and in some cases, class differences.4 This shift in the slave trade was “based 
on a lucrative triangular trade transporting goods from Europe to Africa, African slaves, 
mostly sold by Arab dealers, to the plantations in America, and finally products and raw 
materials from America to Europe.”5
The middle ages saw a significant rise in the capture of individuals from the coast 
in Spain by the Barbary corsairs for use as slaves in North Africa. This time period gave 
rise to a practice known as redemption or ransoming. Redemption is the payment of 
funds to the owners of the slaves for their release. The name of redemption comes from 
the beginning of this practice in medieval Spain when “a succession of popes had 
declared the giving of alms for the rescue of Christians in Muslim lands,” thus redeeming 
their souls.6 The redemption movement was championed by both the Catholic Church 
and by the Spanish government. While some individuals who were ransomed returned to 
their lives without significant issues, a number of former slaves did not have anything to 
return to, thus becoming beggars.7
Since slavery was a legally protected practice for centuries, the movement to 
outlaw slavery was an uphill battle. The establishment of a number of international non­
governmental organizations and private groups who pushed for change throughout the
3 Montesquieu, “The Spirit o f  the Laws,” in Chris Brown, Terry Nardin, and Nicholas Rengger (eds.), 
International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from  the Ancient Greeks to the First World War, (New  
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002),399-406, 403.
4 William Renwick Riddell, “Observations on Slavery and Pirvateering,” The Journal o f  Negro History 15, 
no. 3 (July 1930), 337-371.
5 Malanczuk, 21.
6 Ellen G. Friedman, Spanish Captives in North Africa in the Early Modern Age, (Madison, WI: The 




international community eventually changed the perception of slavery. As early as the 
mid-1700s, “the movement for the abolition of slavery and the slave trade began -  on 
moral grounds -  to gain influence within the society of states.”9 The coordination of the 
movement eventually started to influence governmental deliberations and allowed for 
states to discuss the legal status of the slave trade and slavery.
The legal status of slavery was hotly debated during the beginning of the 
nineteenth century which led to a split in the legal status of slavery and the slave trade.10 
While domestic slavery was still allowed, the slave trade was first internationally 
condemned in a treaty between France and England in 1814 and subsequently adopted at 
the Vienna Congress of 1815.11 England was one of the states advancing the cause to 
ban slavery by outlawing the slave trade in 1807, and abolishing slavery in 1833.12 
England was at the forefront of the fight of abolition throughout the 19th Century, in large 
part due to the strong presence of non-governmental organizations who opposed the 
practice.
The next major development in the movement to abolish slavery was the 1841 
Quintuple Treaty of London that “bound the governments concerned to prohibit to their 
subjects not only the slave-trade but also the investment of slavery.”13 Despite these 
treaties and the push by England to outlaw slavery, the outlawing of the slave trade did 
not eliminate slavery. For example, French vessels had to follow regulations that 
determined if a passenger was bona fide by carrying a linen bracelet that had been
8 Ian Clark, International Legitimacy and World Society (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007).
9 Hannikainen, 76.
10 Mark Weston Janis, The American Tradition o f  International Law: Great Expectations 1789-1914, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 69-72.
11 Malanczuk, 21.
12 Janis, 2004, 134.
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stamped by the consular; however, slavers simple sent crew members posing as 
passengers to fraudulently obtain the necessary papers, which were passed on to the 
slaves to ensure entry into customs.14
The international community continued to fight against the slave trade with the 
Convention Relative to the Slave Trade and Importation into Africa of Firearms, 
Ammunition, and Spirituous Liquors, also known as the Brussels Conference Act of 
1890. This convention was meant to “attack the evil on land as well as at sea,” was 
agreed upon.15 There is a question as to the motivations of the states to use this 
opportunity to declare the slave trade abolished. It has been suggested that the “real 
reason.. .was prompted by a shortage of workforce on the Western Coast of Africa, 
depopulated by the three-centuries-long export trade of slave labor to North and South 
America.”16 This Act was “ratified by all European states, the United States, Persia, 
Turkey, the Congo and Zanzibar and provided effective military and legal measures to 
terminate the slave trade.”17 While this Act did “recognize the legality of certain forms 
of slavery,” it provided that “the signatories enact legislation against the slave-trade and 
slave-hunting.”18
In some limited instances, the slave trade has been viewed as a type of piracy and 
prosecuted or referenced as such in treaties. One example is an 1820 treaty between the 
Qawasim sultanate and Great Britain. In article 9 of this treaty is stated, “the carrying off
13 Hugo Fischer, “The Suppression o f Slavery in International Law: II,” The International Law Quarterly 3, 
no 4 (October 1950), 503-522, 511.
14 Suzanne Miers, Britain and the Ending o f  the Slave Trade, (New York, NY: Africana Publishing 
Company, 1975), 248.
15 TJ. Lawrence, The Principles o f  International Law, (Littleton, CO: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1895), 216.
16 Slomanson, 62.
17 Malanczuk, 21.
18 Hugo Fischer, “The Suppression o f  Slavery in International Law I,” The International Law Quarterly 3, 
no. 1 (January 1950), 28-51, 50-51.
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of slaves, men, women, or children from the coasts of Africa or elsewhere, and the 
transporting them in vessels, is plunder and piracy, and the friendly Arabs shall do 
nothing of this nature.”19 Another example is during the early 1800s when John Quincy 
Adams, as the United States Secretary of State, negotiated a treaty with Great Britain to 
declare slavery as piracy. Adams stated that “by the simple expedient of declaring the 
slave trade piracy, it would become perfectly consistent for the United States to grant a 
right of search for slave trading pirates,” since “a right to search for pirates was already 
well established in international law.”20 Eventually, the right to search ships on the high 
seas was established between the United States and Great Britain without declaring the 
slave trade a type of piracy.
The United States played a vital role in the slave trade during the 1800s, as 
demonstrated by the willingness of the state to condemn portions of the practice, such as 
“the overseas trade to America and the West Indies.”21 On the other hand, this 
condemnation was accompanied by a continued demand for slaves since only slave 
trading through international means was considered illegal, resulting in the smuggling of 
individuals from Africa. Eventually, after the American Civil War of the 1860s, which 
resulted in the Emancipation Proclamation issued by Abraham Lincoln and the passage of 
the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1865, was slavery outlawed in
19 Sulan Muhammad Al-QasimT, The Myth o f  Arab Piracy in the Gulf, (Dover, NH: Croom Helm, 1986), 
227.
20 Hugh G. Soulsby, The Right to Search and the Slave Trade in Anglo-American Relations: 1814-1862, 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), 9.
21 Lord Lugard, “Slavery in All its Forms,” Africa: Journal o f  the International Institute o f  African 
Languages and Cultures, 6, no. 1 (January 1933), 1-14, 1.
22 Lugard, 1-2.
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the United States. 23 Despite these declarations of freedom for slaves and prohibition on 
slavery, slavery was still an issue and, as seen below, continues today.
Ultimately the split between the slave trade and slavery was weakened during the 
period between World War I and World War II when the international community 
intensified its commitment to banning the institution of slavery and the slave trade.24 The 
Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery of 1926 was the result of this 
intensification. For the first time in international law, slavery and the slave trade was 
defined.25 Article 1 of this Convention defined slavery as “the status or condition of a 
person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are 
exercised.”26 This article also defines the slave trade as “all acts involved In the capture, 
acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved 
in the acquisition of a slave with the view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of 
disposal by sale or exchange of a slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, 
and, in general, every act o f trade or transport in slaves.” This treaty required states to 
suppress the slave trade in all its forms and “to bring about, progressively and as soon as 
possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms.”28 This did not have the 
desired effect of eliminating both slavery and the slave trade. For example, in China,
“the transfer of slaves by written deed from one owner to another has been tolerated by
23 United States o f  America Constitution, Amendment 13 found at
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution amendments i l-27.html. See also  National 
Archives and Records Administration, “The Emancipation Proclamation,” Featured Documents found at 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featureddocuments/emancipationproclamation/.
24 Cassese, 2001, 34.
25 Fischer, 511.
26 Slavery Convention o f the League o f  Nations (1926) found in Universal Instruments, Vol. 1 o f  Human
Rights: A Compilation o f  International Instruments (New York, NY: United Nations, 1994).
27 Slavery Convention o f  the League o f  Nations (1926).
28 Slavery Convention o f the League o f  Nations (1926).
Chinese law” well into the twentieth century. In addition, throughout other parts of 
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, domestic slavery was still supported in both law and 
other societal pressures.
In 1956, this treaty was expanded and updated through a document called the 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery. This Convention expanded the definitions of slavery 
to include debt bondage, serfdom, marital bondage, and child labor, in addition to the 
previously accepted definitions of slavery from the 1926 Convention. The 1956 
Convention also expanded the definition of the slave trade to include provisions requiring 
states to secure their ports, coasts and airfields. While this treaty did not achieve as much 
as the sponsors had hoped, it did provide understanding as to the practices that qualified 
as slavery and slave-like practices.32 Finally, this Convention also requires states to 
cooperate with each other to suppress the slave trade and to abolish slavery in all its 
forms.
Forms o f Slavery
There are a number of different forms of slavery and slave-like practices. The 
most commonly recognized form is chattel slavery, which has been the type of slavery 
that most laws and international agreements focused upon until the middle of the 
twentieth century. Chattel slavery is the legal state of a slave in which he “could be sold, 
given away or inherited, and his services could be pledged or hired out -  all without his
29 E.T. Williams, “The Abolition o f  Slavery in the Chinese Empire,” The American Journal o f  International 
Law 4, no.4 (Oct., 1910), 794-805, 800.
30 Bales, 2004, 14, 88, 109, and 123.
31 Von Glahn and Taulbee, 487.
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consent” because “he was an inferior, whose life was considered less valuable than that 
of a free man.”33 The offspring of these individuals were also slaves, with the same legal 
status as their parents.34 This is the form of slavery that was the basis of the transatlantic 
slave trade. Chattel slaves have also been used as a form of currency that can serve their 
master until they are ready to be used for purchases.
Serfdom is another form of slavery. Serfdom is when “a person is bound to a 
piece of land owned by another person, is bound to render service to that owner and is not 
free to change his status.”36 The individual who owns the land can sell the serf with the 
land if he or she chooses. In addition, the serf does not have the ability to end his or her 
status as a serf. This type of slavery is not found today as this slavery institution has been 
replaced with debt bondage.37
Debt bondage is also slavery. Debt bondage is defined in Article I of the 1956 
Convention as “the status or condition arising from a pledge by a debtor of his personal 
services or of those of a person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of 
those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards the liquidation of the debt to 
the length and nature of those services are not respectively limited and defined.”38 Two 
of the oldest forms of debt bondage are pawning and peonage.39 The African tradition of
32 Joyce A.C. Gutteridge, “Supplementary Slavery Convention, 1956,” The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 6, no. 3 (July 1957(, 449-471, 469.
33 Miers, 59.
34 William D. Phillips, Slavery from  Roman Times to the Early Transatlantic Trade, (Minneapolis, MN: 
University o f  Minnesota Press, 1985), 23.
35 John Grace, Domestic Slavery in West Africa: With Particular Reference to the Sierra Leone 
Protectorate, 1896-1927, (New York, NY: Barnes and Noble Books, 1975), 13.
36 Hannikainen, 450.
37 Hannikainen, 450.
38 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition o f  Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery (1956) in Universal Instruments, Vol. 1 o f  Human Rights: A Compilation o f  
International Instruments (New York, NY: United Nations, 1994).
’9 Lord Lugard, “Slavery in All Its Forms,” Africa: Journal o f  the International African Institute 6, no. 1 
(January 1993), 1-14,4.
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pawning is “offering of services of a person in return for a loan.”40 Pawning is “distinct 
from slavery” because it was viewed as being “only temporary and was not considered a 
disgrace.”41 Often if the pawn repays quickly, it is not an issue; however, often the debt 
is not repayed for decades or in some cases passed on to heirs.42 Peonage is used mostly 
in Central and South America where individuals pledge labor in exchange for either the 
payment of a debt or for a loan. Often those who agree to be peons do not realize that 
they are slaves until “gunmen kill a runaway and leave his body exposes for all to see or 
when they cut him up and feed the pieces to pigs.”43 In India, debt bondage is often 
intergenerational because “when a father is too old to work his son may have to replace 
him, an event which usually occurs when the child is aged around 10.”44 In many of 
these cases, the original debt continues to lead to more debt as the principle of the loan is 
not paid off and more money must be borrowed to survive.
Forced labor, another form of slavery, is similar to chattel slavery, except that the 
laborer is forced to work through either coercion or to survive, but there is not a legal 
status of being owned by the master. Often the slave is forced to “choose among very 
unpleasant options, between, for example, death, dismemberment, torture, endless 
confinement on the one hand, or back braking physical labor on the other.”45 Forced
40 Miers, 140.
41 Miers, 141.
42 Alain Testart, “The Extent and Significance o f  Debt Slavery,” Revue Frangaise De Sociologie 43, 
Supplement: An Annual English Selection (2002), 173-204, 178.
43 Jose de Souza Martins, “The Reappearance o f  Slavery and the Reproduction o f  Capital on the Brazilian 
Frontier,” in Tom Brass and Marcel van der Linden (eds.), Free and Unfree Labour: The Debate 
Continues, (Bern Germany: Peter Lang AG, 1997), 281-302, 301.
44 Roger Sawyer, Slavery in the Twentieth Century, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 128.
45 Robert J. Steinfeld and Stanley L. Engerman, “Labor -  Free or Coerced: A Historical Reassessment o f  
Differences and Similarities,” in Tom Brass and Marcel van der Linden (eds.), Free and Unfree Labour: 
The Debate Continues, (Bern, Germany: Peter Lang AG, 1997), 107-126, 119.
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labor does not include labor that is “part of criminal punishment, military service, to deal 
with emergencies, or normal civil obligations.”46
Sex slavery, also a distinct form of slavery, has a variety of manifestations. One 
manifestation is historical and was called ‘white slavery” and was when “white women 
were being sold into slavery to non-white males” for sexual purposes.47 Sex tourism is 
another manifestation of sex slavery. This type of slavery involves individuals, typically 
children and younger women, working as prostitutes for tourists. Another manifestation 
has been referred to as “comfort girls,” who were used during World War II as sex slaves 
for Japanese soldiers.48 These “comfort girls” have been found in conflicts throughout 
history. Another manifestation of sex slavery is hierodulic prostitution. Hierodulic 
prostitution is the giving of children, typically young girls, to temples or other religious 
groups.49 In India, they are referred to as “devadasi” or “female servant of a deity” and in 
Ghana, they are called “trokosi” or “wives of the gods.”50 These are just two examples of 
this type of sex slavery. These girls are “often raped by the priests and forced to work 
without pay or compensation.”51
Two slave-like practices, child labor and marital bondage, are also covered in 
Article I of the 1956 Convention; however, they typically are accepted as part of the other 
forms of slavery in the international community. Child labor is where “a child or young 
person under the age of 18 years, is delivered by either or both of his natural parents or 
by his guardian to another person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the
46 Aust, 240.
47 Karen E. Bravo, “Exploring the Analogy Between Modem Trafficking in Humans and the Trans-Atlantic 
Slave Trade,” Boston University International Law Journal, (Fall 2007), 209-295,217.
48 Slomanson, 469.
49 Anti-Slavery Society, Hieroras, http://www.anti-slaverysociety.addr.com/hieroras.htm.
50 Andrea Parrot and Nina Cummings, Sexual Enslavement o f  Girls and Women Worldwide, (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Publishers, 2008) 49, 51.
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exploitation of the child or young person of his labor.” Marital bondage is the practice 
when a women is “promised or given in marriage on payment of a consideration in 
money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or any other person or group” where 
she does not have the right to refuse; or, “the husband of a women, his family, or his clan, 
has the right to transfer her to another person for value received or otherwise;” or, “a 
women on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited by another person.”53 Slave­
like practices has now been expanded to include such actions as the recruitment of child 
soldiers and the removal of organs.54
Modern Day Slavery
Slavery has existed for all of recorded history, but its modem forms have changed 
as compared to older forms of slavery. Older forms of slavery involved a legal and long­
term relationship between the master and slave; a high purchase price but a low profit 
margin; maintenance of the slave; and, an emphasis on ethnic differences.55 Newer forms 
of slavery involve an avoidance of a legal or long-term relationship; a very high profit 
margin due to a low purchase price; a surplus of disposable slaves; and, less concern over 
ethnic differences.56 Another difference is that in historical forms of slavery, the slave 
was often not considered to be a full person under the law; however, modem day law will
51 Parrot and Cummings, 51.
52 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition o f  Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery (1956).
53 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition o f  Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
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54 Office o f  the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Abolishing Slavery and its 




recognize the full legal personality of a slave, with all the rights and obligations that are 
conferred with that status.57
The traditional slave trade, large ships with a number of individuals chained in the 
holds like cattle or cargo to an open market, is no longer the primary method of 
transporting slaves. The shift has occurred because of expanded methods of transporting 
slaves and is now referred to as human trafficking in the international community.58 
Trafficking in human beings comprises of three different elements: action; through a 
means; and, goal of exploitation or for the purpose o f exploitation.59 The action element 
of trafficking includes one of the following: recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harboring, or reception of persons.60 A means includes the “threat of use of force, 
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or vulnerability, or giving 
payments or benefits to a person in control of the victim.”61 This means of control can be 
either physical or psychological, and in most cases, is psychological.62 Exploitation in 
this context “includes exploiting the prostitution of others, other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or similar practices, and the removal of
ATorgans.” The buying and selling of people into servitude happens in both public 
methods, such as “cattle markets” for the Karamojong women, and in hidden methods, 
such as mail-order bride catalogs.64
57 Bravo, 271.
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While differences exist, modem day slavery is similar to historical slavery in 
some ways. Both historical and modem day slavery “include elements of control and 
ownership; the restriction or control of an individual’s autonomy, freedom of choice or 
freedom of movement; and, often, the accming of some gain to the perpetrator” where 
“the free will of the victim is absent.”65 Modem and historic slavery also both involve 
humiliation, the breaking of the individuals who resist servitude, the branding and 
tattooing of victims, and children being bom into servitude.66 Another similarity between 
historical slavery and modem day slavery is the use of redemption. There have been 
cases of slaves’ freedom being purchased for as little as $33 per slave late in the last 
century.67 Finally, another similarity is the use of auctions for the purchase of slaves. 
While historical slavery was similar to cattle markets, the modem day auctions take place 
on the internet or in inconspicuous places, such as a coffee shop in an English airport.68
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL TEXTBOOK RHETORIC
Just as in Chapter IV concerning piracy, slavery discussions in textbooks also has 
specific rhetoric can be discerned. This rhetoric demonstrates viewpoint of the 
community of international lawyers concerning the jus cogens nature of slavery, the 
relation between slavery and treaty law, jurisdictional issues, and the obligations that 
flow from this peremptory norm. The next generation of the international community of 
lawyers obtains its viewpoints and understanding of slavery through this rhetoric.
65 Cassese, 2003,75.
66 Paola Monzini, (Translated by Patrick Camiller), Sex Traffic: Prostitution, Crime and Exploitation, (New  
York, NY: Zed Books, 2005), 81-83.
67 E. Benjamin Skinner, A Crime So Monstrous: Face-to-Face with Modern Day Slavery, (New York, NY: 
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Slavery as Jus Cosens
The textbooks’ rhetoric shows that despite the authors who claim that slavery and 
the slave trade fall into the category of jus cogens, there is no discussion of details or 
practical issues.69 The basic jus cogens nature is established in by Dixon, McCorquodale 
and Williams because a treaty that contemplates participating in slavery is considered to 
be void as the prohibition on slavery is one of “the most obvious and best settled rules of 
jus cogens.”70 Slavery and the slave trade are referred to as one of the “many norms of 
human rights law [that] are peremptory in character from which no derogation is 
permitted.”71 It is considered a “particularly egregious offense,” which is part of “a body 
of general international human rights law” that is no longer disputed.72 These statements 
show that the prohibition of slavery and slave trading meets the requirements of 
peremptory norms in international law.
Slavery and slave-trade is regarded by the community of international lawyers as 
a fundamentally prohibited act or a “universal crime.”73 As stated by Joyner, “slavery or 
slave-related practices were among the earliest abrogations of human rights to be 
expressly condemned as international criminal offenses,” and in some cases because 
these activities are “deemed unlawful simply because they are perceived to be so evil that 
they shock the conscience of humankind.”74 This “general condemnation of the slave
69 Malone, 37. See also  Dunoff, Ratner and Wippman, 60, Murphy, 81-83, Scott, 301, Weston, Falk, 
Charlesworth, and Straus, 146.
70 Dixon, McCorquodale, and Williams, 2011, 92.
71 Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert, 173. Malone, 1998,122 and Malone, 2011,107.
72 Buergenthal and Murphy, 144. See also Lowe, 59, Cassese, 2001, 370.
73 Epps, 2005, 106.
74 Joyner, 2005, 73 and 136.
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trade” is present in a number of international law textbooks.75 The acceptance of slavery 
as jus cogens is seen in the oft-quoted statement that a slave trader is “an enemy of all 
mankind,” as it is viewed as the same as piracy in international law.76
The jus cogens nature of the prohibition of slavery is reinforced by Aust in 2010 
when he refers to it as an absolute right without being “subject to specific conditions or 
qualified in general terms.”77 This prohibition has also been referred to by some as a jus
78cogens crime; however, this is not a common terminology.
Slavery and Treaty Law
International legal texts use treaty law to support the assertion that slavery has 
been abolished in international law. The Slavery Conventions of 1926 and 1956 are the 
two controlling treaties that ban slavery and slave trade in international law.79 In addition 
to these treaties, authors discuss international agreements that ban slavery, such as the 
Statue of the International Criminal Court, the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and the American Convention on Human
• o nRights. Taken together, these substantive treaties and international agreements 
establish the treaty basis of the illegality of slavery and the slave trade in the rhetoric of 
the international legal community.
75 Carter, Trimble and Bradley, 888. See also Damrosch, Henkin, Pugh, Schachter, and Smit, 1445, Evans, 
2010,291, and Aust, 2010, 10.
76 Janis and Noyes, 188. See also Janis, 2008, 335, Evans, 307, Shaw, 550.
77 Aust, 2010, 227.
78 Evans, 2010, 754.
79 Brownlie, 238.
80 Cassese, 2003, 75. See also Epps, 311, D ’Amato, 1994, 314, Aust, 240, and Shaw, 2008, 274-275.
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Other texts discuss how UNCLOS III also has controlling provisions concerning 
the use of the high seas for the transport of slaves.81 Article 99 requires “that every state 
shall take effective measures to prevent and punish the transport of slaves in ships 
authorized to fly its flag, and to prevent the unlawful use of its flag for that purpose.”82 
UNCLOS III also provides in Article 100 that if a slave takes refuge aboard any ship they 
shell be declared free.83 Article 110 of this Convention also “reaffirms the right of all 
public vessels to stop, visit, and search any merchant vessel on the high seas when there 
is reasonable ground for suspecting that the ship in question is engaged in the slave 
trade.”84
In addition to finding support in treaty law, some authors state that the prohibition 
on slavery “is now accepted that the abhorrent practice subject to customary international
o r
law.” This movement from a prohibition contained in treaty laws to an accepted 
customary law principle provides further support for the jus cogens nature of the 
prohibition and satisfies the positivist and naturalist traditions of international law. States 
are bound to follow the prohibition against slavery because “even if a State has not 
ratified a human rights treaty, it could be bound by customary international law” and “all 
States” are “bound when the human right is considered part of jus cogens.”86
Slavery and Jurisdiction
The international legal community perpetuates the rhetoric that the international 
crime of slavery and slave-trading falls under universal jurisdiction. During the 19th
81 Carter, Trimble and Bradley, 888.
82 Von Glahn and Taulbee, 488.
83 Von Glahn and Taulbee, 488.
84 Von Glahn and Taulbee, 488.
85 Aust, 2010,251.
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Century, the prohibition on slavery was considered to be one of the only exceptions other 
than piracy to the restriction that “virtually all matters that today would be classified as 
human rights issues were at that stage universally regarded as within the internal sphere
87of national jurisdiction.” Support for universal jurisdiction is found in both treaty-based
88and customary law-based prohibitions of slavery. Universal jurisdiction pertains to 
certain acts that are “considered so reprehensible by the international community that the 
usual rules of jurisdiction are waived and any state apprehending the alleged perpetrator 
is deemed competent to exercise its jurisdiction.”89 Universal jurisdiction allows the case 
to be tried in any jurisdiction and “not confined to the state on whose territory the act 
took place, or the national state of the offender.”90
Since slavery is considered to be “prejudicial to the interests of all states,” the 
application of universal jurisdiction is applied allowing for “states to have jurisdiction 
under their law over crimes committed abroad by foreign nationals against foreign 
nationals.”91 Agreement that the prohibition of slavery is one of the “core activities that 
trigger universal jurisdiction” is evident in the international community.92
Slavery. Oblisations and Enforcement
The rhetoric also concentrates on the establishment of an obligation to “capture, 
prosecute, and punish any offender on behalf of the international community.”93 The 
1926 Convention also requires that “all States take measures to suppress slavery and
86 Dixon, McCorquodale and Williams, 2011, 200.
87 Shaw, 2008, 270.
88 Aust, 2005, 269-270. See also  Buergenthal and Murphy, 207 and 222, Carter, Trimble and Bradley, 888.
89 Epps, 106
90 Shaw, 2003, 234.
91 Aust, 2010,44.
92 Epps, 2009, 115.
138
slave institutions, to release persons found in bondage, and to prosecute those found to be 
engaged in these activities.”94 These treaty obligations have evolved because slavery is 
considered to be subject to universal jurisdiction and gives rise to obligations erga 
omnes.95 These obligations are placed upon states regardless of the status of their signing 
or ratifying treaties that specifically outlaw slavery or attempt to suppress slavery because 
of the jus cogens status of slavery, which is shown in a number of textbooks by the 
discussion of the Barcelona Traction case.96 In addition to these obligations, a trend 
found in international law textbooks is the discussion of the ability of states to exercise 
jurisdiction over ships on the high seas that are suspected of slave trade, including the 
right to visit or board.97
Despite the inclusion of the slavery prohibition in the texts, slavery and the slave 
trade are viewed as a former problem that do not have much relevance in modern-day 
discussions and are mostly regulated to historical issues. It is often used as an example of 
the power of non-govemmental organizations, such as the Anti-slavery Society and other
Q O
British abolitionist groups. Discussions also concentrate on the use of state interests 
when negotiating international treaties. For example, when the General Act of the 
Brussels Conference relative to the African Slave Trade of 1890 was negotiated, Great 
Britain was able to use the prohibition on the slave trade to take “a central role as a 
maritime enforcement agency controlling shipping,” but not just for purposes of 
suppressing the slave trade, despite that being the purpose under the treaty.99 Britain
93 Joyner, 2005, 151.
94 Bederman, 2010, 108.
95 Scott, 2010, 25.
96 Cassese, 2005, 394. See also Malanczuk, 58.
97 Brownlie, 238. See also Buergenthal and Murphy, 222.
98 Armstrong, Farrell and Lambert, 168.
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could “monitor overseas trade by other states in goods in general.”100 Some authors do 
briefly discuss the modern-day issues of ineffective enforcement, but these discussions 
are few and far between.101
What does the Rhetoric Mean?
What is the rhetorical picture being perpetuated by the international community of 
lawyers? As far back as 1896, international law books have claimed that the slave trade 
is not allowed under international law and should be punished by all states.102 This is 
over a hundred years of international agreements to stop the crime of slavery; however, 
the trials and prosecutions for slave trading and slavery have been few, as seen below.
The prohibition of slavery meets the requirements of a jus cogens norm. No state may 
promulgate a treaty to participate in slave trade or slavery. Any such treaty would be 
void under international law. No state may derogate from the prohibition of slavery. 
These aspects of jus cogens are found in the epistemic community’s rhetoric concerning 
the prohibition of slavery and the slave trade.
The peremptory nature of the prohibition on slavery also gives rise to obligations 
to prosecute offenders regardless of jurisdiction. The prohibition of slavery also has 
considered support in customary international law that has been developing for the last 
two hundred years. These obligations are supported in the international agreements such 
as the Slavery Conventions of 1926 and 1956, the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, and UNCLOS III. Despite the strong status in international law that slavery 
appears to have given the rhetoric of the international community of lawyers, which
100 Malanczuk, 2003,21.
101 Von Glahn and Taulbee, 2007, 487-488.
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should have eliminated the problem of slavery in the modem world, the next section 
shows that the reality is very different.
CONTEMPORARY REALITY
Modem slavery is ongoing problem that affects every state in the world. Despite 
a common belief that slavery died out in the 1800s, today’s slaves operate in a variety of 
domains, including, but not limited to, agriculture, harvesting of raw materials, creation 
finished goods, sex trade, domestic work, and fishing.103 As summarized by Ambassador 
Luis CdeBaca, “modem slavery continues to be a reality for millions of people, rather 
than for an isolated few.”104
It is difficult to obtain accurate data on the extent of human trafficking because of 
its nature as an “underground activity” and its low priority in law enforcement efforts.105 
Another problem with gaining accurate insight into slavery and human trafficking is that 
many states do not provide or do not track the number of reported incidents.106 Since 
1964, when the United Nations Economic and Social Council first began to send slavery 
questionnaires to member states, states have “self-righteously denied the existence of
107slavery within their borders.” In addition to the low priority, there is often collusion 
between law enforcement and those trafficking in humans. Often the law enforcement 
personnel can choose to either “cooperate with the thugs and make a profit, or attempt to
102 Herbert Wolcott Bowen, International Law: A Simple Statement o f  Its Principles, (New York: G.P. 
Putnam’s Sons, 1896), 77.
103 United States Department o f  State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 2011.
104 United States Department o f  State, 2011, 2.
105 Alison Cole, “Reconceptionalising Female Trafficking: The Inhuman Trade in Women,” Cardozo 
Journal o f  Law and Gender, (Summer, 2006), 789-820, 799. See also Alexis A. Aronowitz, Human 
Trafficking, Human Misery: The Global Trade in Human Beings, (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers,
2009), 15.
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107 Roger Sawyer, Slavery in the Twentieth Century, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 15.
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I ORenforce the law and die.” This mentality is seen around the world in places like 
Russia, Thailand, Brazil, Ghana, Pakistan and the Philippines. These factors hide the 
magnitude of the problem of slavery and human trafficking, thus leading researchers to 
conclude that the incident of slavery and servitude around the world is under reported and 
under documented.109
The population of slaves throughout the world is “greater than the population of 
Canada” because “there are more slaves alive today than all the people stolen from Africa 
in the time of the transatlantic slave trade.”110 Estimates o f the number of people 
enslaved around the world range from 12.3 million to 29 million.111 These enslaved 
individuals are everywhere, such as it is estimated that there are at least 3,000 household
i j2
slaves in the city of Paris. Women and children as especially vulnerable, thus twenty
percent of people trafficked are children worldwide.113 Given that slaves cost an average 
of $90, the number of slaves continues to rise.114
The “profit to cost ratio is so high” in modem trafficking, especially the case of 
women, that the trafficker “accru[es] massive profits with very low overhead long after 
initial outlays have been covered.”115 In addition to the low overhead, the demand for 
slaves or trafficked humans is high and the cost for being captured or punished are
108 Bales, 2004,31.
109 Aronowitz, 15.
110 Kevin Bales, Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy, (Berkley, CA: University o f  
California Press, 2004), 9.
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extremely low, adding to the benefit of being a slaver or trafficker.116 According to 
Stoeker, “the head operations for the UN crime prevention remarked bluntly...’the 
earnings are incredible. The overhead is low -  you don’t have to buy cars and guns. 
Drugs you sell once and they are gone. [Slaves] can earn money for a long time.’”117
Technology influences the practice of human trafficking and slavery. The speed 
at which individuals can move from one end of the globe to another has increased the 
frequency and ease that human traffickers can transport their goods, in some cases, as 
quickly as a blink of an eye. The “Rape Camp” website, unfortunately one of many 
around the world, “showed Asian women as sex slaves blindfolded, gagged, and tied 
during sex acts in bondage, discipline and humiliation” that “asked viewers to humiliate 
these Asian sex slaves to your heart’s content.”118 The internet also provides increased 
communication among people who are looking to buy and sell people.
Examples o f Modern Day Slavery
The variety of examples of modem day slavery is as diverse as the world’s 
population. There is no region of the world that is not affected. In Brazil, charcoal 
camps that enslave men in a forced labor situation that have been referred to as 
‘concentration camps.”119 These men who are working at these charcoal camps never 
have the opportunity to pay back the principle on their loans as they are charged interest
116 James O. Finckenauer and Jennifer Schrock, “Human Trafficking: A Growing Criminal Market in the 
U.S.,” in Anna M. Troubnikoof, Trafficking in Women and Children, (New York, NY: Nova Science 
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and for food, clothing, and shelter at exorbitant rates and those who try to escape without
irepayment are killed or maimed. Another example of slavery in Brazil is the number 
of child prostitutes has been estimated as high as 500,000.121 In Haiti, author Skinner 
was able to negotiate the purchase of a child for less than a cab fare across New York 
City.122
In Germany and England, individuals from economically depressed areas 
throughout other parts of Europe answer “advertisements for barmaids, receptionists, and 
croupiers” prior to becoming enslaved. In North America, slavery has survived “in 
areas of pornographic film making, forced prostitution, and preying on migrants.”124 
Turkish children have been imported into Belgium under the guise of apprenticeships to 
be used as domestic servants.125 Moroccan women are trafficked into France and 
Holland, while Thai girls are trafficked into Germany for purposes of prostitution.126
In Asia, a number of states have significant problems with slavery. Thailand has a 
large number of sex slaves and is considered to be one of the most popular sex tourism 
destinations. Thailand’s interior minister was a proponent of the sex tourism trade, 
despite that the result has been thousands of girls and women being bought and sold into 
sexual slavery each year.127 In China, snakeheads are human traffickers. These 
snakeheads are concentrated in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao, and other areas of southern 
China; however, they also are seen in large immigrant communities throughout the
120 Sawyer, 1986, 123.
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128 • •world. Cambodia’s economy is “classified as a state whose economy is in part
dependent on offering underage sex to tourists as a ‘specialty.’”129 In Nepal, debts from
bonded labor can be inherited where entire families spend generations in servitude from a
loan.130 In India, the most common form of slavery is debt bondage, including
intergenerational debt bondage.131 India is also one of the states that strongly deny there
is even a problem with servitude. During a meeting of the Haryana State Legislative
Assembly, “The Chief Minister was scornful and declared that there was not one bonded
labourer in his entire area; it subsequently transpired that he owned some of the quarries
1 Dmaking full use of the system.” Another form of slavery in India is the aforementioned 
devadasi, or religious slaves, which has risen to a number of new slaves 15,000 
annually.133 In Pakistan, bonded laborers are used on government contracts to dig 
irrigation channels and to build dams.134 To fulfill these contracts, recruiters go to small 
villages and give cash advances to the parents of young men in exchange for their sons 
being bonded until the money is repaid. The camps which these young men are sent to 
are virtual prisons with guards armed with pistols and dogs where the individuals who 
attempt escape are bound by chains.135
127 Parrot and Cummings, 54 and 74.
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Dubai and the United Arab Emirates frequently imports migrant workers for
1domestic servants or the construction industry. These workers are kept in situations of 
involuntary servitude because their passports are confiscated by their employers and no
1 T7ability to receive help from the government. Women are sold outright from 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Nepal for approximately $3,000 to $10,000 to wealthy 
individuals throughout the Middle East. These women live approximately two years 
before “the client becomes bored with her, she is abandoned and left to die from the 
sadistic abuse which he and his friends have subjected to her,” at which time “the client 
will then simply purchase another young woman.”138 Another type of slavery that is seen 
in this region, and in Africa, is camel jockeys, who are starved and denied water while
1 TOworking on farms to maintain their regulation weight for camel races.
In Russia and other former Soviet Union states, slavery has significantly 
increased, especially trafficking of children and women. While the main problem faced 
by traffickers in these areas is obtaining a child because many parents do not want to sell 
their children for cultural reasons, traffickers have found a way to circumvent this 
problem by obtaining children from orphanages and hospitals.140 Another form of 
slavery in this area is the kidnapping of individuals for use as labor, commodities to be
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sold to the highest bidder, and for their organs.141 In addition to the buying of children 
and kidnapping, human traffickers control the slaves, particularly women used for 
prostitution around the world, by threatening their families with harm.142 Trafficking of 
women and threats to their families back home has created what is called “the second 
wave,” which is the use of a previously trafficked woman to find new victims from her 
hometown.143
In Africa, the slave trade has been firmly reestablished where “following the old 
slave trade routes, except that trucks, jeeps and modem four-wheel drive vehicles and, on 
occasions, aircraft, have replaced camels.”144 In poorer states, such as Benin and Togo, 
children are purchased from their parents, or simply kidnapped, and then sold in 
wealthier states such as Nigeria and Gabon for five times the purchase price.145 A child 
can “still be bom a slave in parts of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroun, Chad, Guinea, 
Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan.”146 In Western 
Africa, the cocoa plantations in rural areas use slave labor where the slaves are beaten by 
an overseer, fed improperly, work long hours, locked up at night, and often killed if they
147attempt to escape.
Mauritania is possible the most extreme example of modem day slavery. A law 
passed in 1980 outlawed slavery and provided compensation to the slave owners for the
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freed slaves; however, no compensation has been paid.148 Since no compensation has 
been paid by the government, the slave owners refuse to release their slaves because they 
view these slaves as “a kind of collateral held against the compensation debt owed to 
them by the government.”149 Occasionally a non-governmental organization will help 
bring a suit against a slave owner for a lesser offense, such as an illegal confinement, but 
even on the off chance that that a court does find the perpetrator guilty, no one has ever 
been punished.150 One of the methods for controlling slaves is to take the slaves’ legs 
and tightly tie them to the sides of a camel who has been denied water for weeks, then let 
the camel drink until its stomach expands, the slaves’ legs, thighs, and groin are slowly 
dislocated and stretched.151 The type of slavery that is practiced in Mauritania is the 
same kind of slavery that was practiced during the 1700s and 1800s during the 
transatlantic slave trade.
Perhaps one of the most despicable forms of human trafficking is the underground 
market in organs and other body parts because it involves groups of individuals whose 
calling in life is to help others, specifically medical professionals and law enforcement. 
Doctors and medical staff “knowingly remove healthy organs from individuals not
1 S7related to the recipients,” for implant in wealthy clients. It has been estimated that as 








State and Law Enforcement Response
Law enforcement, promulgated laws, and other legal remedies in most states are 
inefficient.154 Often when laws have been passed, the laws are not being implemented or 
being applied incorrectly. For example, in India, bonded labor is illegal under the 
constitution, but this right is not being implemented.155 The general perception of 
communities on borders in a number of states is that the human trafficking networks are 
“organized and protected.”156 In Bangladesh, some trafficking laws “are sometimes 
misapplied with the result that victims were charged with immoral behavior and put in 
jail.”157 In some cases, United Nations peacekeepers, also known as blue helmets, would 
press women into slavery in a number of states, including Cambodia, the Congo, Eritrea, 
and Bosnia.158
The corruption of government and law enforcement officials is vital to the success 
of slavery and human trafficking operations.159 Human traffickers “are known to often 
enjoy high-level political patronage.” 160 Some officials, such as border guards, police 
and consular officials, take monetary payment; however, other officials “partake of free 
sexual services in exchange for ignoring trafficking and sometimes engaging in 
trafficking directly.”161 Officials have a variety of ways to participate in human
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trafficking. One method is for government officials to provide fake documentation, such 
as passports and visas, for the transport of individuals across international borders.162 
Border guards and passport inspectors also accept bribes to let in the fake documentation,
16Tin almost every state in the world, including the United States. Bribery is so common 
from Nepal to India that “border bribes had normalized to 2 percent to 5 percent of the 
final price of the slave, depending upon the experience of the slave trader.”164 Another 
method is to use the police as enforcers of human trafficking networks or to return 
runaway slaves, such as in Benin.165 Judges and prosecutors also participate in 
corruption that prevents the prosecution of human traffickers. In Moldova, a trafficking 
case was dismissed by a judge “on the basis that the women chose to work as prostitutes 
and ‘felt good’ being there.”166 Even diplomats misuse the visa system to traffic 
domestic workers around the world, including into the United States when stationed at 
the United Nations.167
The United States has become a world leader in pushing for the elimination of 
slavery and human trafficking, but it is still barely a drop in the bucket given the number 
of slaves. It has been estimated that less than 2 percent of the slaves in the United States 
were liberated between 2000 and 2006, while as many as 17,500 new slaves enter every
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year.168 In 2003, the United States passed the PROTECT Act that “makes it a crime for 
any United States citizen or alien to ‘travel in foreign commerce, and engage in any illicit 
sexual conduct with another person’... under 18 years of age.”169 Recently the United 
States federal government indicted six individuals in Honolulu for trafficking four 
hundred Thai farm workers, which is one of the largest human trafficking cases.170 This 
is the second recent case in Hawaii concerning human trafficking. The first being two
* 171brothers indicted for the human trafficking of forty-four Thai farm workers in 2004. 
Despite these recent cases and other limited past prosecutions, an attorney at the Justice 
Department admitted that “prosecutors can only pursue those slavery operations that
1 T 7seem like surefire wins.” In addition to pushing only for wins, these “slavery cases 
typically take years to investigate and prosecute, presenting a wide array of special
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challenges few public officials are trained to handle.” Some other states have 
attempted different approaches to ending trafficking. Canada recently suspended 
marriages between their citizens and Cambodian women.174 This 2008 law had the 
unintended consequence of increasing the number of marriages brokered with South 
Korean men.175
Arrests are occasionally made, but they are still few and far between given the 
large numbers of slaves throughout the world. According to the 2010 Trafficking in
168 E. Benjamin Skinner, “A World Enslaved,” Foreign Policy, (March/April 2008), 62-67, 64-65.
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176Persons Report, the identified victims average out to 18 per 1000 world inhabitants. 
Despite this rate of trafficking victims around the world, there were only 5,606 
prosecutions worldwide in 2009, of which 4,166 resulted in convictions.177 In 2010, the 
number of prosecutions increased to 6,017. In 2011,the number of convictions dropped 
to 3,619.178
There are a few recent examples of prosecutions and convictions; however, the
majority of the cases do not make news, thus slavery remains a largely hidden problem.
The following are examples of recent cases that have been reported. In March 2010,
seven people suspected of trafficking were arrested for transporting women to South
Africa from Mozambique and China.179 In 2008, Russia sentenced a group of men who
had been selling women into sexual slavery for years. The longest sentence was eight
years for trafficking over 200 women.180 The Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) Community Court of Justice found that Niger had failed to protect
Hadijato Mani from slavery when she was sold in 1996; however, it failed to conclude
that this judgment was applicable to other possible victims.181 In 2009, Spain broke up a
human trafficking network that controlled Nigerian women through the use of voodoo 
182curses.
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Overall, modem day slavery is a significant issue. Slavery is “the goose that lays 
the golden eggs” because “human beings once enslaved can continue to produce more 
and more value.” The human toll on the individuals who are suffering is staggering. The 
problem of slavery and human trafficking is becoming an item on the international 
political agenda, but is still largely being underrepresented given the suffering that this 
issues cause.183 While there are occasionally prosecutions of human traffickers, the 
majority of modem violators of slavery provisions do not have to worry about being 
caught or punished. The gap between the international legal rhetoric and the reality is 
emphasized by the continued flagrant collusion between states and/or state actors and 
those who are breaking the law.
RHETORIC/REALITY GAP
The gap between the international legal community’s rhetoric on slavery and the 
reality of enforcement of jus cogens norms is evident in the estimated 20 to 30 million 
people184 held in slavery today. The continued increase in slavery and the lack of 
substantial prosecution by states shows that there is a significant difference between the 
rhetoric of the international legal community and the reality of the situation.
According to the community’s rhetoric, the norm of prohibiting slavery falls 
within the category jus cogens. Despite the strength of the prohibition, this does not 
mean that this will be sufficient to stop the violation of the norm. Even though slavery 
has been illegal under international law and accepted by all states as illegal, the duties 
and obligations that flow from this jus cogens norm are not being fulfilled. The
183 Claudia Aradau, Rethinking Trafficking in Women: Politics Out o f  Security, (New York, NY: Palgrave 
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international legal system recognizes that slavery is a peremptory norm under 
international law, but this recognition does not transform into freedom for enslaved 
individuals.
The Gap Contained in Treaties and Definitions
The treaty basis for the peremptory norm of slavery, the combination of the 
Slavery Conventions of 1926 and 1956 and the provisions of UNCLOS III, is also 
contained in the rhetoric of the textbooks. The provisions of UNCLOS III are only 
applicable for ships on the high seas, which have been shown to be an unlikely method of 
transport for slaves in the modem day. The provisions of the 1926 and 1956 conventions 
do not take into account the changes in slavery due to technological advances, such as the 
Internet, and the transnational nature of modem day slavery and human trafficking, as 
they are mostly based on sovereign enforcement. While these documents provide 
definitions that had been lacking in international law, they do not give sufficient basis for 
prosecution or capture of human trafficker or help free individuals, thus further 
demonstrating the gap between the rhetoric and reality.
The Gap o f Universal Jurisdiction
The rhetoric includes the use of universal jurisdiction as a means to provide states 
the ability to prosecute anyone participating in human trafficking. The establishment of 
universal jurisdiction allows for states to pursue legal action against human traffickers 
without having to worry about jurisdictional issues. The international legal community’s 
rhetoric opens any jurisdiction in the world to prosecute, yet states are not taking
184 J.J. Gould, “Slavery’s Global Comeback,” The Atlantic, December 19, 2012.
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advantage of this open venue. The belief of the international legal community, as 
demonstrated by its rhetoric concerning universal jurisdiction, is not aligned with the 
reality of the lack of states pursuing this avenue of prosecution.
The Gap o f Duties and Obligations o f States
The prohibition of slavery as a peremptory norm places duties and obligations 
upon states to prosecute human traffickers under the provisions of international law. The 
freedom that many human traffickers feel to be free from prosecution, as demonstrated 
previously in this chapter, shows that the enforcement obligations and duties flowing 
from jus cogens are not being fulfilled. This lack of prosecution is a violation of 
international law; however, there is more significant evidence of a rhetoric/reality gap in 
the evidence of state collusion as manifested in political protection and state involvement 
in human trafficking.
CONCLUSION
The above provides further evidence that a gap exists between the international 
legal system and the reality of state action. This gap is observed because of the strength 
of peremptory norms in international law, specifically in this case slavery, is irrefutable 
in international law rhetoric, but the practical application of these principles is lacking in 
reality. This gap as it relates to the norm of slavery further demonstrates the 
disconnection between the epistemic community and the actions of international actors.
Since the investigation of the jus cogens norms prohibiting slavery and piracy 
presented above demonstrates the existence of the gap between the rhetoric of
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international law and reality of state behaviors, an examination of the implications of this 
gap is necessary. The following chapter focuses on these implications.
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CHAPTER VI
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GAP BETWEEN RHETORIC AND REALITY
This study examined both the rhetoric of the international legal system and the 
reality of actions of state actors with regard to the canon of international law, specifically 
the core tenets of jus cogens. The research goes beyond the basic examination of the 
legal community’s rhetoric or a straightforward look at the reality of international law 
concerning piracy and slavery. The principal outcome of the research is that a gap is 
apparent between the rhetoric of the law and the practice of states in its application. The 
intent of the following is to explain the implications that emanate from this gap.
The rhetoric and reality of international law are two of the four sources of 
international law found in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. The discontinuity between the 
sources concerning / ^  cogens has a ripple effect throughout the international legal 
system. This ripple effect can also be seen in the modem day understanding of the 
system by the community of international lawyers. Beyond the implications for 
peremptory norms, the gap between the rhetoric of the epistemic community of lawyers 
and the reality of state actions indicates possible issues throughout the international legal 
system. Tension that is caused by discontinuity in what is widely regarded as the 
strongest and most robust area of international law, peremptory norms, is detailed 
throughout this chapter.
The following reviews the current argument concerning the gap between rhetoric 
and reality and analyzes the different implications that flow from this gap for the tenets of 
jus cogens and the international legal system.
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ARGUMENT REVIEW
The purpose of this study is to analyze the discontinuity between the sources of 
international law from Article 38 of the ICJ Statute concerning peremptory norms and 
what this gap implies. To understand the rhetoric, the ideas and values of the 
international legal community was examined in relation to the general concept of jus 
cogens and two particular instances, the prohibitions against piracy and slavery. The 
reality of the current practices of international actors was surveyed in detail concerning 
the two peremptory norms of the prohibition against piracy and slavery. The previous 
chapters have provided evidence of this gap, as summarized below.
Article 38.1 o f the Statute o f the International Court ofJustice
The sources of international law are set out in Article 38 of the Statue o f  the 
International Court o f Justice. This article is the key place to start to understand any 
principle in international law. The two relevant portions of this statute for this project are 
38.1 .b, “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law” and
38.1.d, the “judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of
1 0 various nations.” Since this statue is considered to be “the most authoritative”
statement as to the sources of international law, when a discontinuity exists between two
of the sources, it indicates an issue worth examining.
In the case of peremptory norms, this project has shown that the teachings of
international lawyers do not align with the international custom of state actors. The
judicial decisions and teachings have been demonstrated by the rhetoric of the epistemic
1 “Charter o f  the United Nations and Statute o f  the International Court o f  Justice,” 1945, 26.
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community of international lawyers. The international custom of state actors has been 
shown by examining the current reality concerning the core tenets of jus cogens, the 
prohibitions against piracy and slavery. A gap has been identified between the rhetoric 
and the reality concerning peremptory norms based upon the discontinuity of the sources 
of jus cogens as indicated by Article 38.
Methodology
This project uses crucial case methodology with a window into the epistemic 
community allowing an assessment into the state of the international legal system. 
Peremptory norms were chosen to be examined for this project because the unique status 
of jus cogens in international law, thus functioning as a crucial case. Crucial case
methodology is used in this project by examining the case, peremptory norms, that
•>
“provide[s] the most definite type of evidence” as compared to lesser norms within the 
international legal system. As previously seen in Chapter I, by using jus cogens, 
information and understanding can be extrapolated about the international legal system 
since it is “the most-likely case shown to be negative.”4
These norms are considered to be the strongest and most robust of all norms in 
international law. They are perceived to be on the top of the hierarchy of international 
legal principles, due to their prohibition on derogation. The special status of jus cogens 
means that “[t]he duties to prosecute the core international crimes both under 
conventional and customary international law are stated in quite unconditional and 
imperative terms, thus leaving no room for some kind of margin of appreciation for
2 Shaw, 2008, 70.
3 George and Bennett, 2004, 120.
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considering alternative factors to justify the failures of prosecution.”5 Jus cogens is seen 
as having the ability to overcome jurisdictional issues and call upon states to provide 
support for the enforcement of these tenets. These norms are considered to have the 
ability to proscribe behavior, provide predictive elements, and enjoy historical 
precedence and continued support throughout the international legal community. The 
prohibitions against piracy and slavery are the core of these peremptory norms, thus 
providing more evidentiary support for the premise of this project.
The epistemic community in question is made up of experts who have a 
“competence in a particular domain,”6 in this case, international law. This community of 
international lawyers is held together by similar methods and the transference of 
knowledge and ideals of the community to new members and outsiders. Epistemic 
communities, in specific issue areas, can influence policy orientations and can provide 
“recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain.”7
REVIEW OF THE RHETORIC/REALITY GAP
The gap between the rhetoric of the international legal community and the reality 
of the actions of states raises questions about the strength o f jus cogens in the 
international legal system. This gap is based on the disconnect between the sources of 
international law with the rhetoric of the community of international lawyers on one side 
and the reality of state action on the other side. The legal textbooks provide the written 
record of the system norms being passed from one generation of practitioners of 
international law to another generation. There are common threads being passed on
4 Gerring, 2001, 220.
5 Orakhelashvili, 2006, 233.
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conceming /w.y cogens in general and the two core tenets, the prohibitions against piracy 
and slavery. The reality of the tenets of jus cogens was examined as it relates to the 
particular state actions regarding the prohibitions against piracy and slavery.
The Rhetoric o f the International Legal Community
In understanding the general concepts of peremptory norms, a number of common 
rhetorical themes were observed. These themes were measured through the teaching of 
international law that is perpetuation of the epistemic community of international 
lawyers. The relatively uniform ideals and values of the international legal community 
are seen throughout the international legal system through conventions and judgments.8 
An examination of the rhetoric contained in international legal textbooks allowed for the 
identification of specific ideals and values as they relate to peremptory norms.
There are several general themes that are contained within the international legal 
textbooks relating to the overall nature and substance of jus cogens, as demonstrated in 
Chapter III. The first general theme is the use of a treaty, in this case, the VCLT, to 
establish the initial nature and content of jus cogens. This theme concentrates on the 
relationship between the provisions of the VCLT and the existence of peremptory norms 
in the international legal system. The next theme is the progression of jus cogens from a 
concept that relied heavily on the VCLT to a purely autonomous one that is at the top of 
the hierarchy of international law norms. The use of jus cogens to overcome a variety of 
jurisdictional issues through universal jurisdiction is the next theme. The content, scope
6 Haas, Winter 1992, 3.
7 Haas, 1992, 3. See also Haas, Winter 1992.
8 Schachter, 1977,225-226.
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and expansion of the specific categories of norms that are peremptory are the final 
common pattern.
As shown in Chapters IV and V, evidence of the international legal community’s 
ideals and values concerning the peremptory norms of the prohibitions against piracy and 
slavery are clearly found in the international law curriculum. The first rhetorical theme is 
the status of these prohibitions as peremptory norms. The treaty basis of these norms is 
the second rhetorical theme. These prohibitions having universal jurisdiction, thus 
allowing any state to prosecute violators of these crimes, is another rhetorical theme. The 
final theme is the obligations and enforcement duties that flow from these norms.
These rhetorical themes, both those relating to jus cogens in general and the 
prohibitions on piracy and slavery, show the ideals and values of the international legal 
community. This rhetoric is one of the sources of international law under Article 38. It 
shows the one side of the discontinuity between the teachings of jurists and the custom of 
states as demonstrated by the actions of state actors.
Reality o f  State Actions
These rhetorical themes concerning the prohibitions against piracy and slavery are 
not aligned with the actions of the states. As shown in Chapter IV, pirate attacks are 
becoming more frequent and more violent.9 Given that most piracy statistics come from 
self-reporting, which has been shown to be consistently underreported by up to seventy- 
five percent, the large number of piracy incidents throughout the world is noteworthy.10 
These attacks indicate a lack of enforcement by states to prevent both at sea attacks and
9 International Maritime Bureau, 2012.
10 McNicholas, 2008, 172. See also International Maritime Bureau, 2012.
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to quash safe havens for those committing the attacks. In addition to not providing 
enforcement of this peremptory norm, when pirates are captured, they are often released 
and not prosecuted. Some states also collude with individual pirates through government 
officials, shipping offices, port administrators, and others in power. Piracy is still a 
problem throughout the world and states are failing in their duties under the mantle of jus 
cogens.
In the same fashion as piracy, the extent of slavery is also hard to pin down. As 
previously discussed in Chapter V, slavery is an illegal activity that is a low priority for 
law enforcement, thus accurate data is hard to capture.11 Slavery estimates have placed 
the number of individuals throughout the world to be 18 out of every 1000 individuals or
19up to as many as 29 million individuals. The abundance of slaves existing in the world 
today indicates that slavery remains a significant problem. Government collusion is also 
a problem because of the role of governmental corruption in facilitating the success of 
human trafficking operations.13 Slavery is similar to piracy in that states are not fulfilling 
their responsibilities under international law.
The reality of piracy and slavery indicates that not only do states not prosecute for 
these crimes, thus violating the obligations and duties bom out of the nature of 
peremptory norms, but they actively collude with pirates and human traffickers. This 
reality shows the actions of state actors, or the general practice of states, a source under 
Article 38. It shows the opposite side of the discontinuity between the two sources of 
international law or the gap between rhetoric and reality.
11 Cole, 2006, 799. See also Aronowitz, 2009, 15.
12 United States Department o f  State, 2011. See also Kara, 2009.
13 Aronowitz, 2009, 62.
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This gap between the rhetoric of the international legal community and the reality 
of state action raises a significant question within the international legal system. This gap 
is noticeable by both the actions of the states violating international law, but also by a 
lack of acknowledgement of these violations by the community of international lawyers. 
The gap between the rhetoric and reality of peremptory norms is especially instructive 
because of the special status that jus cogens holds in international law. This status of 
peremptory norms in modem day international law “implies that it outlaws not just 
conflicting treaties but also any inconsistent legal action or situations.”14 Since the 
rhetoric of these norms is so very strong, the reality of enforcement and application 
should be substantial. The existence of this gap shows that this is not the case. If the 
strongest and most robust area of the international legal system does not have alignment 
between the sources of international law as contained within Article 38, what are the 
implications of this gap?
IMPLICATIONS
A number of implications flow from lack of alignment between the different 
sources of international law. According to the international legal community, peremptory 
norms are well-established and properly functioning in the international legal system.
The reality, as seen in the actions of states, calls this into question. What are the 
implications that arise from this disconnect?
Jus cogens serves more than one purpose in the international legal system. It is 
seen as a basis for the morality of the system and the pinnacle of the hierarchy of norms, 
thus controlling other lesser norms in international law. It gives rise to state obligations
14 Orakhelashvili, 2006, 206.
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and responsibilities to the international community as a whole and to individuals. These 
norms also control state behavior by having the ability to override sovereignty.
This study concentrated on the role of jus cogens in the international legal system. 
While the main understandings of this project are limited to the role and function of these 
particular norms, some general implications can be extrapolated from this project. An 
understanding of jus cogens is necessary to comprehend international law generally, due 
to the nature of these norms and their prominence in the hierarchy of the international 
legal system. These general implications, while applying to the entire international legal 
system, must still be viewed in the context of peremptory norms.
There are also implications for the field of international relations. Since the 
international legal system is a normative system, the disconnect between the two different 
sources of peremptory norms implies effects for both examining epistemic communities 
and normative systems. The following section discusses these implications.
Implications Concentrating on Peremptory Norms
The examination has focused on the role of peremptory norms in the international 
legal system as a crucial case demonstrating the inconsistency between the sources of 
international law under Article 38. As a result of this concentration, there are 
implications from this project that do not and cannot be applied to the international legal 
system generally. These implications relate specifically to the uniqueness of peremptory 
norms.
165
The Content o f  Jus Cogens
The first implication concerns the current content of jus cogens. Since there is an 
inconsistency between the sources of international law concerning peremptory norms, 
especially the prohibitions against piracy and slavery, what is the status of these norms?
It can be argued that these norms have apparently fallen into a no-man’s land. The main 
group of individuals who have the ability and influence to point out the lack of 
enforcement, the international legal community, view this law as settled and mature, have 
thus largely looked the other way. State actors, which is the group that has the ability to 
enforce these provisions, has an interest in continuing on the current path, due to limited 
resources and a lack of apparent long-term consequences on the international stage. If 
these norms are within this no-man’s land, then do these norms still fall into the category 
of jus cogens?
The implication is that no norm is strong enough or robust enough in both its 
tenets and its application to currently fall into category of jus cogens. Under this view, a 
norm has to fulfill all the requirements to be considered peremptory. Considering that the 
two oldest and most well-established norms, the prohibitions against piracy and slavery, 
do not fulfill the requirements, the other less well-establish norms, such as the prohibition 
against torture, would probably not meet the jus cogens ’ test.
The Nature ofJus Cogens as a Category o f International Law
Given the evidence presented above, jus cogens is not the robust and strong set of 
norms as put forth by the international legal community. If these norms are not fulfilling 
the requirements of their perceived category, is there an issue with this being a separate
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category of international law? Even if this is still viable as a separate category of law, 
then the true nature of these norms should be recognized.
Jus cogens has a certain well-defined nature. These norms are characterized by a 
number of features. These features include obligations placed upon states to fulfill the 
necessary obligations, such as enforcement of the provisions of these norms; the ability to 
overcome issues of jurisdiction by having universal jurisdiction; the inability of states to 
derogate from these norms, thus overriding issues of sovereignty and state interest; and, 
being the top norms in the hierarchy of the international legal system. As seen in the 
examples of the prohibitions of piracy and slavery, the features the jus cogens nature are 
not being met by states. For instance, states are not fulfilling the necessary obligations 
that are contained with the nature of peremptory norms. Since these norms are separate 
from other norms found within the international legal system because of their nature, and 
this nature is not being fulfilled, this category of norms may be considered to be an 
illegitimate separation from other norms in international law.
Peremptory norms may be considered a separate category of law, but the 
international legal community needs to recognize that it is currently more aspirational 
than a reality. The simple naming of the norm as jus cogens does not make it a 
peremptory norm. The international legal community needs to pay more careful attention 
to these failings and determine steps that may make jus cogens more robust in reality.
The Expansion o f the Canon o f Peremptory Norms
The second implication is that the premature expansion of peremptory norms will 
both harm the category of peremptory norms by further weakening this canon of norms 
and will probably not provide the benefit being sought by adding to this category. As
167
Koskenniemi stated, “[t]he wider the laws grasp, the weaker its normative forces.”15 
Peremptory norms lose their fundamental nature due to the expansion of the category, 
thus threatening their purpose in international law.
Due to the potency of peremptory norms, it is seen by some as “even more 
difficult to prove and establish than is a usually controversial rule in customary 
international law.”16 Despite the increased difficulty in establishing new jus cogens 
principles, this does not prevent international actors from trying to expand the scope of 
jus cogens. This leads to the concept of peremptory norms being watered down. The 
more norms that are pushed into the category of jus cogens, the less strength this category 
possess. This temptation to expand also might weaken the individual norm being pushed 
into this category since jus cogens is weaker than the international legal community has 
presumed.
This push for expansion has been occurring “since the adoption of the Vienna 
Convention” as can be seen in how “literature has abounded in claims that additional
| n
international norms constitute jus cogens.” One of the most commonly considered 
norms to include in the expanded category is the prohibition of torture.18 Other possible 
peremptory norms include the prohibitions on drug trafficking, hostage taking, and 
terrorism.19 While a number of these expanded norms do shock the conscience of 
mankind, they have not necessarily reached the same level of acceptance of other areas, 
such as piracy and slavery. Attempts to expand jus cogens have been used to further state
15 Martti Koskenniemi, “The Fate o f  Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics, The 
Modern Law Review  70, no. 1 (January 2007), 1-30, 23.
16 Janis, 2003, 65.
17 Dinah Shelton, “Normative Hierarchy in International Law,” The American Journal o f  International Law 
100, no. 2 (April 2006), 291-323, 303.
18 Janis and Noyes, 24. See also Malanczuk, 568.
19 Epps, 197. See also The National Security Strategy o f  the United States o f America, September 17, 2002.
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interests by placing the label of peremptory norm on a principle. For example, some 
states have argued that jus cogens should include the “sovereignty of national resources,” 
thus remote sensing data should not be used and disseminated on a “non-discriminatory 
basis.”20
In addition to the category of jus cogens being expanded to include more specific 
issues, such as terrorism, pre-existing peremptory norms are also being expanded to 
include issues that do not fully fall into original definitions. The best example is the 
peremptory norm concerning piracy. There is a number of individuals who “misuse... 
the term” because they “want to stamp a particular act with a well-known and attention-
9 Igetting epithet.” This is seen when the illegal download of music or other media is 
labeled as “piracy.” It is being used to invoke certain duties and obligations, even though 
these duties and obligations should not be applied because there is a lack of comparative 
importance.
If a norm is found to be peremptory, then it is viewed by the international 
community of lawyers as having a value added in its invoking of duties, obligations, and 
universal jurisdiction. However, “[u]nder these circumstances, the value added by
99labeling norms as peremptory is certainly open to question.” In a system that is based 
upon words, the labels that norms receive matter. When a specific label is applied to a 
principle that does not fit the category, the special nature of the category is lost for all 
principles within this category.
20 Damrosch, Henkin, Pugh, Schachter, and Smit, 1561.
21 Gottschalk and Flanagan, 29.
22 Shelton, 305.
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Implications Concerning the Overall International Lezal System
The identified gap between the rhetoric and reality of peremptory norms implies 
that there are several issues that affect the international legal system. These are the 
logical conclusions based in the role of jus cogens in the international legal system.
The Moral Basis o f  the International Legal System
As discussed Chapter II Ju s  cogens could be considered to be a basis of morality 
in the international legal system because of the fundamental subjects that are peremptory 
norms. These norms are considered to be “already working as a host of ‘world public 
order’ standards.” These peremptory norms can also be seen as the morality of the 
international legal system because it “appears here less as this rule or that institution than 
as a placeholder for the vocabularies of justice and goodness, solidarity, responsibility 
and faith.”24 This can easily be seen in subject matters that fall into the category of jus 
cogens, such as the prohibitions against slavery and genocide. Peremptory norms are the 
basis of the normative system of international law that “provides direction for 
international relations by identifying the substantive values and goals to be pursued.”25 
Given that the effectiveness of jus cogens has been called into question by the gap 
between the rhetoric and reality of these norms, the morality of the international legal 
system may also be an issue.
Some authors claim that there is a “clear distinction between substantive rules of 
law and rules of morality, no matter how much the latter might be thought desirable or
23 Cassese, 2001. 148.
24 Koskenniemi, 2007, 30.
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necessary.”26 This statement is true in some cases, such as the prevention of the 
depletion of natural resources. Many individuals would see the protection of natural 
resources as rule of morality, but it is treated as a substantive rule under the current 
international law system. While this might be the case with certain lower level norms, 
jus cogens is a special category of principles, whose purpose is to provide moral guidance 
to the international legal system. This moral basis is called into question due to the gap 
between the rhetoric and reality of these norms.
The Stability and Strength o f the International Legal System
International law is important because it provides stability in the international 
system. When the two of highest norms of the international legal system are suffering 
from a discontinuity in its sources, this weakens the foundations of the international legal 
system. Hannikainen argues that “[t]he absence of peremptory norms would constitute at
97least a potential threat to the international legal order.” Since these norms are not 
functioning at the expected level, the implication exists that other areas of the 
international legal system are not functioning properly either. As stated by Louis Henkin, 
“[l]aw keeps international society running, contributes to order and stability, and provides 
a basis and a framework for common enterprise and mutual intercourse.” Since 
stability and strength in the international community flows from international law, the
25 Charlotte Ku and Paul F. Diehl, “International Law as Operating and Normative Systems: An Overview,” 
in Charlotte Ku and Paul F. Diehl (eds.) International Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings, (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 1-16, 7.
26 Dixon, 342.
27 Hannikainen, 726.
28 Louis Henkin, “The Politics o f  Law-Making,” in Charlotte Ku and Paul F. Diehl (eds.) International 
Law: Classic and Contemporary Readings, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998) 17-24, 18.
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failure of states to rise up to the obligations provided for by peremptory norms 
counteracts this strength.
For this stability to be maintained, both system rules, such as pacta sunt servanda, 
and normative rules, such as the right to passage on the open seas, need to be enforced by 
states. The gap between the rhetoric and reality of jus cogens, especially the lack of 
states enforcing their obligations, calls into question the enforcement of other norms. 
Since the international legal system is a self-enforcing system, this can be seen as a 
possible weakening of the strength and stability of the international legal system.
Concepts in the International Legal System Related to Jus Cogens
A number of other concepts in the international legal system are related to 
peremptory norms. Since peremptory norms are at the top of the international law 
hierarchy, if these norms are demonstrated to be a mirage, then other international norms 
can also be brought into question. These norms can be well-established, such as 
sovereignty, or they can be lesser norms, such as agreements relating to fishing stocks. 
The international legal community perpetuates the belief that jus cogens is an effective, 
but, as this project has demonstrated, this belief is misplaced.
Two norms of international law considered to be of a relative higher level that 
might be implicated by the consequences of the gap between the rhetoric and reality of 
jus cogens are pacta sunt servanda and sovereignty. Peremptory norms have the ability 
to supersede both pacta sunt servanda and sovereignty by voiding treaties that violate jus 
cogens. If a state agrees to a treaty that violates a peremptory norm, the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda, which basically means that agreements must be kept, will be 
overridden. Sovereignty can also be dominated by jus cogens because it prevents the
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unfettered actions of states to make any agreement that they deem necessary or to act 
strictly in their own best interests if in involves a situation of peremptory norms. 
Orakhelashvilli stated that “[t]he purpose of jus cogens is to safeguard the predominant 
and overriding interests of the international community as a whole as distinct from the 
interests of individual states.
If peremptory norms are not properly functioning, as demonstrated by the 
examples of the prohibitions against piracy and slavery, then their other functions, such 
as providing limits on state behavior are also uncertain. If these higher ranking norms do 
not have the limitations of jus cogens upon them, the violations can continue, which 
provides a further glitch in the functioning o f the international legal system as it is 
viewed by the epistemic community of international lawyers.
Lesser norms are also affected by the questionable effectiveness and strength of 
jus cogens. Given that the gap indicates issues with the strongest and most robust 
principles in international law, the enforcement of lesser principles can naturally be 
called into question. When the fundamental norms that are intended to prevent piracy 
and slavery are not being upheld by state actors, it stands to reason that lesser norms will 
also be ignored by these actors, since the basis of the lesser norms is not as deep-seated in 
the international legal system. Rules that are formed merely on negotiated treaties or 
only have a basis in general customary law do not have as strong of a base as jus cogens. 
However, the core tenets of the peremptory norms cannon, which have their basis in 
history, treaty law and the teachings of the epistemic community, are not being 
adequately enforced in the international legal system. This failure of enforcement casts 
doubt upon the enforcement of these lesser rules.
29 Orakhelashvilli, 2006,46.
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The Purpose o f the International Legal System
The role of international law “plays in world affairs -  political, economic, social, 
and humanitarian -  has never been greater.”30 Despite this increased role, the purpose of 
the international legal system is being subverted by the lack of effectiveness of 
peremptory norms. The system has “aims of.. .specific prevention, maintain public 
confidence in the legal system, the settlement of conflicts, and demonstrating solidarity 
with the victims.”31 The international legal system is meant to provide proscription and 
prediction of behavior. If states are not living up to their responsibilities concerning the 
strongest and most robust norms, what about lesser norms in the international system?
Put another way, how can the international legal system be relied upon predictive or 
proscriptive information if the norms that are at the top of the hierarchy are not being 
supported by international actors?
The gap between rhetoric and reality of peremptory norms affects the 
predictability of the international legal system. When the most fundamental norms of a 
system are not effective as intended, the ability for other norms of the system to be 
effective in a predictable manner is dubious. The international legal system is meant to 
provide a framework for behavior of international actors and individuals. However, 
when the most fundamental norms of this system are not being implemented, the 
behavior of international actors and individuals cannot necessarily be predicted.
The proscriptive nature of the international legal system is also called into 
question by the existence of the gap between rhetoric and reality of jus cogens.
30 Janis, 2003, 8.
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International actors have a duty to protect the interests of “the whole world community,” 
especially when “protecting such fundamental values as peace, human rights, or self- 
determination of people.” While it can be argued that “there is no particular merit 
inherent in complete compliance with the law,” the law does have to have enough 
“compliance to enable civilized social life to proceed” and “to satisfy the basic demands 
of justice.”33 In other words, ifjus cogens is not being enforced to meet the basic 
demands of justice, then the proscriptive nature of the international legal system is not 
being satisfied.
If the top of the hierarchy of international law is not being enforced, states may 
not be motivated to enforce lesser norms. The lack of enforcement could negatively 
affect the predictive and proscriptive nature of the international law system because there 
would be a deficiency of purpose of the system to indicate future behavior of 
international actors and individuals.
Implications for International Relations Theory
The epistemic community of international lawyers have a constructed world view. 
This view is seen in the rhetoric contained in international legal textbooks as 
demonstrated in Chapter III. The epistemic community literature would expect the 
international legal community to exercise power over agendas, policies, and the general 
field. The gap between the rhetoric and reality of peremptory norms concerning the 
prohibitions of piracy and slavery shows that it is not as powerful. This lack of power is
31 Peer Stolle and Tobins Singelnstein, “On Aims and Actual Consequences of International Prosecution of 
Human Rights Crimes,” in Wolfgang Kalkeck, Michael Ratner, Tobins Singelnstein and Peter Weiss (eds.), 
International Prosecution o f  Human Rights Crimes, (New York: Springer, 2007), 37-54, 47.
32 Cassese, 2005, 262.
33 Lowe, 33.
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seen in the disconnect between the actions of states and the rhetoric perpetuated by the 
epistemic community.
Amongst many international relations scholars, the international legal system is 
viewed as a paragon of normative systems. It is a normative structure that is believed to 
significantly influence state behavior as discussed in Chapters I and III. The case of the 
core concepts of jus cogens, the prohibitions of piracy and slavery, are considered the 
strongest and most robust, but the influence of international law on the actions of states is 
surprisingly weak. This indicates that the mere existence of norms or a normative system 
does not necessarily have the extensive power to modify behavior of state actors.
Both of these observations call into question the usefulness of relying on 
normative analysis to explain state behavior. While the value of studying normative 
aspects of international relations is not completely discounted, caution should be applied 
so international relations theorists do not follow the international legal community down 
the rabbit hole of assuming the power of normative systems.
CONCLUSION
An understanding of the international legal system, in particular, jus cogens, is 
demonstrated throughout this study. The following discusses the implications of this 
understanding. By looking at the international legal system using crucial case 
methodology through the lens of the international legal community, insights that are not 
prevalent in the current literature are found. To determine these insights, this project has 
looked at the inconsistency between the sources identified in Article 38 concerning 
peremptory norms, specifically the prohibitions against piracy and slavery. These two 
norms where chosen because of their well-established history as both part of international
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law, and in particular, as jus cogens. The inconsistency of international law sources is 
demonstrated by the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of these jus cogens norms.
This chapter highlights the implications of this gap. These implications relate 
both to jus cogens and to the broader international legal system as it relates to peremptory 
norms. The borders of the category of peremptory norms are not as well-defined as 
indicated by the rhetoric because the content is uncertain in reality. The nature of this 
category of norms is questionable because of the lack of robustness in reality of jus 
cogens. The rhetoric of the international legal community is also attempting to expand 
this category which diminishes the norms that already are categorized as peremptory and 
does not provide the support being sought by designating a norm as jus cogens.
Implications are also evident in the broader international legal system. The 
disconnect between the rhetoric and reality of peremptory norms has far reaching 
implications. Since peremptory norms are considered to be the morality of the 
international legal system, their lack of success calls this base into question. The stability 
and strength of the system could be considered undermined since the strongest norms are 
not fulfilling their rhetorical promises. Another implication involves related legal 
concepts. When peremptory norms are not being upheld, there may be a lack incentive to 
uphold lesser norms that do not have established and extensive foundation. The purpose 
of the international legal system is to proscribe and predict the behavior of those within 
the system. This purpose is undermined when those norms that are peremptory in nature 
are not being realized.
Implications for the field of international relations are also shown by the gap 
between the sources of peremptory norms. This project has shown that care must be
177
given to the use of normative systems when examining state behavior. The mere 
existence of norms, even those norms often considered the strongest and most robust, as 
in this case, does not necessarily impact state behavior.
Overall, these implications show that the rhetoric/reality gap is both significant to 
understanding the normative system of international law and to highlight the importance 
of taking care when following the viewpoint of an epistemic community.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS, POLICY ISSUES, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This study examined the crucial case of peremptory norms in the international 
legal system, in particular, the core tenets prohibiting piracy and slavery. The 
discontinuity between the Article 38 sources concerning peremptory norms highlights an 
inconsistency between the epistemic community of lawyers and state actors. The 
international legal community’s ideals and values result in rhetorical support for 
peremptory norms as being the strongest and most robust norms in the international legal 
system. The actions of states concerning these norms are significantly different, thus 
creating a gap between these sources. This analysis results in a number of final general 
conclusions, a variety of possible policy issues and areas of future research to further the 
understanding of this area of international legal inquiry.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing examination has provided reliable evidence that the norms 
considered to be the strongest and most robust are surprisingly not that strong or that 
robust. The inconsistency between the Article 38 sources of international law as 
manifested as the gap between the rhetoric and the reality of peremptory norms 
demonstrates that jus cogens is not the robust and more of an empty shirt. This state of 
peremptory norms creates a number of implications for these norms and the general 
international law system as it relates to these norms.
The international legal community seems to be out of touch with the real-world 
status of the prohibitions against piracy and slavery. The lack of acknowledgement
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concerning the pervasiveness of piracy and slavery around the world is seen in the 
international legal community’s view of these prohibitions as settled law. While some 
members of the this community tip their hat to possible issues of enforcement, the 
concentration in the written record, international legal textbooks, still refers to these 
issues as settled with a clear expectation that prosecution barriers, such as jurisdiction, 
have been removed.
International law appears to rest between the body of case materials and the actual 
rules of the international legal system. International law is a different system than 
domestic law. It is important for supporters of international law to not oversell the 
international legal system. The international system does not have a separate 
enforcement arm of government. It is a self-enforcing system where enforcement can be 
overridden by the interests of states. This is not to say that international law is 
unimportant, it is merely to emphasize the need to be cautious when discussing the power 
of the international legal system.
POLICY ISSUES ARISING FROM THE RHETORIC/REALITY GAP
International law has the potential to be a strong tool to combat the scourge of 
problems, such as piracy and slavery, but how can this be accomplished? Below a 
number of policy concerns are identified that address the problem of closing the gap 
between the rhetoric and the reality of jus cogens.
The policy questions that arise from this gap begin with the attempt to align the 
sources of international law. The occurrence of this shift would have to be accompanied 
by a greater understanding of jus cogens and not a mere acceptance that views its 
existence as enough to create the necessary reality. The next policy question goes to the
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heart of the most recent shift in jus cogens theory and rhetoric. The shift is seen in the 
continuous increase in attempts to expand the boundaries of jus cogens. By expanding 
the boundaries of jus cogens this concept is both weakened, in general, as aspects that are 
included do not necessarily fit the level of peremptory norms and weakened by the 
growing gap between rhetoric and reality in the international arena. This expansion 
problem also is an issue from the other direction. If jus cogens is not an effective 
principle in international law, by pushing other issues into this mold, the usefulness of the 
prohibitions and guiding tenets may also be diminished. The third policy question relates 
to the international legal community and the teaching of the future generations. The only 
way to have successful change is to interrupt the continuity of rhetoric that permeates the 
current international legal curriculum. The final policy question involves the financial 
issues surrounding the enforcement of the prohibitions of piracy and slavery.
Better Alignment Between the Sources o f  International Law
To enforce the laws that fall into the category of peremptory norms, a better 
alignment is needed for the Article 38 sources. If this occurs, then the inconsistencies 
that call into question the nature of jus cogens and its core tenets will no longer exist. In 
the realm of policy, the alignment should occur from a shift in the states’ inability or lack 
of enforcement of these norms.
States failed to rise to the obligations and responsibilities of peremptory norms. 
This failure has manifested into a failure of international law. The law needs to find a 
way to be relevant again. The best method for this to occur is for states to start fulfilling 
their obligations under these universal norms. Not only will that protect the victims of
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these heinous crimes, but it will align the pinnacle of the international legal system. In 
order for this to occur, the international legal community must recognize this gap.
Jus Cosens Expansion
The arguments for including more subject in the canon of jus cogens is based 
upon a misconception that norms in this category are enforced by the international 
community and that the rhetoric of these norms imparts increased authority into the 
subject matter. While the temptation to include a variety of issues in this category of 
norms can be overwhelming, it should be resisted. The efforts to make more norms jus 
cogens will only further weaken the category of peremptory norms. It is not an effective 
method of ensuring enforcement. If all norms are eventually considered peremptory, then 
the purpose of providing a separate category is negated, thus abolishing the category of 
jus cogens. This desire to force norms into the category of jus cogens underscores power 
of labels and words. A good example of this is the expanding use of the word “piracy” to 
describe copyright violations of music, movies, or software.
Arguments for expanding the category of jus cogens, such as forcing enforcement 
obligations upon states, might be used to be twisted around if these laws are important 
and should be observed. Other areas of international law have been more successfully 
enforced then peremptory norms, and these laws may serve as a model for future actions 
in the areas traditionally reserved to jus cogens.
The International Leeal Community and Teaching
The education of future generations of the international legal community relies on 
a standardized teaching method and a coherent and consistent pedagogical approach.
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This method is based upon the precedent of past generations and established case law and 
materials. The international community of lawyers perpetuate the continued flawed 
functioning of the system through teaching new generations that peremptory norms are 
settled law that has developed from both treaty law and customary law. These lawyers 
rarely address the practical application of jus cogens, thus continuing the viewpoint that 
these are not issues that need to be addressed in legal instruction. In other words, the 
international community of lawyers typically does not examine the lack of functionality 
of these norms, they simply espouse their existence in international law. This lack of 
acceptance of reality demonstrates that the international community of lawyers appears to 
be operating under different assumptions than state actors.
To change the epistemic community, the teaching methods and the overriding 
ideals and values need to be reexamined and changed to encompass the lack of practical 
effectiveness of the rhetoric of this community. This policy shift in the international 
legal community’s method of knowledge transfer to subsequent generations of 
international law practitioners will increase the general understanding of the international 
legal system and should lead to possible solutions.
Financial Policy Issues Concerning Piracy and Slavery
Economics will probably determine a change, if any, in state behavior toward the 
prohibitions against piracy and slavery. Those participating in these illegal activities will 




The enforcement of the prohibitions against piracy and slavery are expensive 
propositions in terms of both financial resources and political capital. It takes away 
limited military or law enforcement resources, if they are not participating in the illegal 
activity. In addition to the cost of the catching the pirates, “overseeing prosecutions is 
costly and logistically challenging.”2 Slavery investigations are costly and complicated 
that draw funding away from other opportunities.
Local populaces also benefit from piracy and slavery. Beyond pirates and 
traffickers, the economic benefits are observable. A variety of business, such as “farms, 
factories, restaurants, and other legitimate businesses,” benefit from the money being 
spent by those participating in these illegal activities.3 Populations even benefit from the 
services of slaves being provided to take care of their wants and need and thus argue 
against a change in the status quo.
The lack of enforcement of these prohibitions also has a cost. For example, in the 
case of piracy, the costs can be measure in both economic costs and human costs. Piracy 
increases the cost of commerce. When cargoes are stolen or delayed, there is a resulting 
cost. It can also raise the cost of shipping goods due to the increase of the cost of 
insurance, security measures, and shipping route changes. The cost of insurance has 
significantly increased as underwriters change how policies are written to reflect war-risk
2 Elizabeth Anderson, Benjamin Brockman-Hawe, and Patricia Goog, Suppressing Maritime Piracy: 
Exploring the Options in International Law, American Society o f  International Law, Academic Council on 
the United Nations System and One Earth Future Foundation, Workshop Report from October 16-17, 2009, 
8 found at http://www.asil.org/files/suppressing-maritime-piracy.pdf.
3 Aronowitz, 63.
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levels and additional premiums for high-risk shipping routes.4 Piracy, even if under 
reported, cost at least $60m-70m in 2008 just in relation to Somali.5
Piracy can also create international security problems. The human toll goes 
beyond the cost of human lives to the individual seafarer. A decrease in safety and 
security of high seas and shipping corridors can occur when pirates take over vessels. 
They may not be properly trained to maneuver the ships, especially in chokepoint areas, 
which could lead to a grounding or other environmental threat, such as a fuel spill. There 
is a loss of control of weapons and munitions to pirates, who are by definition using them 
for violent activity, thus decreasing security. Since military resources are finite, using 
these resources to combat piracy decreases their availability for other missions. Just to 
successfully protect the merchant vessels sailing only near the Horn of Africa, an increase 
of at least forty ships to the recent twenty in the international antipiracy task force would 
be needed.6
Hopefully there will be a tipping point, when the lack of enforcement of these 
peremptory norms is more costly to states then the current lax of enforcement. This 
tipping point could be measured in not only a cost-benefit determination based simply on 
straight balance sheets, but could also account for broader costs. These broader costs 
could include the erosion of international law and the stability of the international legal 
system or the human toll that cannot necessarily be reduced to simple dollars and cents.
If these broader costs are included in a more inclusive accounting, states might see the
4 Zack Phillips, “Marine Insurers Transfer Piracy Risks to War Cover,” Business Insurance, March 30, 
2009.
5 BBC News, “Q&A: Somali Piracy,” January 1, 2009.
6 Mark Hosenball, “The Danger o f  Escalation,” Newsweek, April 29, 2009, 6.
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importance of committing financial resources to battling piracy and slavery more 
aggressively.
Possible Lone-Term Consequences
There are two legal shifts being proposed by the international legal community 
and other international actors, which could have long-term consequences if the legal 
theories being perpetuated come to fruition. These theories argue for enhanced action on 
the part of the state to allow for more prosecutions by increasing state responsibility and 
decreasing immunity protections from prosecution.
While this project has shown that the strength and robustness of peremptory 
norms does not guarantee the actions of states, these norms have given rise to calls for 
higher levels of responsibility by the international community of states as a whole. There 
has been a movement since the World Summit in 2005, which provides for a “formalized 
notion that when a state proves unable or unwilling to protect its people, and crimes 
against humanity are perpetrated, the international community has an obligation to 
intervene -  if necessary, and as a last resort, with military force.”7 While this duty has 
not yet been fully tested, the concept, known as “responsibility to protect” or R2P, calls 
for an increase in the acceptance of duties and responsibilities that the international 
community is being charged with in the case of peremptory norms, specifically crimes 
against humanity.
It has been argued that the violation of a jus cogens norm provides the ability to 
overcome the immunity provided to heads of state under the guise of universal 
jurisdiction, but this has been a minority viewpoint in relation to cases that have been
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pursued, such as Pinochet.8 Nevertheless, some authors concentrate on how “a state,” not 
an individual head of state, “waives its right to sovereign immunity when it transgresses a 
jus cogens norm” by discussing the Hugo Princz v. Federal Republic o f Germany.”9
These possible shifts in legal theory will probably still suffer from the same issues 
as the current enforcement regimes. However, this does show that there may be hope for 
the future.
FUTURE RESEARCH
There are four areas of future research that could develop from this study and 
move it in different directions and toward new horizons. These areas emerge from the 
parameters of this project. Other questions and issues arise from the determinations of 
this examination, but were not included to the scope of the current study.
The first area of future research is to examine an historical cross-culture survey of 
concept similar to peremptory norms in non-Westem traditions. While this project 
examined only the use of Western concepts due to the current concentration in the 
international legal system, it is by no means the only worldwide legal tradition. This type 
of cross-cultural analysis may provide insight into the possible solutions for the current 
international system.
The interaction between the increased level of globalization and grass-roots 
movement on the rhetoric of the international legal system is another area of future 
research. The increase of grass roots movements through the use of modem tools, such 
as social networking, and more traditional methods, such as non-governmental
7 Roger Cohen, “A Change to Believe In,” The New York Times, February 21,2008.
8 Dixon, McCorquodale, and Williams, 2010, 334.
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organizations, may influence the dialogue of the community of international lawyers or 
the actions of states. These outside factors may have an influence upon the rhetoric of 
the epistemic community or even upon the ideals and values of the community members. 
Actions of states may also be influenced by the increase in the access to information by 
individuals.
A third area is to determine if a general increase in enforcement or if a different 
legal regime would influence the actions of states. This would require a different method 
of analyzing the information provided in both this project and possible world changes, 
but it could provide insight into what is needed to change the current international legal 
system to effectively enforce the rights of individuals around the world.
The final area of future research that arises from this project is to look at the 
punishment aspects of these international crimes. Very few prosecutions of international 
crimes occur as seen throughout this project, but an examination of the punishments 
given to violators will provide further insight into the international legal system. These 
are extraordinary violations of international law. Are the current punishments also 
extraordinary? Should these punishments be extraordinary? The behavior of the future 
criminal does not appear to be deterred, would stricter punishments, even with fewer 
prosecutions, be enough to deter the behavior of international criminals.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing study provided insight into how peremptory norms in the 
international legal system are affected by the disconnect between the international 
community of lawyers and international actors. There are both policy issues and
9 Reisman, Arsanjani, Wiesner, and Westerman, 536-537.
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implications that flow from this inconsistency in the sources of international law under 
Article 38. By showing the effects of the gap between rhetoric and reality of jus cogens, 
new understandings into this area of literature have been discovered.
The issues that have risen from this project will continue to be problematic unless 
there are changes. This will create long-term consequences to the international legal 
system. This will be increasingly highlighted as globalization increases and the action of 
one international actor greatly influences and affects a larger portion of the world’s 
population, not even necessarily the citizens of that state. Overall, this is one area of 
international law that cannot be ignored for the sake of both the victims of these 
international crimes and all members of the world.
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APPENDIX
The textbooks were selected based upon popularity on internet book purchasing 
sites. This method was used to incorporate both the first-hand market and the second­
hand market popularity for international legal textbooks. The top book purchasing sites 
were found by doing a Google search with the keywords “law textbooks bookstore.” 
First, a search for the top eleven sites for book purchasing based on a Google 
search for keywords “law textbooks” was conducted. The following sites were used to 
determine the textbooks that will be used to demonstrate the rhetoric of the international 












Second, the individual textbooks that appeared on at least four sites and 
concentrated on either “general international law” or “public international law” as the 
subject-matter were chosen to form a list of the top textbooks. The following list 
provides the top textbooks should supply sufficient evidence of the rhetoric of the 
epistemic community of lawyers and the number of websites that they are found upon. 
The following is an alphabetical list of the textbooks used for this project:
• Akehurst’s Modem Introduction to International Law, Peter Malanczuk, 1997 (6)
• An Introduction to International Law, Mark Janis, 2003 (7)
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• Cases and Materials on International Law, Martin Dixon and Robert 
McCorquodale, 2003 (4)
• Emanuel Law Outlines: International Law, Linda Malone, 2008 (7)
• Fundamental Perspectives on International Law, William Slomanson, 2006 (4)
• Handbook of International Law, Anthony Aust, 2005 (4)
• International Law, Mark Janis, 2008 (6)
• International Law, Antonio Cassese, 2005 (6)
• International Law, Malcolm N. Shaw, 2003 (5)
• International Law, Vaughan Lowe, 2007 (5)
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• Understanding International Law, Stephen C. McCaffrey, 2006 (4)
The year of publication is included and the number of websites that list the textbook is 




Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia 
Doctor of Philosophy, Spring 2013
Tulane University, School of Law, New Orleans, Louisiana 
Juris Doctor, Spring 2002
University of Central Missouri, Warrensburg, Missouri 
Bachelor of Science, Political Science, Spring 1999 
Bachelor of Arts, Economics, Spring 1999
HONORS
Old Dominion University Doctoral Fellowship 
University of Central Missouri Regents Scholarship 
University of Central Missouri Honors Program Scholarships 
Tulane Law School Best Editor, Journal o f  American Arbitration 
Pi Sigma Alpha Honor Society 
Alpha Phi Sigma Honor Society
Leadership Achievement for Outstanding Service and Commitment 
Zeta Tau Alpha Sister of the Year
SELECTED EMPLOYMENT
Comprehensive Civil-Military Legal Overview, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
Norfolk, Virginia
Legal Knowledge Manager, November 2010 -  March 2012
Office of Graduate Studies, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia 
Graduate Assistant, August 2009-May 2010
Center for Regional and Global Study, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia 
Graduate Assistant, August 2003 -  May 2006
SELECTED PRESENTATIONS
Old Dominion University 5th Graduate Research Conference: Conflict and the 
Environment
National Social Science Association Annual Conference: Refugee Policy and Audience 
Costs: An Examination o f the Pacific Solution and Audience Costs in Australia 
International Studies Association -  South Conference: Working Paper: Transnational 
Criminal Organizations and Legitimacy in the Andean Region 
Missouri Academy of Science: Working Paper: Examining the Effects o f Internal 
Pressures on the Legislature o f Bill Passage
